【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長期激勵(lì)機(jī)制,在國外已得到廣泛運(yùn)用,它有助于解決委托代理問題所產(chǎn)生的利益不一致問題,即股東通過向經(jīng)理人授予股權(quán)或期權(quán),將經(jīng)理人與股東利益長期捆綁,同時(shí)實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化和股東財(cái)富最大化。企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)動(dòng)機(jī)有很多,它能夠激勵(lì)員工努力工作,為企業(yè)創(chuàng)造更多的財(cái)富,又能提高企業(yè)的業(yè)績,留住核心員工。同時(shí),企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的方式也有所區(qū)別,如股票期權(quán)、限制性股票等等。由于不同激勵(lì)方式的適用條件限制及上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和治理結(jié)構(gòu)等方面的原因,不同的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。任何制度都有其雙面性,股權(quán)激勵(lì)也一樣,它猶如一把雙刃劍,使用恰當(dāng)可以使管理層與股東的利益實(shí)現(xiàn)最大化,而使用不當(dāng)則有可能使股東遭受巨大損失。定增式股權(quán)激勵(lì)是近年來新出現(xiàn)的一種股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式,深入研究其所產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果,即其對股價(jià)和企業(yè)業(yè)績的正面效應(yīng),以及可能帶來的利益輸送等不良影響,可以為我國企業(yè)采用定增式股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供參考,同時(shí)對上市公司激勵(lì)方案的優(yōu)化具有借鑒意義。本文以浙江龍盛實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的動(dòng)機(jī)為背景,結(jié)合股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)理論和浙江龍盛的實(shí)際情況,通過財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)指標(biāo)來分析股權(quán)激勵(lì)對企業(yè)業(yè)績及股價(jià)的影響,并結(jié)合定增式股權(quán)激勵(lì)的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)對其所產(chǎn)生的利益輸送的后果進(jìn)行分析,針對研究結(jié)論提出建議。通過研究,得出以下研究結(jié)論:浙江龍盛實(shí)施定增式股權(quán)激勵(lì)提高了企業(yè)的經(jīng)營業(yè)績,并使股價(jià)在短時(shí)期內(nèi)得到快速的提高;但是由于我國股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)的制度和政策的不完善,導(dǎo)致浙江龍盛實(shí)施定增式股權(quán)激勵(lì)產(chǎn)生了利益輸送的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果,主要體現(xiàn)在企業(yè)實(shí)施定向增發(fā)方案之后高額的股利分紅以及經(jīng)營業(yè)績短暫上升后的下降,為大股東謀取利益提供了方便,最終侵害的是中小股東的利益。基于以上分析,本文提出如下建議:對非公開發(fā)行股票的目的進(jìn)行審核、完善上市公司的信息披露機(jī)制、完善監(jiān)督機(jī)制維護(hù)中小股東利益、健全資本市場的市場約束機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive has been widely used in foreign countries. It helps to solve the problem of inconsistent interests arising from the principal-agent problem, that is, shareholders grant equity or options to managers. The interests of managers and shareholders are tied together for a long time, and the maximization of enterprise value and shareholder wealth is realized at the same time. There are many motivations for enterprises to implement equity incentives, which can encourage employees to work hard, create more wealth for enterprises, improve the performance of enterprises, and retain core staff. At the same time, there are some differences in the way of equity incentive, such as stock option, restricted stock and so on. Due to the limitation of the applicable conditions of different incentive modes and the reasons of equity structure and governance structure of listed companies, different ways of equity incentive may have different economic consequences. Any system has its dual character, and so is the equity incentive. It is like a double-edged sword, which can maximize the benefits of management and shareholders, while improper use may make shareholders suffer huge losses. The fixed increase equity incentive is a new kind of equity incentive in recent years. The economic consequences of it are studied in depth, that is, the positive effect on the stock price and enterprise performance, and the possible adverse effects, such as the transmission of benefits, etc. It can be used as a reference for Chinese enterprises to adopt fixed increase equity incentive scheme and to optimize the incentive scheme of listed companies. Based on the motivation of equity incentive in Longsheng, Zhejiang, combining the relevant theory of equity incentive and the actual situation of stock right incentive in Zhejiang, this paper analyzes the influence of equity incentive on enterprise performance and stock price through financial accounting indicators. Combined with the advantages and disadvantages of fixed increase equity incentive, this paper analyzes the consequences of interest transmission, and puts forward some suggestions on the research conclusions. Through the research, the following conclusions are drawn: Zhejiang Longsheng implementation of fixed increase equity incentive to improve the business performance, and the stock price in a short period of time to get a rapid increase; However, due to the imperfect systems and policies related to equity incentive in China, the implementation of fixed increase equity incentive in Longsheng, Zhejiang Province, has resulted in the economic consequences of interest transmission. It is mainly reflected in the high dividends after the implementation of the targeted issuance scheme and the decline after the brief increase in the operating performance, which provides convenience for the large shareholders to seek benefits, and ultimately infringes the interests of the minority shareholders. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: to audit the purpose of non-public issuance of stocks, to perfect the information disclosure mechanism of listed companies, to improve the supervision mechanism to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders, and to perfect the market restraint mechanism of the capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92

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