【摘要】：隨著整個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的主導(dǎo)權(quán)逐漸由上游廠商向下游廠商轉(zhuǎn)移,下游廠商對(duì)市場(chǎng)控制能力不斷上升,所具有的討價(jià)還價(jià)能力也不斷增強(qiáng),進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致上游廠商對(duì)中間品實(shí)行區(qū)別定價(jià),并對(duì)下游弱勢(shì)廠商產(chǎn)生"水床效應(yīng)"。本文以上游壟斷-下游寡頭的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)為基準(zhǔn),在上下游廠商都具有一定討價(jià)還價(jià)能力的情形下分析中間品區(qū)別定價(jià)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)。結(jié)果表明,當(dāng)上游廠商選擇討價(jià)還價(jià)能力強(qiáng)的下游廠商進(jìn)行統(tǒng)一定價(jià)協(xié)商時(shí),統(tǒng)一定價(jià)時(shí)的消費(fèi)者福利高于區(qū)別定價(jià)情形;當(dāng)上游廠商選擇討價(jià)還價(jià)能力弱的下游廠商進(jìn)行統(tǒng)一定價(jià)協(xié)商時(shí),統(tǒng)一定價(jià)時(shí)的消費(fèi)者福利低于區(qū)別定價(jià)情形;不論上游廠商選擇強(qiáng)勢(shì)或弱勢(shì)下游廠商進(jìn)行價(jià)格協(xié)商,統(tǒng)一定價(jià)時(shí)下游廠商的利潤(rùn)和社會(huì)總福利總是高于區(qū)別定價(jià)情形。因此,對(duì)中間品區(qū)別定價(jià)行為的反壟斷規(guī)制應(yīng)考慮到上下游廠商的討價(jià)還價(jià)能力,應(yīng)將"市場(chǎng)支配地位"標(biāo)準(zhǔn)延伸至"相對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)優(yōu)勢(shì)"。
[Abstract]:As the leading power of the whole industry chain is gradually transferred from the upstream manufacturer to the downstream firm, the downstream manufacturer's ability to control the market is constantly rising, and the bargaining power of the downstream manufacturer is also continuously enhanced, which leads to the upstream manufacturer to carry out the differentiated pricing of the intermediate goods. And to the downstream weak manufacturer produces "the water bed effect". Based on the market structure of upstream monopoly and downstream oligopoly, this paper analyzes the competitive effect of intermediate differential pricing under the condition that upstream and downstream firms have a certain bargaining power. The results show that when upstream firms choose downstream firms with strong bargaining power to negotiate unified pricing, consumers' welfare is higher than differential pricing. When upstream firms choose downstream firms with weak bargaining power to negotiate unified pricing, consumers' welfare is lower than differential pricing when unified pricing; whether upstream firms choose strong or weak downstream firms to negotiate prices, The profits and total social welfare of downstream firms are always higher than those of differential pricing. Therefore, the antitrust regulation of differentiated pricing of intermediate products should take into account the bargaining power of upstream and downstream firms, and extend the criterion of "market dominant position" to "relative economic advantage".
【作者單位】： 湖南農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;肇慶學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社科基金青年項(xiàng)目,項(xiàng)目編號(hào):15CJY001 湖南省社科基金項(xiàng)目,項(xiàng)目編號(hào):14YBA203 湖南省教育廳優(yōu)秀青年項(xiàng)目資助 湖南省社科成果評(píng)審委員會(huì)課題,項(xiàng)目編號(hào):XSP17YBZC086
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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