【摘要】：國有企業(yè)高管薪酬管制已是我國政府在收入分配領(lǐng)域的制度安排之一,但政策效果缺乏明確與統(tǒng)一的結(jié)論。本文基于不完全契約理論構(gòu)建了一個政府與高管薪酬談判的動態(tài)博弈模型,探討了薪酬管制下實現(xiàn)高管有效激勵的契約選擇。在此基礎(chǔ)上,借助2009年"限薪令"的實施作為薪酬管制的準(zhǔn)自然實驗,運用PSM-DID方法實證檢驗了限薪政策的干預(yù)效果。本研究發(fā)現(xiàn),"限薪令"沒有降低國有企業(yè)高管貨幣薪酬,但是有效減緩了貨幣薪酬的增長幅度,職工工資沒有受到"限薪令"的影響;"限薪令"出臺后地方國有企業(yè)在職消費顯著增加,中央企業(yè)在職消費增加不明顯。進(jìn)一步探究限薪對高管與職工努力的影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)薪酬管制減少了企業(yè)過度投資、提高了全要素生產(chǎn)率,對高管和職工分別起到正向的規(guī)范效應(yīng)和激勵效應(yīng)。本文的結(jié)論表明:薪酬管制約束了高管貨幣薪酬激勵機(jī)制,在職消費可能成為地方國有企業(yè)高管獲得隱性薪酬的替代性選擇。因此,進(jìn)行國有企業(yè)分類化管理、拓寬高管激勵方式是國有企業(yè)高管薪酬治理的長效機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:The regulation of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises is one of the institutional arrangements in the field of income distribution of our government, but the effect of the policy lacks a clear and unified conclusion. Based on incomplete contract theory, this paper constructs a dynamic game model of executive compensation negotiation between government and executive, and discusses the choice of contract to realize executive effective incentive under compensation control. On this basis, with the implementation of the "pay restriction order" in 2009 as a quasi-natural experiment of salary control, this paper empirically tests the intervention effect of the wage restriction policy by using the PSM-DID method. This study found that the "pay restriction order" did not reduce the monetary compensation of executives in state-owned enterprises, but effectively slowed down the increase of monetary compensation. Employees' wages were not affected by the "wage restriction order"; after the "wage restriction order" was issued, the in-service consumption of local state-owned enterprises increased significantly, while the in-service consumption of central enterprises did not increase significantly. Further explore the effect of salary restriction on the efforts of executives and staff, found that compensation control reduces the overinvestment of enterprises, improves the total factor productivity, and plays a positive normative effect and incentive effect on executives and employees respectively. The conclusion of this paper is as follows: the compensation regulation constrains the monetary incentive mechanism of the executive, and the in-service consumption may become the alternative choice for the local state-owned enterprise executives to obtain the implicit compensation. Therefore, it is the long-term mechanism of the executive compensation governance of state-owned enterprises to carry out classified management of state-owned enterprises and broaden the ways of executive incentive.
【作者單位】： 西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)財政稅務(wù)學(xué)院;武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社科基金重大項目(15ZDB158) 國家自然科學(xué)基金面上項目(71573194)的資助
【分類號】：F272.92

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本文編號：2176942