【摘要】：財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告反映上市公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況及財(cái)務(wù)狀況,由于管理層薪酬往往依業(yè)績(jī)而定,管理層為了自身利益的實(shí)現(xiàn)可能會(huì)暗箱操作,妨礙財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告正常生成以達(dá)到粉飾報(bào)表的目的,這顯然會(huì)降低公司盈余質(zhì)量,從而不可避免地會(huì)侵害股東利益。改善公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu),增強(qiáng)對(duì)管理層的監(jiān)督約束可以有效改善這一狀況。為了達(dá)到這一目的,我國(guó)于2001年頒布了《關(guān)于在上市公司建立獨(dú)立董事制度的指導(dǎo)意見(jiàn)》,以期獨(dú)立董事可以在公司治理中發(fā)揮作用,監(jiān)督約束管理層的行為。然而,自獨(dú)立董事設(shè)立以來(lái),其治理作用備受實(shí)務(wù)界和理論界的爭(zhēng)議。隨著社會(huì)關(guān)系理論的興起,學(xué)者們開(kāi)始用人與人之間的網(wǎng)絡(luò)關(guān)系特征替代個(gè)人屬性特征進(jìn)行研究。因此,本文通過(guò)獨(dú)立董事兼任構(gòu)建社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)關(guān)系,以獨(dú)立董事在兼任網(wǎng)絡(luò)中所處的位置衡量其治理能力,考察獨(dú)立董事治理能力對(duì)上市公司盈余質(zhì)量的影響。同時(shí),考慮到信息的異質(zhì)性,我們加入了網(wǎng)絡(luò)約束系數(shù)指標(biāo),以獨(dú)立董事占據(jù)的結(jié)構(gòu)洞數(shù)量衡量其在網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的中介作用�；谖覈�(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)眾多的現(xiàn)實(shí)背景,我們又將上市公司按照產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的不同劃分為國(guó)有企業(yè)與非國(guó)有企業(yè),研究產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的異質(zhì)性是否會(huì)對(duì)獨(dú)立董事的治理作用產(chǎn)生影響。進(jìn)一步地,考慮到獨(dú)立董事兼任上市公司數(shù)量不能超過(guò)五家的政策要求,我們?cè)噲D探索獨(dú)立董事兼任政策的合理性,以期找到是否存在最優(yōu)獨(dú)立董事兼任數(shù)量這一謎題的答案。經(jīng)過(guò)理論分析與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),本文發(fā)現(xiàn)獨(dú)立董事的網(wǎng)絡(luò)位置對(duì)盈余質(zhì)量存在正向影響。處于網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心位置的獨(dú)立董事,其信息優(yōu)勢(shì)、知識(shí)優(yōu)勢(shì)、聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)、監(jiān)督的意愿與動(dòng)機(jī)明顯強(qiáng)于網(wǎng)絡(luò)邊緣位置的獨(dú)立董事,因而更能有效地發(fā)揮監(jiān)督約束管理層的作用。通過(guò)對(duì)2011-2015年11029條數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析,我們得出了如下結(jié)論:(1)我國(guó)獨(dú)立董事制度能夠?qū)居噘|(zhì)量的提升發(fā)揮治理作用。具體表現(xiàn)為:公司中獨(dú)立董事的網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心度越高,操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)越小,盈余質(zhì)量越高;公司中獨(dú)立董事的網(wǎng)絡(luò)約束系數(shù)越大,獨(dú)立董事占據(jù)的結(jié)構(gòu)洞越少,操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)越小,盈余質(zhì)量越高。(2)在非國(guó)有企業(yè)中,獨(dú)立董事的治理作用顯著高于國(guó)有企業(yè)中獨(dú)立董事的治理作用。由此可見(jiàn),產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的異質(zhì)性會(huì)對(duì)獨(dú)立董事的治理作用產(chǎn)生影響。(3)通過(guò)對(duì)獨(dú)立董事兼任數(shù)量與盈余質(zhì)量的研究,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)獨(dú)立董事兼任數(shù)量越多,公司盈余質(zhì)量越好。鑒于目前政策要求獨(dú)立董事兼任數(shù)量不能超過(guò)5家公司,因此,在目前的政策背景下,不能得出是否存在最優(yōu)獨(dú)立董事兼任數(shù)量的結(jié)論。本文從獨(dú)立董事的網(wǎng)絡(luò)位置出發(fā)考察其對(duì)公司盈余質(zhì)量的治理作用,對(duì)獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)文獻(xiàn)具有增量貢獻(xiàn)。本文的研究結(jié)論對(duì)企業(yè)獨(dú)立董事候選人員的選擇、董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)以及衡量企業(yè)盈余質(zhì)量可以提供啟示。同時(shí),對(duì)如何有效推進(jìn)國(guó)有體制改革、發(fā)揮獨(dú)立董事等公司治理機(jī)制的作用,提供了一些有價(jià)值的研究思考和現(xiàn)實(shí)啟示。
[Abstract]:Financial reports reflect the operating and financial conditions of listed companies. Because management pay is often determined by performance, management may operate in secret to achieve their own interests, hinder the normal generation of financial reports to achieve the purpose of whitewashing statements, which will obviously reduce the quality of earnings, and thus inevitably infringe on shareholders'interests. In order to achieve this goal, China promulgated the Guiding Opinion on Establishing an Independent Director System in Listed Companies in 2001, in order to enable independent directors to play a role in corporate governance and supervise and restrain the behavior of management. However, since the establishment of independent directors, their governance role has been controversial both in practice and in theory. With the rise of social relations theory, scholars have begun to use the characteristics of interpersonal network relationship to replace the characteristics of personal attributes. At the same time, considering the heterogeneity of information, we add the index of network constraint coefficient to measure the intermediary role of independent directors in the network by the number of structural holes occupied by independent directors. In reality, we divide listed companies into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the nature of property rights, and study whether the heterogeneity of property rights will affect the governance of independent directors. Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper finds that the position of independent directors in the network has a positive impact on earnings quality. The willingness and motivation of supervision is obviously stronger than that of independent directors on the edge of the network, so they can play a more effective role in supervising and restraining the management. Through the analysis of 1,1029 data from 2011 to 2015, we draw the following conclusions: (1) The independent director system in China can play a governance role in improving the earnings quality of the company. The higher the network centrality of independent directors, the smaller the maneuvering accrued profits and the higher the earnings quality; the greater the network constraint coefficient of independent directors, the less the structural holes occupied by independent directors, the smaller the maneuvering accrued profits, and the higher the earnings quality. (2) In non-state-owned enterprises, the governance role of independent directors is significantly higher than that of the state. It can be seen that the heterogeneity of property right nature will have an impact on the governance of independent directors. (3) Through the study of the number and earnings quality of independent directors, we find that the more independent directors hold concurrent positions, the better the earnings quality of the company. The quantity of independent directors can not exceed 5 companies. Therefore, under the current policy background, it is impossible to draw a conclusion whether there is an optimal number of independent directors concurrently. The selection of candidates, the structure design of the board of directors and the measurement of earnings quality can provide enlightenment. At the same time, it also provides some valuable research thinking and practical enlightenment on how to effectively promote the reform of the state-owned system and play the role of independent directors and other corporate governance mechanisms.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F275

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 陳麗英;;董事會(huì)特征與盈余重述[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2015年12期

2 洪峰;;獨(dú)立董事治理、管理層權(quán)力與超額薪酬——基于董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)的實(shí)證分析[J];貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2015年02期

3 萬(wàn)良勇;鄧路;鄭小玲;;網(wǎng)絡(luò)位置、獨(dú)立董事治理與公司違規(guī)——基于部分可觀測(cè)Bivariate Probit模型[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐;2014年12期

4 鄧曉嵐;陳運(yùn)森;陳棟;;審計(jì)委員會(huì)與薪酬委員會(huì)委員交疊任職、盈余管理與經(jīng)理人薪酬[J];審計(jì)研究;2014年06期

5 申云;;獨(dú)立董事的聲譽(yù)資本對(duì)公司治理效率的影響[J];湖北經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2014年06期

6 王兵;陳運(yùn)佳;孫小杰;;內(nèi)部審計(jì)負(fù)責(zé)人特征與公司盈余質(zhì)量關(guān)系研究[J];審計(jì)研究;2014年03期

7 萬(wàn)良勇;胡t，

本文編號(hào)：2176825