本文選題：官員獨董 + 政治聯(lián)系�。� 參考：《管理科學》2017年04期

【摘要】：上市公司聘請離退休官員擔任獨立董事(簡稱"官員獨董"),在中國乃至世界范圍內都是一種普遍現(xiàn)象。上市公司通過聘請官員獨董能夠建立起與政府部門的政治聯(lián)系,從而幫助其從政府手中獲得各種稀缺資源和優(yōu)惠政策,同時也需要承擔提供就業(yè)機會、政府稅收、官員政治升遷等多種社會服務和政治任務。官員獨董給公司帶來了怎樣的經濟影響,這是學術界和企業(yè)界長期熱議的焦點問題,但一直沒有得到令人信服的科學檢驗。為了探究官員獨董對所任職公司的經濟影響,利用2013年10月19日中組部發(fā)布的《關于進一步規(guī)范黨政領導干部在企業(yè)兼職(任職)問題的意見》(簡稱"18號文")作為外生沖擊事件,手工收集2013年10月19日至2014年12月31日中國A股上市公司披露的790起獨立董事辭職公告,利用事件研究法檢驗辭職公告的市場反應,以測量官員獨董在中國上市公司中發(fā)揮的實際作用。研究結果表明,投資者對官員獨董的辭職公告事件表現(xiàn)出顯著為正的市場反應,而且官員獨董辭職事件的正向市場反應明顯強于非官員獨董辭職事件的市場反應,實際上非官員獨董辭職事件的市場反應顯著為負,說明相對非官員獨董而言,官員獨董更多地扮演了"掠奪之手"的角色,進而損害了公司價值。進一步探索公司內外部多個因素對官員獨董價值的可能影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)如果公司注冊地的政府監(jiān)管強度或者公司注冊地所在省市的市場化水平越高,該公司的官員獨董辭職公告事件所引發(fā)的市場反應就越積極,官員獨董的"扶持之手"角色越難以發(fā)揮作用,從而更加突顯了官員獨董的"掠奪之手"角色。但是,并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)官員獨董的行政級別、行業(yè)專長以及公司獲得政府補助的情況等內部因素會影響官員獨董價值的經驗證據。創(chuàng)新之處在于增加了非官員獨董群體作為對照樣本,從而能夠更好地判斷和評估獨立董事政治聯(lián)系的經濟價值,得到的相關研究結論具有更強的說服力。此外,利用官員獨董離職潮事件考察獨立董事政治聯(lián)系的經濟價值,不僅豐富和深化了獨立董事領域的相關研究,而且拓展了政治聯(lián)系領域的研究成果,同時又為中組部發(fā)布"18號文"的政策意義提供了及時可靠的經驗證據。研究結果啟示企業(yè)不能盲目追求和構建與政府的聯(lián)系,實際上與政府保持適度的距離將更有利于企業(yè)的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:It is a common phenomenon that listed companies employ retired officials as independent directors. The listed companies can establish political ties with government departments by hiring officials as their chief executives, thereby helping them to obtain all kinds of scarce resources and preferential policies from the government. At the same time, they also have to bear the burden of providing employment opportunities and government taxes. Officials political promotion and other social services and political tasks. What kind of economic impact officials have had on the company has long been the focus of debate in academia and business, but has not been tested convincingly by science. In order to explore the economic impact of the executive director on the company, Using the opinions on further standardizing the Part-time (position) of leading cadres in Enterprises issued by the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee on October 19, 2013 (referred to as "article 18"), as an exogenous shock event, Collecting by hand 790 announcements of resignation of independent directors disclosed by listed companies listed in A shares from October 19, 2013 to December 31, 2014, and using the event study method to test the market reaction of resignation announcements, In order to measure the official Dong alone in China's listed companies to play a real role. The results of the study show that investors have shown a significantly positive market response to the resignation announcement of the official Chief Executive, and the positive market reaction to the resignation of the official Chief Executive is obviously stronger than the market reaction to the resignation of the non-official Chief Executive. As a matter of fact, the market reaction to the resignation of non-official chief executive is obviously negative, which shows that the official independent director plays a more role of "plunder hand" than non-official sole director, and thus damages the company value. To further explore the possible impact of many factors inside and outside the company on the value of the sole director of the company, it is found that the higher the level of government supervision in the place where the company is registered or the higher the level of marketization in the province or province where the company is registered, The more positive the market response caused by the announcement of the resignation of the company's chief executive, the more difficult the role of the "supporting hand" of the official sole director was, thus highlighting the role of the "predatory hand" of the official sole director. However, no empirical evidence has been found that internal factors such as executive rank, industry expertise, and the company's access to government subsidies may affect the value of government executives. The innovation lies in the addition of non-official independent groups as a control sample, which can better judge and evaluate the economic value of independent directors' political connections, and the relevant research conclusions are more persuasive. In addition, the economic value of independent directors' political ties has been investigated by using the incident of the departure tide of independent directors, which not only enriches and deepens the relevant research in the field of independent directors, but also expands the research results in the field of political relations. At the same time, it provides timely and reliable empirical evidence for the policy significance of the publication of document 18. The results suggest that enterprises should not blindly pursue and build a relationship with the government. In fact, keeping a proper distance from the government will be more conducive to the development of enterprises.
【作者單位】： 廈門大學管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金(71572160)~~
【分類號】：F271;F275;F832.51

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