本文選題：多渠道 + 渠道選擇��； 參考：《工業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟》2017年11期

【摘要】：本文針對擁有網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道的制造商,考慮零售商實體渠道促銷努力水平及消費者的搭便車行為,在Nash博弈和零售商主導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈下,就零售商開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道的問題進行研究。通過理論和數(shù)值分析,得到以下結(jié)論:零售商渠道地位對其開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道影響不大;開通后,制造商利潤減小,當(dāng)實體渠道基本市場份額較小時,零售商利潤增大;零售商應(yīng)根據(jù)實體渠道基本市場份額大小來決定是否開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道。
[Abstract]:This paper, aiming at the manufacturers with network direct channel, considers the promotion effort level of the retailer and the free riding behavior of the consumers. Under the Nash game and the retailer dominated Stackelberg game, this paper makes a research on the retailer's opening network channel. Through theoretical and numerical analysis, the following conclusions are obtained: the retailer channel It has little influence on its network channel. After the opening, the profit of the manufacturer is reduced. When the basic market share of the real channel is small, the retailer's profit increases, and the retailer should decide whether to open the network channel according to the basic market share of the entity channel.
【作者單位】： 大連海事大學(xué)交通運輸管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社科基金項目“大數(shù)據(jù)背景下網(wǎng)購消費者行為模式與網(wǎng)購評語引導(dǎo)機理研究”(項目編號:15CGL031) 大連市科技計劃項目“基于超電子的城市交通出行行為動態(tài)模型與算法研究”(項目編號:2015A11GX016) 大連市高層次人才創(chuàng)新支持計劃項目“交通運輸大數(shù)據(jù)的知識挖掘與規(guī)則提取”(項目編號:2015R063) 中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(項目編號:3132016306,3132017085)
【分類號】：F274
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本文編號：2058853