本文選題：經(jīng)理管理防御 + 風(fēng)險承擔(dān)　； 參考：《經(jīng)濟經(jīng)緯》2017年05期

【摘要】：基于委托代理理論中代理人風(fēng)險規(guī)避與風(fēng)險追逐假說,探討經(jīng)理管理防御與企業(yè)風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平之間的影響機理和關(guān)系,考察股權(quán)激勵對兩者關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)作用。研究結(jié)果表明:經(jīng)理管理防御程度越強,企業(yè)風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平越低,說明經(jīng)理人為了保持自身職位和個人利益最大化,表現(xiàn)出更多的風(fēng)險規(guī)避行為;管理層股權(quán)激勵程度與公司風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平正相關(guān);管理層股權(quán)激勵對經(jīng)理管理防御與企業(yè)風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平的關(guān)系存在正向調(diào)節(jié)作用。股權(quán)激勵能激勵經(jīng)理人選擇更多風(fēng)險承擔(dān)行為。
[Abstract]:Based on the hypothesis of agent risk aversion and risk chase in principal-agent theory, this paper probes into the influence mechanism and relationship between manager's management defense and enterprise's risk-bearing level, and investigates the regulating effect of equity incentive on the relationship between them. The results show that the stronger the managerial defense level, the lower the risk-bearing level of the enterprise, which indicates that the manager shows more risk-averse behavior in order to keep his position and personal interests maximized. The degree of managerial equity incentive is positively related to the level of corporate risk-taking, and the managerial equity incentive has a positive regulating effect on the relationship between managerial defense and enterprise risk-taking level. Equity incentive can encourage managers to choose more risk-taking behavior.
【作者單位】： 西安理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟與管理學(xué)院;西安財經(jīng)學(xué)院統(tǒng)計學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金項目(71272118) 中國(西安)絲綢之路研究院科學(xué)研究項目(2016SY19) 陜西省教育廳專項科學(xué)研究項目(17JK1297)
【分類號】：F272.3;F272.91;F272.92

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