本文選題：云服務提供商 + 道德風險　； 參考：《系統(tǒng)管理學報》2017年05期

【摘要】：客戶企業(yè)實施云外包時,面臨著服務質(zhì)量信息不對稱所帶來的風險。針對在"一對多"的云外包服務模式下,因云服務提供商(CSP)服務質(zhì)量不可觀測所引發(fā)的共同代理問題,以客戶企業(yè)期望收入最大化為目標,分別在客戶企業(yè)合作及不合作情況下,設計外包合同以激勵CSP付出最優(yōu)的服務質(zhì)量水平,并對兩種情況下的合同激勵效果進行比較分析。研究表明:當客戶企業(yè)之間合作時,收益共享系數(shù)由服務質(zhì)量對產(chǎn)出的影響系數(shù)、風險規(guī)避度、產(chǎn)出方差和成本效率參數(shù)所決定;當不合作時,具有先動優(yōu)勢的客戶企業(yè)不會向CSP支付固定服務報酬;客戶企業(yè)之間合作時的合同激勵效果要優(yōu)于不合作時的激勵效果。
[Abstract]:When customer enterprise implements cloud outsourcing, it faces the risk of asymmetric service quality information. Under the "one to many" cloud outsourcing service mode, the common agent problem caused by the unobservable service quality of the cloud service provider (CSP) is aimed at the maximization of the customer's expected income. Under the circumstances, the design outsourcing contract is designed to encourage the CSP to pay the best quality of service and to compare the effect of the contract incentive under the two circumstances. When the company does not cooperate, the customer enterprises with predominant advantage will not pay the fixed service payment to the CSP, and the incentive effect of the contract between the customers' enterprises is better than the incentive effect when they do not cooperate.
【作者單位】： 重慶工商大學商務策劃學院;電子科技大學經(jīng)濟管理學院;重慶大學經(jīng)濟與工商管理學院;西南政法大學經(jīng)濟學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金資助項目(71272086) 國家社會科學基金重大項目(15ZDB169) 重慶市教委科學技術研究項目(KJ1705126);重慶市教委人文社科項目(17SKG075)
【分類號】：F274
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本文編號：1938649