本文選題：供給側改革 + 過度投資��； 參考：《電子科技大學》2017年博士論文

【摘要】：2015年11月,中國政府首次提出了供給側改革,此后,國家領導人在國際、國內重要場合會議上多次提及。至此,以“去產(chǎn)能、去庫存、去杠桿、降成本、補短板”為重點的供給側改革拉開了帷幕。供給側改革得到了各級政府的推廣,成為了企業(yè)界和學術界關注的熱點問題。供給側改革的背后,卻是我國經(jīng)濟自2011年開始增速回落,長期依賴高投資拉動經(jīng)濟增長的發(fā)展模式難以繼續(xù)保持,宏觀經(jīng)濟不景氣,且面臨持續(xù)下行的壓力。同時,我國經(jīng)濟長期以來依賴投資維持高速增長所帶來的一系列弊端日益突出,比如過度投資現(xiàn)象嚴重、企業(yè)產(chǎn)能過剩、行業(yè)過度競爭、政府及企業(yè)偏好激進擴張,使得企業(yè)財務杠桿普遍畸形高企、企業(yè)盈利能力及現(xiàn)金流弱化,導致企業(yè)整體信用壓力趨增、企業(yè)信用風險提升,由此可知,企業(yè)過度投資、經(jīng)營擴張可能是導致企業(yè)信用風險擴大的重要原因。事實上,在當前宏觀經(jīng)濟整體不景氣的大環(huán)境下,企業(yè)信用風險的增加,降低了企業(yè)生產(chǎn)、經(jīng)營及資金使用效率,增加企業(yè)陷入破產(chǎn)境地的可能性。基于此,本文從信用風險視角,研究微觀企業(yè)過度投資、經(jīng)營擴張現(xiàn)象導致的經(jīng)濟后果及影響因素。論文的研究內容及結論主要有以下幾點:(1)研究過度投資對公司信用風險的影響機理。在對我國過度投資的經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象進行分析及回顧、總結現(xiàn)有相關研究后,構建了過度投資與公司信用風險關系的研究框架,實證分析了過度投資對公司信用風險的影響機理。研究結果發(fā)現(xiàn):過度投資加大了公司的信用風險;新增有息負債、公司業(yè)績分別在過度投資影響公司信用風險的過程中具有中介作用。(2)分別基于委托代理理論和信息不對稱理論,研究了公司信用風險的治理效應。以委托代理理論為基礎,分析了內部控制對過度投資導致的信用風險是否能有效管控,以及內部控制對信用風險管控作用是否因企業(yè)產(chǎn)權性質而產(chǎn)生差異。通過實證分析產(chǎn)權性質、內部控制、過度投資與公司信用風險之間的關系,研究發(fā)現(xiàn):內部控制能有效降低過度投資導致的公司信用風險;相比非國有企業(yè),國有企業(yè)內部控制的信用風險管控作用更為顯著。以信息不對稱理論為基礎,研究了會計信息質量、過度投資及公司信用風險之間的作用機制,以及會計信息質量對信用風險的抑制作用是否因企業(yè)所處的融資約束而產(chǎn)生差異。通過實證分析融資約束、會計信息質量、過度投資與公司信用風險之間的關系,研究發(fā)現(xiàn):會計信息質量的改善有利于抑制過度投資,進而降低公司的信用風險;相對于融資約束較嚴重的公司而言,融資約束寬松公司的會計信息質量對公司信用風險的抑制作用更加顯著。(3)研究多元化經(jīng)營對公司信用風險的影響。多元化經(jīng)營可能會加大公司信用風險,而多元化經(jīng)營的實施與管理者的過度自信密切相關。通過實證分析了管理者過度自信、多元化經(jīng)營及公司信用風險之間的關系,研究發(fā)現(xiàn):管理者的過度自信增加了多元化經(jīng)營程度,多元化經(jīng)營程度的提高加大了公司信用風險,且多元化經(jīng)營在管理者過度自信影響公司信用風險中具有中介作用;上期多元化經(jīng)營程度會加大管理者的過度自信心理,而上期公司信用風險對管理者的過度自信心理影響較弱。(4)研究公司多元化經(jīng)營的過度投資效應和融資約束效應。在研究了多元化經(jīng)營對公司信用風險的影響后,進一步研究了多元化經(jīng)營的過度投資效應和融資約束效應,以揭示多元化經(jīng)營失敗的內在原因及作用機制。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):在公司多元化經(jīng)營程度位于較低水平時,隨著多元化經(jīng)營程度的增加,公司的過度投資會減少,但當多元化經(jīng)營程度增加達到一定的閾值之后,繼續(xù)增加多元化經(jīng)營程度會造成過度多元化,從而加大過度投資;公司實施多元化經(jīng)營戰(zhàn)略會加深融資約束。多元化經(jīng)營失敗往往一方面在于沒有把握多元化經(jīng)營的度,過度多元化導致過度投資,公司會逐漸陷入虧損困境,另一方面在于對資金未能有效管控,融資約束的加深可能會導致公司資金鏈斷裂。以上研究對過度投資、多元化經(jīng)營與公司信用風險之間的關系進行了較為深入的探討,從信用風險的研究視角,深化了過度投資及多元化經(jīng)營的經(jīng)濟后果。本文的研究對于提高企業(yè)投資效率、調整公司經(jīng)營戰(zhàn)略、管控公司信用風險提供了借鑒,為國家進行供給側結構性改革提供了經(jīng)驗證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:In November 2015, the Chinese government put forward the supply side reform for the first time. After that, the state leaders mentioned many times at the international and domestic conference. At this point, the supply side reform focused on "capacity, inventory, deleveraging, cost reduction and short board". The supply side reform has been popularized by all levels of government and became the enterprise. On the back of the supply side, behind the supply side reform, China's economy has slowed down since 2011. The long-term dependence on high investment in economic growth is difficult to continue, the macroeconomic downturn and the continuing downward pressure. At the same time, China's economy has long relied on investment to maintain high growth. A series of disadvantages are becoming more and more serious, such as excessive investment phenomenon, overcapacity of enterprises, excessive competition in the industry, the radical expansion of government and enterprises, which makes the financial leverage of enterprises generally deformed, the profitability of enterprises and the weakening of cash flow, which leads to the increase of corporate credit pressure and the promotion of enterprise credit risk. Overinvestment and expansion of business may be the important reason for the expansion of enterprise credit risk. In fact, in the current macroeconomic environment, the increase of enterprise credit risk reduces the possibility of enterprise production, operation and capital use efficiency, and increases the possibility of enterprises falling into bankruptcy. Based on this, this article is from credit risk The research contents and conclusions of the paper are as follows: (1) the study of the mechanism of the effect of overinvestment on the company's credit risk. The research framework of the relationship between excessive investment and corporate credit risk has been made. The results show that excessive investment increases the credit risk of the company; the new interest liability is added to the company's performance, and the company performance has a mediating role in the process of overinvestment affecting the credit risk of the company. (2) Not based on the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory, the governance effect of the company's credit risk is studied. Based on the principal-agent theory, it is analyzed whether the internal control can effectively control the credit risk caused by excessive investment and the difference between the internal control and the property property of the enterprise. The empirical analysis of the relationship between property property, internal control, excessive investment and corporate credit risk shows that internal control can effectively reduce the risk of corporate credit caused by excessive investment; compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the internal control of state-owned enterprises has more significant role in controlling credit risk. The mechanism of the effect of information quality, over investment and the risk of the company's credit, and whether the accounting information quality restrains the credit risk is different from the financing constraints of the enterprise. Through the empirical analysis of the relationship between financing constraints, the quality of accounting information, the excessive investment and the credit risk of the company, the research finds that the accounting letter is the one. The improvement of interest quality is beneficial to restraining over investment and reducing the credit risk of the company. Relative to the companies with more serious financing constraints, the quality of accounting information is more significant to the company's credit risk. (3) to study the effect of diversification on the company's credit risk. To increase the company's credit risk, the implementation of diversification is closely related to the overconfidence of the managers. Through the empirical analysis of the relationship between the overconfidence of the managers and the relationship between the diversification and the credit risk of the company, the study finds that the overconfidence of the managers has increased the degree of diversification and the increase in the diversification of the management. The credit risk of the company has an intermediary role in the credit risk of the managers, and the degree of diversification in the last period will increase the overconfidence mentality of the managers, while the credit risk of the previous company has a weak influence on the overconfidence of the managers. (4) to study the overinvestment effect of the diversification of the company and the overinvestment effect of the company. After studying the effect of diversification on corporate credit risk, this paper further studies the overinvestment effect and financing constraint effect of diversification in order to reveal the internal causes and mechanism of diversification failure. As the degree of operation increases, the overinvestment will be reduced, but when the diversification is increased to a certain threshold, the continued increase in diversification will result in excessive diversification, thus increasing excessive investment; the implementation of diversification strategy will deepen the financing constraints. In order to grasp the degree of diversification, excessive diversification leads to excessive investment, the company will gradually fall into the loss predicament, the other is that the fund is not effectively controlled, the deepening of the financing constraints may lead to the break of the company's capital chain. From the perspective of credit risk, it deepens the economic consequences of overinvestment and diversification. This study provides a reference for improving the efficiency of enterprise investment, adjusting the management strategy of the company, controlling the credit risk of the company, and providing empirical evidence for the state to carry out the structural reform of the supply side.
【學位授予單位】：電子科技大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275

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