發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-11 08:02

  本文選題：單邊非完全信息 + 信號(hào)博弈��； 參考：《西安建筑科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),使用博弈論研究供應(yīng)鏈的方法已經(jīng)引起了學(xué)術(shù)界的高度關(guān)注,并被廣泛應(yīng)用。傳統(tǒng)研究供應(yīng)鏈的方法主要有三種。第一,控制理論。它用差分方程為供應(yīng)鏈建模,用積分變換來(lái)研究其特性。優(yōu)點(diǎn)是可以動(dòng)態(tài)的分析供應(yīng)鏈,缺點(diǎn)是要求供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)是線性的。而實(shí)際情況下的供應(yīng)鏈都不能滿足這個(gè)條件,大大限制了其使用范圍;第二,仿真方法。它是針對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)建立模型;第三,運(yùn)籌學(xué)方法。它主要適用于非線性的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng),但是這種方法不能?chē)?yán)格動(dòng)態(tài)的分析供應(yīng)鏈。以往對(duì)于供應(yīng)鏈的研究?jī)H僅集中在系統(tǒng)具體的節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)上,對(duì)于整條鏈作為整體研究其協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題少之又少,即使有也只是局限于單邊非完全信息的情形下。缺乏對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)同時(shí)擁有私人信息情形的進(jìn)一步研究,尤其是用供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)系統(tǒng)內(nèi)的各節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)。在生產(chǎn)成本與市場(chǎng)需求的變化下,擁有產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)成本私人信息的供應(yīng)商與擁有真實(shí)市場(chǎng)需求信息的銷(xiāo)售商二者的利潤(rùn)是一種你增我減的情形。銷(xiāo)售獎(jiǎng)懲契約具有平衡供應(yīng)商和銷(xiāo)售商信息優(yōu)勢(shì)的靈活性。第一,研究在單邊非完全信息情形下,從供應(yīng)商發(fā)送信號(hào)方式的角度解決供應(yīng)商的選擇問(wèn)題。設(shè)計(jì)了不同類型的供應(yīng)商發(fā)送信號(hào)成本不同的博弈模型,通過(guò)數(shù)學(xué)方法得到唯一的精煉貝葉斯均衡解。得到結(jié)論只有不同類型供應(yīng)商信號(hào)發(fā)送成本不同時(shí),生產(chǎn)商可通過(guò)接收信號(hào)甄別供應(yīng)商。解決了在單邊非完全信息情形下供應(yīng)商的選擇博弈問(wèn)題。第二,研究擁有產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)成本私人信息的供應(yīng)商與擁有市場(chǎng)真實(shí)需求信息的銷(xiāo)售商構(gòu)成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈在此種雙邊非完全信息情形下,制定供應(yīng)鏈契約的問(wèn)題。本文引入了沒(méi)有個(gè)人利潤(rùn)的利他委托人作為系統(tǒng)的委托人,以供應(yīng)鏈作為協(xié)調(diào)主體,建立了供應(yīng)商與銷(xiāo)售商構(gòu)成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈在此雙邊非完全信息情形下的博弈模型。首先將完全信息情形下的最優(yōu)訂購(gòu)量與雙邊非完全信息情形下的最優(yōu)訂購(gòu)量進(jìn)行對(duì)比,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤(rùn)發(fā)生了扭曲,得到了該二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈在此種雙邊非完全信息情形下很難達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)。其次得到了系統(tǒng)中節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)的轉(zhuǎn)移支付。最后,研究了固定價(jià)格契約問(wèn)題,求解出銷(xiāo)售獎(jiǎng)懲契約的具體參數(shù)形式。本論文對(duì)于供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)內(nèi)具體節(jié)點(diǎn)的研究以及制定其他類型供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)契約提供了理論基礎(chǔ)與實(shí)踐方法。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the method of using game theory to study supply chain has attracted much attention and been widely used. There are three methods of traditional research on supply chain. First, the theory of control. The difference equation is used to model the supply chain and the integral transformation is used to study its characteristics. The advantage is that the supply chain can be dynamically analyzed, but the disadvantage is that the supply chain system is required to be linear. In fact, the supply chain can not meet this condition, which greatly limits the scope of its use. Second, the simulation method. It is to build a model for the supply chain system; third, the operational research method. It is mainly suitable for nonlinear supply chain system, but this method can not be used to analyze supply chain strictly and dynamically. In the past, the research of supply chain is only focused on the specific node enterprises of the system, and the coordination problem of the whole chain as a whole is very few, even if there is only limited to the case of unilateral incomplete information. There is a lack of further research on the situation that the node enterprises in the supply chain system have private information at the same time, especially the node enterprises in the supply chain contract coordination system. Under the change of production cost and market demand, the profit of supplier with private information of production cost and seller with real market demand information is a case of increasing or decreasing. Sales rewards and penalties contracts have the flexibility to balance the information advantages of suppliers and vendors. Firstly, in the case of unilateral incomplete information, the problem of supplier selection is solved from the point of view of the way the supplier sends signals. A game model with different cost of sending signals from different suppliers is designed and the unique refined Bayesian equilibrium solution is obtained by mathematical method. It is concluded that only different types of suppliers have different signaling costs and manufacturers can identify suppliers by receiving signals. The problem of supplier selection game in the case of unilateral incomplete information is solved. Secondly, this paper studies the problem of making supply chain contract in the case of bilateral incomplete information between suppliers with private information of product production cost and vendors with real market demand information. In this paper, we introduce altruistic clients with no personal profit as the trustor of the system, take the supply chain as the coordinating agent, and set up the game model of the two-level supply chain composed of the supplier and the seller under the condition of the bilateral incomplete information. Firstly, the optimal order quantity in the case of complete information is compared with that in the case of bilateral incomplete information, and it is found that the profit of the supply chain is distorted. The two-level supply chain is difficult to coordinate under the condition of bilateral incomplete information. Secondly, the transfer payment of node enterprises in the system is obtained. Finally, the fixed price contract problem is studied, and the specific parameter form of the sales reward and punishment contract is solved. This paper provides the theoretical basis and practical method for the research of the specific nodes in the supply chain system and the formulation of other types of supply chain system contracts.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前9條

1 王新輝;汪賢裕;蘇應(yīng)生;;雙邊成本信息不對(duì)稱的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2013年04期

2 王新輝;汪賢裕;蘇應(yīng)生;;雙邊信息不對(duì)稱的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)與效率分析[J];計(jì)算機(jī)集成制造系統(tǒng);2012年06期

3 姚s，

本文編號(hào)：1873111