發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-27 14:26

  本文選題：技術(shù)型獨(dú)立董事 + 研發(fā)投資不足　； 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：十三五規(guī)劃中創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)仍是重中之重的主題,并頒布了國(guó)家科技創(chuàng)新規(guī)劃,公司的創(chuàng)新研發(fā)活動(dòng)不僅是公司的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)、未來(lái)發(fā)展的核心動(dòng)力,更是推動(dòng)國(guó)家創(chuàng)新水平高速發(fā)展的主心骨。獨(dú)立董事制度研究也一直是會(huì)計(jì)及公司治理方面研究居高不下的熱點(diǎn)話題。然而RD活動(dòng)本身的投入多、周期長(zhǎng)、回報(bào)率不確定等特質(zhì)以及公司治理中的矛盾決定了管理者往往傾向于削減研發(fā)活動(dòng)投入、選擇回報(bào)快的投資這樣的短視行為,另一方面研發(fā)活動(dòng)時(shí)間一般較長(zhǎng)、過(guò)程復(fù)雜且專業(yè),投入和產(chǎn)出并不一定呈線性關(guān)系,對(duì)其監(jiān)督難度很大�；谶@樣的考量,本文認(rèn)為技術(shù)型獨(dú)董作為董事會(huì)中獨(dú)立第三方的管理者,能夠發(fā)揮其專業(yè)技能和經(jīng)驗(yàn),一方面為企業(yè)RD活動(dòng)提供指導(dǎo),另一方面對(duì)RD決策中不科學(xué)合理之處加以監(jiān)督和抑制。本文以2011-2013年上市公司制造業(yè)企業(yè)為對(duì)象,研究技術(shù)型獨(dú)立董事與RD投資不足之間的關(guān)系,檢驗(yàn)技術(shù)型獨(dú)立董事能否發(fā)揮其專業(yè)知識(shí)技能對(duì)管理層進(jìn)行監(jiān)督,從而有效抑制RD投資不足的現(xiàn)象。通過(guò)實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn),技術(shù)型獨(dú)立董事能夠發(fā)揮監(jiān)督職能,有效抑制管理層減少RD投資的行為,并且越年輕的技術(shù)型獨(dú)董對(duì)RD投資不足現(xiàn)象的抑制作用越強(qiáng)。實(shí)證結(jié)果未能證明技術(shù)型獨(dú)董的與工作地是否異地、技術(shù)型獨(dú)董的薪酬水平會(huì)顯著影響其監(jiān)督職能,使其抑制RD投資不足現(xiàn)象作用更強(qiáng)。此外,在穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)中對(duì)RD投入水平的檢驗(yàn)也同樣證明了本文觀點(diǎn),認(rèn)為技術(shù)型獨(dú)董能夠給企業(yè)的RD活動(dòng)積極的影響。本文的研究結(jié)果能為政府和企業(yè)在完善獨(dú)立董事制度、鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)新、提高企業(yè)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和公司治理水平等方面提供一些參考和建議。
[Abstract]:Innovation and entrepreneurship is still the most important theme in the 13th Five-Year Plan, and the National Science and Technology Innovation Plan was promulgated. The company's innovative R & D activities are not only the core driving force for the company's production and operation, but also for future development. Is to promote the national innovation level of high-speed development of the backbone. Independent director system research has also been a hot topic in accounting and corporate governance. However, the characteristics of R D activity itself, such as large investment, long cycle, uncertain rate of return and contradictions in corporate governance, determine that managers tend to reduce R & D investment and choose short-sighted behavior such as fast return investment. On the other hand, R & D activities generally take a long time, the process is complex and professional, input and output do not necessarily show linear relationship, it is very difficult to supervise the R & D activities. Based on these considerations, this paper argues that technical directors, as managers of independent third parties in the board of directors, can bring their professional skills and experience into full play, on the one hand, to provide guidance for enterprise R D activities. On the other hand, the unscientific and reasonable aspects of Rd decision should be supervised and restrained. Taking the manufacturing enterprises of listed companies in 2011-2013 as the object, this paper studies the relationship between independent directors of technology and insufficient R D investment, and tests whether independent directors of technology type can exert their professional knowledge and skills to supervise the management. In order to effectively curb R D investment insufficient phenomenon. The empirical results show that the independent directors of the technology type can play a supervisory role and effectively restrain the behavior of the management to reduce R D investment, and the younger the technical independent directors are, the stronger the restraining effect is on the phenomenon of insufficient R D investment. The empirical results fail to prove whether the technology independent director is located in a different place, and the salary level of the technology independent director will significantly affect its supervisory function, making it more effective in restraining R D investment insufficiency. In addition, the test of R D input level in the robustness test also proves the viewpoint of this paper, that the technology independent director can positively influence the R D activity of the enterprise. The results of this paper can provide some references and suggestions for the government and enterprises to perfect the independent director system, encourage innovation, improve the core competitiveness of enterprises and corporate governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271;F273.1;F406.7
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本文編號(hào)：1811097