本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理�。� 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：為了解決兩權(quán)分離帶來的委托-代理、信息不對(duì)稱等問題,國(guó)內(nèi)外紛紛實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)的手段,實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果并不是都是正面的,由于股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃達(dá)到業(yè)績(jī)條件后為管理層帶來的豐厚利益,盈余管理操縱行為橫行,造成了財(cái)務(wù)丑聞相繼爆發(fā),本文針對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施過程中的不足提出建議,希望最大程度的發(fā)揮股權(quán)激勵(lì)的正面作用,有效抑制負(fù)面作用的影響。本文通過對(duì)以往研究的總結(jié),發(fā)現(xiàn)以往學(xué)者忽視了實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)公司在多個(gè)關(guān)鍵時(shí)點(diǎn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與盈余管理之間的關(guān)系研究,本文希望通過多時(shí)點(diǎn)多維度對(duì)兩者之間關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究,結(jié)合相關(guān)委托代理理論、人力資本理論、契約理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、利益趨同效益和機(jī)會(huì)主義行為效應(yīng)理論基礎(chǔ),綜合三個(gè)關(guān)鍵時(shí)點(diǎn)和兩個(gè)研究方面:從業(yè)績(jī)考核期前和業(yè)績(jī)考核期內(nèi)兩種盈余管理特征、兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵時(shí)點(diǎn)影響我國(guó)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司盈余管理因素,對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與盈余管理關(guān)系進(jìn)行多方面研究,運(yùn)用文獻(xiàn)搜索法、演繹推理法、定性與定相結(jié)合三種研究方法,通過對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)的搜集整理采用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、Pearson相關(guān)性分析、多元線性回歸等實(shí)證研究方法檢驗(yàn)本文假設(shè),形成最終結(jié)論:管理層會(huì)在基準(zhǔn)期前一年進(jìn)行負(fù)向真實(shí)盈余管理,計(jì)劃實(shí)施中進(jìn)行正向的真實(shí)盈余管理;相對(duì)于等待期/禁售期年度,股權(quán)激勵(lì)公告基準(zhǔn)期年度的真實(shí)盈余管理更加顯著;股權(quán)激勵(lì)的三個(gè)關(guān)鍵時(shí)點(diǎn)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理與真實(shí)盈余管理均呈正向聯(lián)動(dòng)關(guān)系;在股權(quán)激勵(lì)公告公布當(dāng)年,業(yè)績(jī)考核條件實(shí)現(xiàn)的難易程度與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理均呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,在度過等待期/禁售期當(dāng)年,業(yè)績(jī)考核條件實(shí)現(xiàn)的難易程度與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,但關(guān)系均不顯著;相比較股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃度過等待期/禁售期,股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃公告基準(zhǔn)期的盈余管理受到股權(quán)激勵(lì)有效期、業(yè)績(jī)考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式、股權(quán)激勵(lì)人數(shù)的影響更大,在后文通過穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)再次檢驗(yàn)了上述的結(jié)論。通過三個(gè)重要時(shí)點(diǎn)的加入,本文在時(shí)間維度上更加明確了不同關(guān)鍵時(shí)點(diǎn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與盈余管理的關(guān)系,根據(jù)實(shí)證研究結(jié)果,本文針對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施過程中的不足從上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案和業(yè)績(jī)考體系、監(jiān)理規(guī)范的經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng)、外部資本市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)管四個(gè)方面提出對(duì)應(yīng)的建議,希望可以為我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)更加順利的實(shí)施做出一定貢獻(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problems of principal-agent and information asymmetry brought by the separation of two rights, equity incentive has been implemented as a means of long-term incentive at home and abroad, and the effect of equity incentive is not all positive. Due to the rich benefits brought to the management by the equity incentive plan after the achievement of the performance conditions, the manipulation of earnings management is rampant, resulting in financial scandals. This paper puts forward some suggestions for the deficiencies in the implementation process of the equity incentive. Hope to maximize the positive role of equity incentives, effectively inhibit the negative impact. Based on the summary of previous studies, this paper finds that the former scholars ignore the research on the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management at several critical points in the implementation of equity incentive companies. This paper hopes to study the relationship between the two through multi-point and multi-dimension, combined with the related principal-agent theory, human capital theory, contract theory, information asymmetry theory, benefit convergence and opportunistic behavior effect theory foundation. Synthesizing three key time points and two aspects of research: from the two characteristics of earnings management before the performance appraisal period and the performance appraisal period, the two key time points influence the factors of earnings management of the stock right incentive in our country. This paper studies the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management from many aspects, using literature search method, deductive reasoning method, qualitative and definite combination of three research methods, through the collection of data using descriptive statistical Pearson correlation analysis. The empirical research methods such as multiple linear regression test the hypothesis of this paper and come to the final conclusion: the management will carry on the negative real earnings management in the year before the base period and the positive real earnings management in the implementation of the plan; Compared with the waiting period / no-sale period, the real earnings management in the base period of equity incentive announcement is more significant, and the accrual earnings management and the real earnings management are all positively related to each other at the three key points of equity incentive. In the year of the announcement of equity incentive announcement, the degree of difficulty in realizing the performance appraisal conditions was positively correlated with both accrual earnings management and real earnings management. The degree of difficulty in performance appraisal is positively correlated with accrual earnings management and real earnings management, but the relationship is not significant. Earnings management in the base period of the announcement of equity incentive plan is influenced by the validity of equity incentive, performance evaluation standard, equity incentive model and the number of equity incentives. The above conclusions are tested again through the robustness test in the following articles. Through the addition of three important time points, this paper clarifies the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management at different critical time points in time dimension, according to the results of empirical research. This paper puts forward corresponding suggestions from four aspects: internal governance structure of listed company, equity incentive scheme and performance test system, supervision standard manager market, supervision of external capital market. We hope to contribute to the smooth implementation of equity incentive in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.92

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