本文選題：國(guó)有企業(yè)改革　切入點(diǎn)：高管薪酬　出處：《當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué)》2017年03期

【摘要】：本文以2013年到2014年國(guó)家相繼推出國(guó)有企業(yè)高管薪酬管制政策作為對(duì)于金融市場(chǎng)國(guó)有上市公司的沖擊事件,分別檢驗(yàn)各單一事件和混合事件的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),此次國(guó)有企業(yè)改革背景下對(duì)于國(guó)有企業(yè)管理者薪酬的限制并不是對(duì)企業(yè)活動(dòng)的過(guò)度干預(yù),而是有效的管制;并且,無(wú)論使用絕對(duì)薪酬水平還是超額薪酬水平都發(fā)現(xiàn)國(guó)有上市公司的管理者薪酬水平越高,其市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)越大。在獲得市場(chǎng)肯定的同時(shí),國(guó)有企業(yè)管理者薪酬制度改革有待于進(jìn)一步深化。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the executive compensation control policy of state-owned enterprises was introduced from 2013 to 2014 as a shock event to the state-owned listed companies in the financial market, and the market reaction of each single event and mixed event was tested respectively. In the context of the reform of state-owned enterprises, the restrictions on the salary of managers in state-owned enterprises are not excessive interference in the activities of enterprises, but effective control; and, Whether using absolute compensation level or excessive compensation level, we found that the higher the salary level of managers in state-owned listed companies, the greater the market response. The reform of executive compensation system in state-owned enterprises needs to be further deepened.
【作者單位】： 吉林大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科研究項(xiàng)目“公允價(jià)值分層披露的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果研究”(編號(hào):14YJA630042) 吉林省軟科學(xué)項(xiàng)目“吉林省企業(yè)創(chuàng)新活動(dòng)的市場(chǎng)評(píng)價(jià)與融資約束——基于上市公司R&D投入的研究”(編號(hào):20150418067FG) 中央高校基本科研業(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)種子基金項(xiàng)目“我國(guó)全面‘營(yíng)改增’的實(shí)施效果和增值稅制度的完善與優(yōu)化研究”(編號(hào):2015ZZ038) 中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)資助項(xiàng)目“基于注意理論的投資決策研究”(編號(hào):2014BS011)
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F276.1
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本文編號(hào)：1689167