本文選題：高管晉升激勵　切入點：并購支付方式　出處：《軟科學》2017年12期

【摘要】：基于代理理論的研究框架,研究了高管晉升激勵與并購支付決策的關(guān)系及其邊界條件。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):高管晉升激勵能夠顯著提高并購支付決策的風險承擔水平,表現(xiàn)為更有可能選擇風險較高的現(xiàn)金支付,而不是相對謹慎的股權(quán)支付;高管任期和產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)能夠負面調(diào)節(jié)高管晉升激勵與現(xiàn)金支付之間的正向關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:Based on the framework of agency theory, this paper studies the relationship between executive promotion incentive and M & A payment decision and its boundary conditions, and finds that executive promotion incentive can significantly improve the risk-bearing level of M & A payment decision. They are more likely to opt for riskier cash payments than relatively cautious equity payments, and tenure and property rights can negatively regulate the positive relationship between executive promotion incentives and cash payments.
【作者單位】： 南京大學商學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目(71572075、71272108)
【分類號】：F272.92
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本文編號：1675759