發(fā)布時間：2018-03-23 00:16

  本文選題：高管集權　切入點：內控質量　出處：《山西財經大學》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：21世紀初美國發(fā)生一系列財務舞弊案件,這促使美國政府強化了內部控制信息披露機制。內部控制能實現企業(yè)內部的自我調節(jié)和自我制約,企業(yè)通過建立完善并能得到有效執(zhí)行的內部控制體系,能為利益相關者提供真實可靠的財務信息。而穩(wěn)健性作為財務信息確認的必要標準,可以有效解決由于數據不準確而產生的代理沖突問題。高質量的內部控制下,企業(yè)對外報出真實可靠的財務信息,從而可以提高會計穩(wěn)健性。借鑒美國的經驗,我國的企業(yè)也應如此,況且我國自古以來崇尚權力,企業(yè)高管的個人特質及擁有的權力會影響企業(yè)的經營決策和內部控制執(zhí)行效果。因此,當內部控制增強企業(yè)會計穩(wěn)健性的時候,高管集權會影響這種增強作用。本文搜集滬市和深市2012-2014年主板公司的財務數據,利用迪博內控指數來判斷內控質量的高低,通過Basu提出的盈余股票報酬模型衡量會計穩(wěn)健性,選擇公司規(guī)模、財務風險、成長能力作為控制變量,首先探究穩(wěn)健性特征是否為會計盈余的保障和基礎,接著檢驗內控質量對會計穩(wěn)健性的增強作用,最后用董事長與CEO是否兩職合一來定義高管集權,以分析高管集權對內部控制與會計穩(wěn)健性關系的影響。經過實證研究,本文發(fā)現:(1)在研究樣本中,80.50%的上市公司內控指數較高,然而少數公司內控質量處于較低水平。(2)穩(wěn)健性特征是會計盈余的保障和基礎。(3)高質量的內部控制增強了會計穩(wěn)健性表現。(4)高管集權會削弱內部控制對會計穩(wěn)健性的增強作用,而在高管非集權狀態(tài)下,內控質量對會計穩(wěn)健性的增強作用能得到有效發(fā)揮。本文系統(tǒng)研究了企業(yè)高管集權、內控質量和會計穩(wěn)健性的關系,在理論價值上,相比于其他學者的研究,本文添加高管權力配置結構變量,為配置公司權力結構及制定政策提供參考;在實踐價值上,從會計信息質量的角度證實了規(guī)范內部控制信息披露的必要性,有助于真正發(fā)揮公司內部治理機制的監(jiān)督作用,以保證財務信息的可靠性。
[Abstract]:At the beginning of the 21st century, a series of financial fraud cases occurred in the United States, which prompted the United States government to strengthen the information disclosure mechanism of internal control, which can realize self-regulation and self-restraint within enterprises. By establishing a perfect internal control system that can be implemented effectively, the enterprise can provide real and reliable financial information for the stakeholders, and soundness is the necessary standard for the recognition of financial information. It can effectively solve the problem of agency conflict caused by inaccurate data. Under high quality internal control, enterprises can report true and reliable financial information to the outside world, thus improving accounting conservatism. Chinese enterprises should do the same. Moreover, our country has advocated power since ancient times. The personal characteristics and power of executives will affect the effect of business decisions and internal control. When the internal control enhances the accounting conservatism of the enterprise, the centralization of executive power will affect the enhancement. This paper collects the financial data of the main board companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for 2012-2014, and uses the Depot internal control index to judge the quality of the internal control. Through the earnings stock reward model proposed by Basu to measure accounting conservatism, select company size, financial risk, growth ability as control variables, first explore whether conservatism is the guarantee and basis of accounting earnings. Then it tests the enhancement effect of internal control quality on accounting conservatism, and finally defines the influence of executive centralization on the relationship between internal control and accounting conservatism by using the combination of chairman and CEO to analyze the influence of executive centralization on the relationship between internal control and accounting conservatism. In this paper, we find that 80.50% of the listed companies in the study sample have a higher internal control index. However, a few companies' internal control quality is at a lower level) conservatism is the guarantee and basis of accounting earnings. (3) High quality internal control enhances the performance of accounting conservatism. 4) the centralization of executive power will weaken the enhancement effect of internal control on accounting conservatism. Under the condition of executive non-centralization, the enhancement of internal control quality to accounting conservatism can be effectively brought into play. This paper systematically studies the relationship between executive centralization, internal control quality and accounting conservatism. Compared with the research of other scholars, this paper adds the structural variables of executive power allocation to provide a reference for the allocation of corporate power structure and the formulation of policies. It proves the necessity of standardizing the disclosure of internal control information from the angle of the quality of accounting information, which is helpful to give full play to the supervisory role of the internal governance mechanism of the company and to ensure the reliability of the financial information.
【學位授予單位】：山西財經大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F275

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