本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)激勵 股權(quán)性質(zhì) 激勵動機 激勵效果　出處：《山東大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵制度是解決代理問題的產(chǎn)物,作為完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的手段,股權(quán)激勵對提升公司價值和留住關(guān)鍵人才的貢獻,為公司發(fā)展提供了動力,被國內(nèi)外上市公司廣泛運用。本文以蘇泊爾公司由民營家族上市公司轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橥赓Y控股企業(yè)前后實施的三套股權(quán)激勵方案為背景,總結(jié)蘇泊爾股權(quán)激勵制度的設計特征,對比公司先后兩個階段股權(quán)激勵的動機并評價其激勵效應,最后結(jié)合蘇泊爾的案例提出對上市公司設計股權(quán)激勵制度的啟示。本文采用了文獻研究法,個案分析法,事件研究法等研究方法,首先,結(jié)合公司被收購、高管人才流失頻發(fā)的背景,縱向?qū)Ρ炔煌A段蘇泊爾股權(quán)激勵契約要素的演變特征,發(fā)現(xiàn)激勵范圍不斷擴大、契約模式由股票期權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橄拗菩怨善�、行�?quán)條件更切合實際且多元化、激勵期限延長。接下來,根據(jù)契約要素設計特征和以往文獻的研究得出結(jié)論蘇泊爾股權(quán)性質(zhì)變更是股權(quán)激勵動機差異的根源,外資收購后蘇泊爾公司治理水平提升,有效實現(xiàn)兩權(quán)分離,股權(quán)激勵措施作用層面擴寬,激勵力度加大,相比而言民營家族企業(yè)階段激勵動機表現(xiàn)出更強的福利性質(zhì),外資控股階段主要目的為穩(wěn)定管理團隊。之后,梳理歷次股權(quán)激勵實施情況并從市場反應、行權(quán)結(jié)果和業(yè)績表現(xiàn)多維度衡量評價其激勵效果,蘇泊爾股權(quán)性質(zhì)變更前的股權(quán)激勵方案第一個行權(quán)期后全部行權(quán),短期內(nèi)為激勵對象帶來了高額收益,盡管公司業(yè)績有一定的提振作用,但持續(xù)時間較短且市場反應不積極,不排除盈余管理的嫌疑;外資控股后的激勵方案授予價格為0元,解鎖期的延長使得激勵對象分年分批獲得薪酬獎勵,對穩(wěn)定公司管理團隊有重大貢獻,公司凈資產(chǎn)收益率等業(yè)績表現(xiàn)發(fā)展勢頭良好,超額累積收益率增長顯著。最后,基于制度變遷理論動態(tài)均衡理念,建議上市公司在股權(quán)激勵制度設計前綜合考量公司實際情況明確激勵動機,設計中以激勵動機為導向設置統(tǒng)籌關(guān)鍵契約要素,施行時發(fā)揮管理的協(xié)同作用,提升公司治理水平并耦合其他管理制度。論文的貢獻在于為公司股權(quán)性質(zhì)由民營家族企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)為外資控股公司前后股權(quán)激勵制度設計和實施的不同表現(xiàn)提供了證據(jù)和理論借鑒,案例分析在一定程度上剖析展現(xiàn)了我國現(xiàn)階段民企被外企收購前后面臨的普遍困難和問題,即民背家族企業(yè)的公司治理水平的相對薄弱、被外企收購后人才流失現(xiàn)象嚴重等問題。創(chuàng)新方面,論文最后基于制度變遷理論的動態(tài)均衡理念,將公司股權(quán)激勵看作一個不斷變化和均衡的管理過程,提出每一套股權(quán)激勵方案的制定都需要根據(jù)公司所處環(huán)境和發(fā)展階段確定契合的激勵動機,科學推敲各契約要素設置從而搭建兼具約束性和激勵性的契約框架,并發(fā)揮公司治理等其他管理制度的協(xié)同作用。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive system is the product of solving the agency problem. As a means of perfecting the corporate governance structure, equity incentive contributes to the promotion of corporate value and the retention of key talents, and provides a driving force for the development of the company. It is widely used by listed companies at home and abroad. This paper summarizes the design features of Supor's equity incentive system based on the three sets of equity incentive schemes implemented before and after Supor's transformation from a private family listed company to a foreign-owned holding company. This paper compares the motivation of equity incentive in two stages and evaluates its incentive effect. Finally, combined with the case of Supor, the author puts forward the inspiration to the design of equity incentive system of listed companies. First of all, considering the background of the acquisition of the company and the frequent loss of senior executives, we compare the evolution characteristics of the elements of Supor equity incentive contract in different stages, and find that the scope of incentive is expanding. The contract mode is changed from stock option to restricted stock. The exercise conditions are more practical and diversified, and the incentive period is extended. According to the design characteristics of contract elements and the previous studies, it is concluded that the change of the nature of Supor's equity is the root of the difference of incentive motivation. After the acquisition of foreign capital, the governance level of Supor is improved, and the separation of the two rights is realized effectively. Compared with the incentive motivation of private family enterprises, the incentive motivation in the stage of private family enterprises shows a stronger nature of welfare. The main purpose of the foreign capital holding stage is to stabilize the management team. Combing the past implementation of equity incentive and evaluating its incentive effect from the market reaction, exercise result and performance performance, the stock right incentive scheme before the change of the nature of Supor equity is all exercised after the first exercise period. In the short term, it brings high profit to the incentive target. Although the company's performance has some effect, but the duration is short and the market reaction is not positive, the suspicion of earnings management is not excluded, and the incentive scheme after the foreign capital holding is awarded a price of 0 yuan. The prolongation of the unlocking period makes the incentive object get the salary reward year by year, which has great contribution to stabilizing the company management team. The performance of the company, such as the return on net assets, develops well, and the excess cumulative rate of return increases significantly. Based on the dynamic equilibrium concept of institutional change theory, it is suggested that listed companies should consider the actual situation of the company comprehensively before the design of the equity incentive system, and set up the key contract elements in the design guided by incentive motivation. Exert the synergistic effect of management at the time of implementation, The contribution of this paper is to provide evidence and theoretical reference for the design and implementation of the equity incentive system before and after the ownership nature of the private family enterprise is transformed into a foreign-owned holding company. To a certain extent, the case analysis shows the common difficulties and problems faced by private enterprises before and after they were acquired by foreign companies, that is, the relative weakness of the corporate governance level of the Minbei family enterprises. In the aspect of innovation, the paper regards corporate equity incentive as a changing and balanced management process based on the dynamic equilibrium concept of institutional change theory. It is proposed that the formulation of each set of equity incentive schemes needs to determine the appropriate incentive motivation according to the company's environment and development stage, and scientifically examine the setting of each contract element so as to build a binding and encouraging contractual framework. And give play to the synergy of other management systems such as corporate governance.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F426.6

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