本文關(guān)鍵詞： 管理層持股 財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu) 利益趨同效應(yīng) 壕溝效應(yīng)　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：管理層持股逐漸成為上市公司的重要現(xiàn)象,但是目前學(xué)界對(duì)管理層持股的研究,集中在管理層持股對(duì)公司價(jià)值的研究,較少涉及公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。本文認(rèn)為,管理層持股的雙重效應(yīng)(利益趨同效應(yīng)和壕溝效應(yīng))對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生相反的影響,不同的管理層持股比例會(huì)使得占主導(dǎo)地位的效應(yīng)不同,進(jìn)而會(huì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生不同的影響。本文在梳理了前人管理層持股、債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)、財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)后,選擇了財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)(Z-score)、管理層持股比例(Mbo)、管理層持股比例的平方(Mbo2)、財(cái)務(wù)杠桿(資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率:Lev)、成長性(Tobin' s Q)、盈利性(總資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率:Roa)等變量,以2009-2015年度在滬深兩地A股上市的非金融公司為研究對(duì)象,利用WIND數(shù)據(jù)庫選取了 6244個(gè)樣本。結(jié)合管理層持股的利益趨同效應(yīng)和壕溝效應(yīng)理論,運(yùn)用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、面板回歸和分類研究的方法,研究了管理層持股比例對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的異質(zhì)性和臨界點(diǎn)。本文主要的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)如下:(1)以往的研究主要將管理層持股僅僅作為變量之一去研究其對(duì)債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)和財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,本文將其作為核心解釋變量并輔以適當(dāng)?shù)目刂谱兞咳パ芯?能得到更深入的結(jié)論;(2)前人的文獻(xiàn)未研究管理層持股、債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)和財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)三者關(guān)系。本文依據(jù)管理層持股的利益趨同效應(yīng)和壕溝防守效應(yīng)理論,以債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)為紐帶,分析了管理層持股對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響邏輯,揭示了三者的關(guān)系;(3)理論上看,根據(jù)管理層持股的利益趨同效應(yīng)和壕溝防守效應(yīng),不同的持股比例對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響不同。我國近幾年管理層持股發(fā)生了變化,以往的研究建立在管理層持股比例較低的情況下,所以得出結(jié)論為線性關(guān)系的較多,而隨著管理層持股比例的增加,壕溝防守效應(yīng)可能增強(qiáng),管理層持股比例對(duì)債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)的影響逐漸復(fù)雜,或許存在非線性關(guān)系。實(shí)證上看,國外文獻(xiàn)研究出了非線性關(guān)系,國內(nèi)已有的文獻(xiàn)研究出的仍是線性關(guān)系。本文通過分類研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)我國管理層持股和財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系是非線性的,這一結(jié)論不同于國內(nèi)已有文獻(xiàn)結(jié)論;(4)本文分兩方面深入研究管理層持股比例與上市公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系。通過參照樣本比較持股與不持股的不同;通過持股的五檔分類尋找到了管理層持股比例對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的異質(zhì)性和臨界點(diǎn)。這些是前人文獻(xiàn)中未揭示的。通過理論分析和實(shí)證研究,本文得到結(jié)論如下:(1)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與管理層持股比例存在U型關(guān)系,壕溝效應(yīng)和利益趨同效應(yīng)是財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與管理層持股比例的U型關(guān)系的原因;(2)管理層持股比例至少應(yīng)達(dá)到0.005%才會(huì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生影響;(3)在管理層持股的上市公司中,債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)存在正影響;(4)在管理層不持股的上市公司中,債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響不顯著;(5)管理層持股比例通過影響債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)的方式影響財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
[Abstract]:Management shareholding has gradually become an important phenomenon of listed companies, but the current academic research on managerial shareholding focuses on the value of the company, less on the financial risk of the company. The dual effect of management shareholding (interest convergence effect and trench effect) has the opposite effect on financial risk. Then it will have different influence on financial risk. After combing the previous literature on management stock ownership, debt maturity structure, financial risk, Variables such as financial risk, management holding ratio, management ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, financial leverage (asset-liability ratio: Levn, growth Tobin's QN, total return on assets: Roa) are selected. Taking non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in 2009-2015 as research objects, 6244 samples were selected by using WIND database. Combined with the benefit convergence effect and trench effect theory of management shareholding, descriptive statistics were used. Panel regression and classification methods, This paper studies the heterogeneity and critical point of the influence of managerial shareholding ratio on the financial risk of listed companies. The main innovation of this paper is as follows: 1) in the past studies, management shareholding is only one of the variables to study its debt period. The effects of structural constraints and financial risks, This paper takes it as the core explanatory variable and studies it with appropriate control variables, and can get a more in-depth conclusion: (2) the previous literature has not studied the management shareholding. The relationship between debt maturity structure and financial risk. Based on the theory of interest convergence effect and trench defense effect, this paper analyzes the logic of the influence of management ownership on financial risk, based on debt maturity structure. In theory, according to the benefit convergence effect and trench defense effect of management shareholding, the influence of different shareholding ratio on financial risk is different. In recent years, management shareholding has changed in China. Previous studies have been based on the low shareholding ratio of the management, so the conclusion is that there are more linear relationships, but with the increase of the management shareholding ratio, the trench defense effect may be enhanced. The influence of managerial shareholding ratio on debt maturity structure is becoming more and more complicated, and there may be nonlinear relationship. In this paper, we find that the relationship between managerial shareholding and financial risk is nonlinear. This conclusion is different from the existing literature in China. This paper studies the relationship between the proportion of managerial shareholding and the financial risk of listed companies from two aspects, and compares the differences between shareholding and non-shareholding by reference samples. The heterogeneity and critical point of the influence of managerial shareholding ratio on financial risk are found through the five-file classification of shareholding. These are not revealed in previous literatures. The conclusion of this paper is as follows: (1) there is a U-type relationship between financial risk and managerial shareholding ratio. Trench effect and benefit convergence effect are the reasons for the U-shaped relationship between financial risk and managerial shareholding ratio. (2) the proportion of managerial shareholding should reach at least 0.005% to have an impact on financial risk. Debt maturity structure has a positive effect on financial risk. (4) in listed companies without ownership by management, debt maturity structure has no significant effect on financial risk. 5) the proportion of management holding shares affects financial risk through the way of affecting debt maturity structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.91
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本文編號(hào)：1545903