發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-03-08 12:43

【摘要】：近年來,我國商業(yè)銀行的委托貸款規(guī)模不斷擴(kuò)大,對(duì)借貸關(guān)系和社會(huì)資金配置產(chǎn)生了明顯影響。委托貸款作為商業(yè)銀行的中間業(yè)務(wù),拉長了委托人與借款人之間的委托代理關(guān)系,增加了社會(huì)資金的配置成本,降低了社會(huì)資源配置效率;委托人對(duì)借款人的監(jiān)督比商業(yè)銀行更有激勵(lì)和效率;委托貸款對(duì)金融資源錯(cuò)配的糾偏作用可能會(huì)增加社會(huì)資源配置成本。所以,從宏觀視角來看,委托貸款的司法設(shè)計(jì)并非經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)上的最優(yōu)設(shè)計(jì),如果商業(yè)銀行從委托人與借款人之間的借貸關(guān)系中退出,通過市場(chǎng)化設(shè)計(jì)允許企業(yè)間的直接借貸,可能會(huì)提高整體社會(huì)福利。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the scale of entrusted loans of commercial banks in China has been expanding, which has a significant impact on the relationship between loans and the allocation of social funds. As the intermediary business of commercial banks, entrustment loan lengthens the principal-agent relationship between principal and borrower, increases the allocation cost of social funds, and reduces the efficiency of social resources allocation. The supervision of the principal to the borrower is more encouraging and efficient than that of the commercial bank, and the corrective effect of the entrustment loan on the misallocation of financial resources may increase the cost of the allocation of social resources. Therefore, from the macro point of view, the judicial design of entrusted loans is not the best design in economics. If commercial banks withdraw from the relationship between principal and borrower, direct lending between enterprises can be permitted through market-oriented design. It may raise overall social welfare.
【作者單位】： 河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(12BJY016) 河北省科技計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目(134576209D)的階段性研究成果
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4

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