【摘要】：股權(quán)分置改革從2005年開(kāi)始實(shí)行,它打破了長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)上市公司流通股與非流通股相分割的局面。股權(quán)分置改革后,我國(guó)上市公司原有的非流通股獲得在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)上流通的權(quán)利。隨著股票市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入全流通時(shí)代,上市公司股東以自身利益最大化為目標(biāo)的獲利機(jī)制明顯發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變。他們從關(guān)注公司凈資產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)向更加關(guān)注二級(jí)市場(chǎng)股票價(jià)格的變化。大股東會(huì)利用自身的各種優(yōu)勢(shì),包括財(cái)務(wù)優(yōu)勢(shì)、信息優(yōu)勢(shì)等,盡量地抬高股價(jià),獲取投機(jī)收益。在全流通時(shí)代,大股東在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)上實(shí)現(xiàn)利益的最終方式是減持股份。 本文以2009年1月1日至2011年6月30日,大股東在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)上減持股份的公司為研究對(duì)象,采用事件研究法和多元線(xiàn)性回歸模型,分析大股東減持的深層次原因及減持行為對(duì)股票市場(chǎng)的影響。研究結(jié)果表明,大股東減持比例與公司經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)和盈利能力等公司經(jīng)營(yíng)特征并沒(méi)有直接的相關(guān)關(guān)系,而與股權(quán)制衡度負(fù)相關(guān),說(shuō)明大股東在減持股份時(shí)考慮的是減持是否會(huì)威脅其控制權(quán)地位。此外,當(dāng)大盤(pán)處于高位,市凈率較低的成長(zhǎng)型公司的股價(jià)更容易被高估,下跌的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更大,大股東更容易通過(guò)減持公司股票將所獲得的資本利得“落袋為安”,規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在大股東減持股份之前的一定時(shí)期內(nèi),上市公司存在著顯著為正的超額報(bào)酬,而在股份減持完成后,正的超額報(bào)酬逐漸消失。這表明大股東減持行為在短期內(nèi)呈現(xiàn)出負(fù)的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。通過(guò)研究上市公司減持效應(yīng)的相關(guān)影響因素發(fā)現(xiàn),從事件期的累積超額報(bào)酬來(lái)看,市場(chǎng)對(duì)于成長(zhǎng)型、信息透明度低、大股東減持比例高的公司更為擔(dān)憂(yōu),股票反應(yīng)比較強(qiáng)烈,減持效應(yīng)更明顯。最后本文從內(nèi)部治理和外部監(jiān)管兩方面對(duì)上市公司監(jiān)管層提出了對(duì)大股東市場(chǎng)交易行為監(jiān)管的政策建議。
[Abstract]:The reform of non-tradable shares has been carried out since 2005, which breaks the long separation of tradable shares and non-tradable shares of listed companies. After the reform of split share structure, the original non-tradable shares of listed companies in our country have the right to circulate in the secondary market. With the stock market entering the era of full circulation, the profit mechanism of shareholders in listed companies with the goal of maximizing their own interests has changed obviously. They moved from focusing on the company's net worth to paying more attention to changes in stock prices on the secondary market. Large shareholders will use their own advantages, including financial advantages, information advantages and so on, as far as possible to raise the stock price, to gain speculative gains. In the age of full circulation, the ultimate way for major shareholders to realize their interests in the secondary market is to reduce their share holdings. In this paper, from January 1, 2009 to June 30, 2011, the major shareholders in the secondary market in the reduction of shares as the research object, using the event study method and multiple linear regression model. This paper analyzes the deep reasons of the reduction of large shareholders and the influence of the behavior on the stock market. The results show that there is no direct correlation between the proportion of major shareholder reduction and the operating characteristics of the company, such as operating performance and profitability, but a negative correlation with the degree of equity balance. Major shareholders in reducing their shares consider whether the reduction will threaten their position of control. In addition, when the market is high, growth companies with low price-to-book ratios are more likely to be overvalued, riskier to fall, and larger shareholders are more likely to "pocket" their capital gains and avoid risk by reducing their holdings. In a certain period before major shareholders reduce their shares, listed companies have significantly positive excess returns, but after the completion of the stock reduction, the positive excess returns gradually disappear. This shows that the reduction of large shareholders in the short term shows a negative market reaction. Through the study of the related factors affecting the reduction effect of listed companies, it is found that the market is more worried about the growth type, low information transparency and high proportion of large shareholders' reduction, and the stock reaction is stronger from the cumulative excess returns in the event period. The reduction effect is more obvious. Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on the supervision of large shareholders' market transactions from two aspects of internal governance and external supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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