【摘要】：關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)盈余管理的影響，前期的文獻(xiàn)對(duì)該問題的研究主要局限于對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的考察。本文在前期文獻(xiàn)研究的基礎(chǔ)上，將視角拓展到近年來國際學(xué)術(shù)界研究較多的真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理，并基于中國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司實(shí)證研究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)盈余管理的影響。 本文采用的是規(guī)范研究與實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法，，理論研究為實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)作鋪墊，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)為理論研究作印證。在理論研究部分，本文在總結(jié)國內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)盈余管理的影響的文獻(xiàn)上，分別闡述了盈余管理基礎(chǔ)理論和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)基礎(chǔ)理論。 盈余管理的理論基礎(chǔ)主要包括盈余管理的界定、影響和分類，盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)理論包括委托—代理理論、契約理論和信息不對(duì)稱理論。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的理論基礎(chǔ)主要包括股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的界定、主要類型，同時(shí)分析了我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn)。 在理論研究的基礎(chǔ)上，從股權(quán)性質(zhì)、股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度三個(gè)方面對(duì)盈余管理程度的影響分別進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)闡述，并提出研究假設(shè)。由于計(jì)算應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理水平都需要連續(xù)三年的數(shù)據(jù)，而我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板2009年才上市，所以實(shí)證部分是以2011—2012年中國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)所有上市公司為研究樣本，篩選后共得到246個(gè)樣本。首先對(duì)樣本進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)，然后對(duì)所有變量進(jìn)行相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)。 實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)主要分為兩個(gè)步驟，一是分別計(jì)算應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理程度和真實(shí)盈余管理程度，二是回歸分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)盈余管理程度的影響。在比較盈余管理計(jì)量方法的基礎(chǔ)上，選擇了陸建橋修正Jones模型來衡量應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理水平，以銷售操縱導(dǎo)致的異常經(jīng)營(yíng)現(xiàn)金流量、生產(chǎn)操縱導(dǎo)致的異常生產(chǎn)成本和酌量性費(fèi)用操縱導(dǎo)致的異常酌量性費(fèi)用水平3個(gè)個(gè)體指標(biāo)來衡量企業(yè)真實(shí)盈余管理的程度。 本文通過研究得出結(jié)論：創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司中，國有性質(zhì)的控股股東降低了盈余管理的程度；股權(quán)集中度與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理之間都存在U型關(guān)系；股權(quán)制衡度與真實(shí)盈余管理顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理負(fù)相關(guān)但不顯著。
[Abstract]:As to the influence of equity structure on earnings management, the previous literatures mainly focus on the study of accrual earnings management. Based on the previous literature, this paper extends the perspective to the real earnings management in the international academia in recent years, and studies the impact of equity structure on earnings management based on the empirical study of listed companies in China's gem. This paper adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research. The theoretical research paves the way for the empirical test, and the empirical test serves as the confirmation of the theoretical research. In the part of theoretical research, this paper summarizes the domestic and foreign scholars' literature on the influence of equity structure on earnings management, and expounds the basic theory of earnings management and the basic theory of equity structure respectively. The theoretical basis of earnings management mainly includes the definition, influence and classification of earnings management. The motivation theory of earnings management includes principal-agent theory, contract theory and information asymmetry theory. The theoretical basis of equity structure mainly includes the definition of ownership structure and the main types. At the same time, the characteristics of equity structure of listed companies in gem are analyzed. On the basis of theoretical research, the influence of ownership nature, ownership concentration and equity balance on earnings management degree is elaborated in detail, and the research hypothesis is put forward. Since the calculation of accrual earnings management and real earnings management level require three consecutive years of data, but the gem of China only listed in 2009, so the empirical part is based on 2011-2012 all listed companies in the gem market as a research sample. A total of 246 samples were obtained after screening. First, the sample is analyzed by descriptive statistics, and then all variables are tested by correlation test. The empirical test is mainly divided into two steps. One is to calculate the degree of accrual earnings management and the other is to analyze the effect of equity structure on earnings management. On the basis of comparing the measurement methods of earnings management, this paper chooses the modified Jones model of Lu Jianqiao to measure the level of accrual earnings management, and uses the abnormal operating cash flow caused by sales manipulation to measure the level of accrual earnings management. The abnormal production cost caused by production manipulation and the abnormal discretionary cost level caused by discretionary cost manipulation are three individual indicators to measure the degree of real earnings management. This paper draws a conclusion through the research: in the gem company, the state-owned controlling shareholder reduces the earnings management degree, the equity concentration degree and the accrual earnings management and the real earnings management have the U-type relation; Equity balance is negatively correlated with real earnings management, but not with accrual earnings management.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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