本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 上市公司��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)互相分離使得管理層和股東之間的代理問(wèn)題成為公司治理中的一個(gè)重要問(wèn)題,股權(quán)激勵(lì)是解決代理問(wèn)題的重要方式之一。在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)達(dá)的西方國(guó)家股權(quán)激勵(lì)運(yùn)用相當(dāng)廣泛,相比之下,我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)發(fā)展較為滯后。2006年股權(quán)分置改革完成為我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施掃清了障礙,股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)法律法規(guī)的逐漸完善,為我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施提供了指引,股權(quán)激勵(lì)逐漸成為我國(guó)企業(yè)核心人才激勵(lì)機(jī)制的重要組成部分。但股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施不是一帆風(fēng)順的,有的企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃在中途“夭折”,有的企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)后未帶來(lái)應(yīng)有的效果。如何根據(jù)企業(yè)實(shí)際情況設(shè)計(jì)有效的激勵(lì)計(jì)劃是值得深入研究的。本文采用理論研究與案例分析相結(jié)合的方法,以J上市公司2014年股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為研究對(duì)象,從企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效方面、公司股價(jià)方面及企業(yè)人才保留方面對(duì)J上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果進(jìn)行了評(píng)價(jià)。在財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效方面,J上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)后發(fā)展能力得到提高,營(yíng)業(yè)收入與凈利潤(rùn)實(shí)現(xiàn)了較快增長(zhǎng),但只在股權(quán)激勵(lì)前兩期比較明顯,股權(quán)激勵(lì)后一期營(yíng)業(yè)收入增長(zhǎng)率與凈利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)率放緩;營(yíng)運(yùn)能力得到提高;但未能有效改善企業(yè)盈利能力;說(shuō)明股權(quán)激勵(lì)長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)效果有所不足。在公司股價(jià)方面,股權(quán)激勵(lì)后整體業(yè)績(jī)提升帶動(dòng)了J上市公司股價(jià)上揚(yáng)。從企業(yè)人才保留方面上看,股權(quán)激勵(lì)后大部分核心骨干得以保留。J上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果未能充分發(fā)揮與其股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案制定不科學(xué)是分不開(kāi)的:公司業(yè)績(jī)考核指標(biāo)單一且偏低,個(gè)人業(yè)績(jī)考核指標(biāo)設(shè)置模糊,影響了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的激勵(lì)效果;偏低的授予價(jià)格會(huì)降低激勵(lì)對(duì)象工作的積極性;激勵(lì)有效期偏短以及解鎖比例設(shè)置不合理與股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制相悖;未設(shè)有預(yù)留股份不利于企業(yè)對(duì)優(yōu)秀人才的吸引。針對(duì)其存在的問(wèn)題本文提供了一些建議。希望通過(guò)本文的研究,能提升J上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的合理性,使得企業(yè)更好地利用股權(quán)激勵(lì)促進(jìn)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展;同時(shí)也能為我國(guó)中小民營(yíng)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供借鑒。
[Abstract]:The separation of modern enterprise ownership and management makes the agency problem between management and shareholders become an important issue in corporate governance. Equity incentive is one of the important ways to solve the agency problem. Equity incentive is widely used in the developed western countries, but the development of equity incentive of listed companies in our country lags behind. The completion of the split share structure reform in 2006 cleared the way for the implementation of equity incentive in our country. The improvement of relevant laws and regulations on equity incentive has provided guidance for the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies in China. Equity incentive has gradually become an important part of the incentive mechanism of core talents in Chinese enterprises. However, the implementation of equity incentive is not smooth, some enterprises' equity incentive plan "aborted" in the middle of the way, and some enterprises have not brought due effect after the implementation of equity incentive. How to design an effective incentive plan according to the actual situation of enterprises is worthy of further study. This paper adopts the method of combining theoretical research and case analysis, taking the equity incentive of J listed company in 2014 as the research object, from the aspect of enterprise financial performance, The stock price and talent retention of J listed company are evaluated. In terms of financial performance, the development ability of J listed companies has been improved after the implementation of equity incentive, and the operating income and net profit have been rapidly increased, but only in the first two periods of equity incentive is more obvious. After equity incentive, the growth rate of operating income and net profit slowed down; the ability of operation was improved; but it failed to improve the profitability of enterprises effectively; it showed that the long-term incentive effect of equity incentive was insufficient. In terms of share prices, the overall performance after equity incentives led J-listed companies to rise in stock prices. From the point of view of the retention of talents in enterprises, After equity incentive most of the core backbone can retain .J listed company equity incentive implementation effect is not fully play and its equity incentive plan formulation is unscientific: the company performance evaluation index is single and low. The fuzzy setting of individual performance appraisal index affects the incentive effect of equity incentive, the low award price will reduce the enthusiasm of incentive object. The short period of incentive and the unreasonable setting of unlocking ratio are contrary to the stock right incentive as a long-term incentive mechanism; the absence of reserved shares is not conducive to attracting outstanding talents. Some suggestions are given in this paper for the existing problems. It is hoped that through the research in this paper, the rationality of the equity incentive scheme of J listed company can be enhanced, and the enterprise can make better use of equity incentive to promote the long-term development. At the same time, it can also provide reference for the implementation of equity incentive in small and medium-sized private listed companies in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92

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