本文選題：獨立董事　切入點：政府官員型　出處：《會計研究》2017年08期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：本文基于公司違規(guī)視角檢驗了兩類官員型獨立董事的監(jiān)督功能。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),聘任政府官員型獨立董事的公司違規(guī)傾向更高,違規(guī)被稽查的概率更低;聘任高校官員型獨立董事的公司違規(guī)傾向更低,違規(guī)被稽查的概率沒有表現(xiàn)更低。進一步還發(fā)現(xiàn),對公司過度投資發(fā)揮監(jiān)督功能是官員型獨董影響違規(guī)的重要傳導路徑;政府官員型獨董背后的尋租能力是其監(jiān)督失效的主要原因,而高校官員型獨董則憑借其專業(yè)優(yōu)勢發(fā)揮了積極的監(jiān)督作用。本文的經驗證據表明,"18號文"的政策沖擊導致的官員型獨董的離職,一方面切斷了公司通過聘任政府官員擔任獨立董事而建立政治關系的通道,有利于證券市場秩序的維護,但同時也將部分能夠發(fā)揮積極監(jiān)督作用的高校官員型獨董排除在外。
[Abstract]:Based on the perspective of company violation, this paper examines the supervisory function of two types of official independent directors. The study shows that the company employing government official independent directors has a higher tendency to violate the regulations, and the probability of violations being checked is lower. The company employing independent directors of university officials has a lower tendency to violate regulations, and the probability of violations being checked is not lower. Furthermore, it is found that overinvestment and supervision is an important transmission path to influence the violation; The main reason for the failure of supervision is the rent-seeking ability behind the government officials' independent directors. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that the policy impact of "article 18" has led to the departure of the official independent director. On the one hand, it cuts off the channel of establishing political relations by employing government officials as independent directors, which is conducive to the maintenance of the order of the securities market, but also excludes some university officials who can play an active role in supervision.
【作者單位】： 西南財經大學會計學院;西南財經大學工商管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目(71672149、71620107005、71273212) 教育部高等學校全國優(yōu)秀博士學位論文作者專項資金資助項目(201493) 中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務費專項資金(JBK1407116)的資助
【分類號】：F271;F832.51

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