本文關(guān)鍵詞： 定向增發(fā) 資產(chǎn)注入 操縱行為 監(jiān)管　出處：《沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：定向增發(fā)是目前倍受上市公司青睞的股權(quán)再融資方式,是企業(yè)重要籌資手段之一。定向增發(fā)不僅能夠拓寬企業(yè)的籌資渠道,還在改善企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)治理現(xiàn)狀方面發(fā)揮了積極作用。伴隨著資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展步伐,定向增發(fā)中上市公司大股東操縱行為逐漸受到學(xué)者的重視,特別是大股東操縱資產(chǎn)注入、操縱利潤(rùn)和操縱增發(fā)價(jià)格行為。上市公司大股東利用其控制權(quán)優(yōu)勢(shì)掌握更多信息,從而對(duì)其他股東權(quán)益構(gòu)成侵害,其隱蔽性也給投資者和監(jiān)管部門的識(shí)別造成一定阻礙。因此,如何識(shí)別注入資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量?jī)?yōu)劣、大股東操縱利潤(rùn)行為和操縱股價(jià)行為,從而確定是否存在大股東操縱行為,已成為證券市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和投資者們普遍關(guān)注的問題。本文首先對(duì)定向增發(fā)的概念及理論基礎(chǔ)作以闡述,包括定向增發(fā)中大股東不同操縱行為的概念界定。然后,從定向增發(fā)中大股東注入資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量?jī)?yōu)劣識(shí)別分析、操縱利潤(rùn)行為識(shí)別分析和操縱增發(fā)價(jià)格識(shí)別分析三方面分別進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,分別提出了溢價(jià)后的注入資產(chǎn)預(yù)期收益率、可操縱應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)和累計(jì)平均超額收益率作為大股東操縱行為的識(shí)別指標(biāo),并運(yùn)用不同的識(shí)別方法,判定研究樣本是否存在大股東操縱行為。最后,針對(duì)不同的大股東操縱行為提出了相應(yīng)的監(jiān)管對(duì)策。上市公司定向增發(fā)過(guò)程中大股東操縱行為識(shí)別的研究結(jié)論及監(jiān)管對(duì)策的提出,有利于中小股東準(zhǔn)確識(shí)別上市公司大股東操縱行為,利于上市公司完善內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)。此外,對(duì)于證券監(jiān)管部門強(qiáng)化對(duì)定向增發(fā)中利益輸送行為的整治和對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)可持續(xù)發(fā)展都具有較為積極的意義。
[Abstract]:As one of the most important means of raising funds, directional placement is a popular way of equity refinancing for listed companies, and it can not only broaden the financing channels of enterprises, but also increase the amount of capital of listed companies. It also plays an active role in improving the present situation of enterprise management. With the development of the capital market, the manipulation of large shareholders in the listed companies in directional placement has gradually been attached importance to by scholars, especially in the injection of assets manipulation by large shareholders. The large shareholders of listed companies use their advantages of control to grasp more information, thus infringing on the rights and interests of other shareholders, and its concealment also causes some obstacles to the identification of investors and regulatory authorities. How to identify the quality of injected assets, the behavior of large shareholders manipulating profits and manipulating stock prices, so as to determine whether there is manipulation of large shareholders, It has become a common concern of regulators and investors in the securities market. This paper first expounds the concept and theoretical basis of the placement, including the definition of the different manipulation behavior of the major shareholders in the placement. This paper makes empirical research on the identification of the quality of injected assets by large shareholders, the identification of manipulation of profit behavior and the identification of price of additional equity, respectively, and puts forward the expected rate of return of injected assets after the premium, respectively. The manipulable accrual profit and cumulative average excess return are used as the identification indexes of large shareholders' manipulation behavior, and different identification methods are used to determine whether there is large shareholder manipulation behavior in the study sample. Finally, This paper puts forward the corresponding supervision countermeasures for different large shareholders' manipulation behavior, the research conclusions of the identification of the large shareholders' manipulation behavior in the process of the listed company's directional additional issuance, and the suggestion of the supervision countermeasures. It is helpful for small and medium shareholders to accurately identify the manipulation of large shareholders of listed companies and to improve the internal governance structure of listed companies. It is of positive significance for the securities supervision department to strengthen the regulation of the behavior of interest transmission in the directional issuance and to the long-term sustainable development of the capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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