本文關(guān)鍵詞： 管理層權(quán)力 管理層薪酬 真實盈余管理　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：盈余管理始終是研究上市公司的重點和焦點,薪酬動機是誘發(fā)盈余管理的重要動機之一,而管理層權(quán)力理論又是國外眾多研究中用來解釋高管薪酬水平、薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)及其變化乃至企業(yè)績效的重要依據(jù)。21世紀初會計丑聞的層出不窮,催化了以《薩班斯法案》為代表的法律法規(guī)的頒布,規(guī)范了會計環(huán)境、完善了監(jiān)管制度。而作為應(yīng)對,企業(yè)的會計行為也從以往的應(yīng)計項目盈余管理更多地轉(zhuǎn)向真實盈余管理,希望通過這種手段繁多、隱蔽性高的途徑最大化個人利益,抬高薪酬。本文從管理層權(quán)力理論的視角,借助于Roychowdhury (2006)測度真實盈余管理的模型,選取2008至2012年滬深兩市A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù),將管理層薪酬從總水平、貨幣性現(xiàn)金薪酬、股權(quán)性薪酬三個角度刻畫,研究管理層薪酬與真實盈余管理之問的相互關(guān)系。 本文的研究結(jié)果顯示：管理層的總薪酬水平、貨幣性薪酬、股權(quán)性薪酬均與企業(yè)的真實盈余管理顯著負相關(guān)。也就是說,處于經(jīng)營管理一線的管理層權(quán)力過大,獲得了對外尋租的自由,真實盈余管理這一間接獲利方式就不再是最好的選擇。對于注重短期現(xiàn)金收益的管理層來說,他們能在經(jīng)營管理中得到合理滿意的回報,就沒有必要進行真實盈余管理；而對于堅持“放長線釣大魚”的遠見管理者而言,更加看重企業(yè)的未來發(fā)展,真實盈余管理雖能在短期內(nèi)拉高盈余,卻在長期對企業(yè)價值有害無益,因此需要得到抑制。 在我國,研究管理層薪酬與盈余管理的關(guān)系大都以代理理論為基礎(chǔ),較少涉足管理層權(quán)力理論。本文的創(chuàng)新之處就在于從管理層權(quán)力理論出發(fā),研究管理層薪酬與真實盈余管理的關(guān)系,并對其結(jié)果進行解釋。希望能夠豐富真實盈余管理在中國的研究內(nèi)容,為防范、識別、治理真實盈余管理提供向?qū)?維護利益相關(guān)者的利益,規(guī)范市場運作。
[Abstract]:Earnings management has always been the focus and focus of research on listed companies, compensation motivation is one of the important motivations to induce earnings management, and management power theory is used to explain executive compensation level in many foreign studies. The endless emergence of accounting scandals at the beginning of the 21st century catalyzes the promulgation of laws and regulations represented by Sarbanes Act and standardizes the accounting environment. Improve the regulatory system. And as a response, the accounting behavior of enterprises from the previous accrual items earnings management more to the real earnings management, the hope is that through this means a variety of. This paper measures the real earnings management model from the perspective of management power theory, with the aid of Roychowdhury / 2006. From 2008 to 2012, the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are selected to describe the management compensation from three angles: total level, monetary cash compensation and equity compensation. This paper studies the relationship between management compensation and real earnings management. The results of this study show that: the total salary level of management, monetary compensation, equity compensation are significantly negative correlation with the real earnings management. The management in the line of management is too powerful to obtain the freedom to rent out, the real earnings management is no longer the best way of indirect profit. For the management who pay attention to short-term cash returns. If they can get reasonable satisfactory returns in management, there is no need for real earnings management; But for the visionary managers who insist on "long-term fishing", they attach more importance to the future development of enterprises. Although real earnings management can increase earnings in the short term, it is harmful to the value of enterprises in the long run. Therefore, it needs to be suppressed. In China, the relationship between management compensation and earnings management is mostly based on agency theory, less involved in management power theory. The innovation of this paper is based on management power theory. This paper studies the relationship between management compensation and real earnings management, and explains the results. It hopes to enrich the research content of real earnings management in China and provide guidance for the prevention, identification and governance of real earnings management. Maintain the interests of stakeholders and regulate the operation of the market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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