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審計合謀成因與對策分析

發(fā)布時間:2018-06-23 18:23

  本文選題:審計 + 審計合謀 ; 參考:《首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學》2007年碩士論文


【摘要】: 注冊會計師的審計鑒證功能,是現(xiàn)代資本市場正常運轉的重要基石之一,注冊會計師獨立性的保持更是其發(fā)揮鑒證功能的基本前提。但是近年來發(fā)生的財務報告舞弊案件,很多都牽涉到注冊會計師的審計合謀問題。審計合謀是一種不正常的經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象,它的存在對我國市場經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展造成很嚴重的危害,同時也嚴重損害了我國會計師事務所形象。筆者希望通過對我國審計合謀現(xiàn)象的研究,能夠提供一點對審計合謀防范和治理有價值的建議。 本文試圖結合我國的制度、環(huán)境等非經(jīng)濟因素,從經(jīng)濟學的角度,運用博弈分析的方法,考察審計市場中合謀雙方的預期合謀利益、合謀成本,分析雙方趨利避害的行為選擇,揭示審計合謀的形成機制,進而提出通過整治外部社會法律環(huán)境、完善創(chuàng)新現(xiàn)有制度等途徑來改變審計合謀雙方的預期和行為選擇,從而達到防范、治理審計合謀行為的目的。 文章首先介紹了文章的研究背景以及選題的意義,對中外學者以往的研究情況進行了回顧,通過學習、借鑒國內(nèi)外專家、學者以往的研究成果,闡述了審計合謀的內(nèi)涵和審計合謀行為形成的理論機理,并結合中國審計市場的當前現(xiàn)狀,歸納了審計合謀的特性。 通過收集、整理、比較近幾年審計署、證監(jiān)會等監(jiān)管機構公布的處罰公告,簡要介紹了審計合謀行為在我國的現(xiàn)狀,揭示了我國審計市場中目前存在的問題。通過對一個典型審計合謀案例的說明與分析,指出了審計合謀行為產(chǎn)生的原因是多方面的,既有外部制度環(huán)境等因素的影響,也有內(nèi)部利益驅動原因。由此區(qū)分制度環(huán)境以及利益驅動等不同方面深入考察了審計合謀行為的形成機制。在分析利益驅動原因部分,為了能夠深入分析利益的取舍以及審計市場雙方趨利避害的行為選擇,采取了處理此類問題比較通用的作法,即運用博弈分析的方法,通過建立符合中國審計市場特點的博弈矩陣并對其進行分析,考察雙方的預期合謀利益、合謀成本,希望在此基礎上找到治理審計合謀的有效措施。 通過對審計合謀行為產(chǎn)生機制的分析,有針對性的提出了對審計合謀行為的治理意見,其中既包括為鼓勵和保證良好審計業(yè)務質量而應當采取的積極對策與措施,也包括為抑制審計合謀行為發(fā)生所應當采取的懲治對策與措施。
[Abstract]:The audit verification function of CPA is one of the important cornerstones of the normal operation of the modern capital market, and the maintenance of the independence of CPA is the basic premise of its function of authentication. However, in recent years, many of the financial reporting fraud cases involve the audit collusion of CPA. Audit collusion is a kind of abnormal economic phenomenon, its existence causes very serious harm to the development of market economy of our country, at the same time, it also seriously damages the image of the accounting firm of our country. The author hopes to provide some valuable suggestions for the prevention and management of audit collusion by studying the phenomenon of audit collusion in China. This paper attempts to combine the system, environment and other non-economic factors of our country, from the angle of economics, using the method of game analysis, to investigate the expected collusion benefit and collusion cost of both sides in the audit market, and to analyze the behavior choice of both sides to seek profit and avoid harm. This paper reveals the forming mechanism of audit collusion, and then puts forward to change the expectation and behavior choice of both sides of audit collusion by renovating the external social legal environment and perfecting and innovating the existing system, so as to achieve the purpose of preventing and managing audit collusion. The article first introduces the research background and the significance of the topic, reviews the past research situation of Chinese and foreign scholars, and draws lessons from the previous research results of domestic and foreign experts and scholars. This paper expounds the connotation of audit collusion and the theoretical mechanism of the formation of audit collusion, and sums up the characteristics of audit collusion combined with the current situation of audit market in China. By collecting, sorting out and comparing the punishment announcements issued by the Audit Office and the Securities Regulatory Commission in recent years, this paper briefly introduces the present situation of audit collusion in China, and reveals the problems existing in the audit market in our country. Through the explanation and analysis of a typical audit collusion case, it is pointed out that the causes of audit collusion are various, both the influence of external institutional environment and the internal interest driven reason. The formation mechanism of audit collusion is investigated from different aspects, such as institutional environment and interest drive. In the part of analyzing the reasons of interest driving, in order to analyze the choice of interests and the behavior choice of both sides of audit market, we adopt the general method to deal with this kind of problem, that is, using the method of game analysis. By establishing and analyzing the game matrix in accordance with the characteristics of China's audit market, the paper investigates the expected collusion interests and collusion costs of both sides, and hopes to find effective measures to govern audit collusion on this basis. Based on the analysis of the mechanism of audit collusion, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the governance of audit collusion, including the positive countermeasures and measures to encourage and guarantee the good audit quality. It also includes the countermeasures and measures that should be taken to curb the occurrence of audit collusion.
【學位授予單位】:首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2007
【分類號】:F239.4

【引證文獻】

相關期刊論文 前1條

1 龔嘉音;;審計合謀的成因與治理對策探析[J];商;2012年03期

相關碩士學位論文 前1條

1 薛美君;上市公司審計合謀及其治理研究[D];山西財經(jīng)大學;2011年

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本文編號:2058003

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