【摘要】：分權(quán)改革這一制度設(shè)計對于我國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展起到重要的作用。然而,我國分權(quán)改革機(jī)制重視激勵忽視監(jiān)督,存在一定的缺陷,隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)體量的累積,制度上的激勵將面臨失效。特別是在2008年經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)以后,分權(quán)改革制度缺陷浮出水面。國家經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展速度下滑,但經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型卻尾大不掉。為此,近年來政府審計作為監(jiān)督機(jī)制維護(hù)國家經(jīng)濟(jì)安全,擬補(bǔ)了分權(quán)改革的缺陷,促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。但是,由于理論發(fā)展的滯后,政府審計功能依然局限于監(jiān)督。本文通過對中央分權(quán)和政府審計文獻(xiàn)的梳理發(fā)現(xiàn)政府審計不僅可以在監(jiān)督方面具有揭露效應(yīng),同時對于政府官員具有威懾力。與此同時,通過對比委托代理理論和威懾效應(yīng)理論發(fā)現(xiàn)兩者具有相似的性,以此發(fā)現(xiàn)政府審計的威懾效應(yīng)。這是以往研究未有觸及。因此,文章以分權(quán)改革為背景,結(jié)合委托代理理論和威懾效應(yīng)理論,利用博弈模型分析了在經(jīng)濟(jì)分權(quán)的背景下,政府審計的揭示效應(yīng)和威懾效應(yīng)對地方經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響路徑。并且利用2007-2014年的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。實(shí)證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),政府審計的威懾效應(yīng)和揭示效應(yīng)均對地方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生顯著的影響。揭示效應(yīng)在短期內(nèi)對經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面影響,但這種負(fù)面影響是提高經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的合理性為前提,最終促進(jìn)了經(jīng)濟(jì)的長期發(fā)展;而威懾效應(yīng)對地方經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生了顯著的促進(jìn)作用,而威懾效應(yīng)時效性有一定的滯后,但威懾效應(yīng)在中長期具有持續(xù)的影響力。這表明政府審計對于地方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展一方面通過揭示問題降低了經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險,另一方面通過威懾力遏制地方政府的機(jī)會主義行為,提高長期的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展效益。
[Abstract]:The system design of decentralization reform plays an important role in the economic development of our country. However, China's decentralization mechanism attaches importance to incentives and neglects supervision, and there are some defects. With the accumulation of economic volume, institutional incentives will be faced with failure. Especially after the economic crisis in 2008, the system of decentralization reform defects surfaced. The national economy develops the speed to decline, but the economic transformation actually ends big. Therefore, in recent years, government audit, as a supervisory mechanism to safeguard national economic security, has made up for the defects of decentralization reform and promoted economic development. However, due to the lag of theoretical development, the function of government audit is still limited to supervision. By combing the documents of central decentralization and government audit, this paper finds that government audit can not only expose the effect of supervision, but also be a deterrent to government officials. At the same time, by comparing the principal-agent theory with the deterrent effect theory, the author finds that the two theories are similar, so as to find out the deterrent effect of government audit. This has not been touched upon in previous studies. Therefore, under the background of decentralization reform, combined with principal-agent theory and deterrent effect theory, this paper analyzes the influence of government audit on local economy under the background of economic decentralization by using game model. And using the 2007-2014 data for empirical testing. The empirical results show that both the deterrent effect and the revealing effect of government audit have a significant impact on the development of local economy. In the short term, however, the negative effect is the premise of improving the rationality of economic development, and ultimately promotes the long-term development of the economy, while the deterrent effect has a significant role in promoting the local economy. But the deterrent effect has lasting influence in the medium and long term. This indicates that the government audit can reduce the economic risk by revealing the problems on the one hand, and restrain the opportunistic behavior of the local government through deterrence on the other, so as to improve the long-term economic development benefit.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F239.44;F127

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 付敏杰;;分稅制二十年:演進(jìn)脈絡(luò)與改革方向[J];社會學(xué)研究;2016年05期

2 楊U嗘，

本文編號：2223883