發(fā)布時間：2018-04-11 20:59

  本文選題：產學研合作 + 博弈論　； 參考：《天津大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：20世紀末期以來,隨著知識經濟的初見端倪和創(chuàng)新活動的日益頻繁,科技創(chuàng)新逐漸成為我國經濟社會發(fā)展的不竭動力,產學研合作創(chuàng)新正是應這一背景發(fā)展而來,它能有效配置整合創(chuàng)新資源,促進各要素之間的有效結合和創(chuàng)新主體間的優(yōu)勢互補,加速技術成果商業(yè)化、市場化。從國家層面來看,有助于提升國家自主創(chuàng)新能力,這也符合我國建設創(chuàng)新型國家的目標要求。良好的產學研合作模式能實現(xiàn)各方形成能夠滿足利益需求、在能力上相互匹配的保證機制,使合作創(chuàng)新主體實現(xiàn)博弈中的共贏。因此,產學研合作創(chuàng)新是我國當前環(huán)境下實現(xiàn)經濟社會發(fā)展的重要途徑,已成為我國技術創(chuàng)新體系的重要組成部分。但現(xiàn)在我國有限的科技資源仍處于相互封閉、分散孤立、整體效率不高等狀態(tài),各方的動力和能力難以對接,企業(yè)和學研方之間的合作創(chuàng)新缺乏長效的機制。并且,政府對企業(yè)如何使用財政補貼、創(chuàng)新投入的具體信息等,無從知曉,也就說政府創(chuàng)新補貼的過程中信息也是不對稱的。由于信息不對稱導致的產學研創(chuàng)新主體間掌握信息不平衡,溝通不暢,無法深入了解彼此需求,將對產學研合作創(chuàng)新效率產生嚴重的制約作用。從微觀個體來說,這種信息不對稱造成的問題將會使每個參與合作創(chuàng)新的主體自身的創(chuàng)新能力不足,而從宏觀來看,將會使區(qū)域甚至整個國家的創(chuàng)新能力降低。因此,有必要從不對稱信息的角度對產學研合作創(chuàng)新進行分析。因此,本文查閱相關文獻,梳理基礎理論,應用了博弈論分析方法,從產學研合作創(chuàng)新的不對稱信息特性出發(fā),分析其產生的原因,繼而通過兩階段序貫博弈分析產學研過程中企業(yè)與學研方在合作創(chuàng)新中的策略,在實現(xiàn)各自利益的最大化情況下的不同選擇。之后又通過建立學研方、企業(yè)和政府三者結合的博弈模型,探討政府對產學研合作創(chuàng)新實行資金補貼行為與產學研主體創(chuàng)新行為二者之間存在的博弈,以此角度為切入點,分析政府補貼的產學研報酬激勵問題,政府和企業(yè)、學研方的動態(tài)博弈是最大限度實現(xiàn)創(chuàng)新的預期績效的結果,并試圖做出數(shù)據(jù)模擬,為產學研合作提供理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Since the end of the 20th century, with the emergence of knowledge economy and the increasing frequency of innovation activities, scientific and technological innovation has gradually become the inexhaustible motive force for the economic and social development of our country.It can effectively allocate and integrate innovative resources, promote the effective combination of various elements and complement the advantages of innovation subjects, accelerate the commercialization and marketization of technological achievements.From the national level, it is helpful to promote the national independent innovation ability, which is also in line with the goal of building an innovative country in China.A good model of cooperation between industry, university and research can realize the guarantee mechanism which can satisfy the interests of all parties and match each other in the ability, so that the main body of cooperation and innovation can realize the win-win situation in the game.Therefore, the cooperative innovation of industry, university and research is an important way to realize the economic and social development under the current environment of our country, and has become an important part of the technological innovation system of our country.However, the limited scientific and technological resources of our country are still in the state of mutual closure, dispersion and isolation, low overall efficiency and so on, the power and ability of all parties are difficult to connect, and the cooperative innovation between enterprises and researchers is short of long-term effective mechanism.Moreover, the government has no way to know how enterprises use financial subsidies and the specific information of innovation input, that is to say, the information in the process of government innovation subsidies is also asymmetric.Because the information asymmetry causes the information imbalance among the innovation subjects of industry, education and research, the communication is not smooth, and they can not understand each other deeply, which will restrict the innovation efficiency of the industry, college and research cooperation seriously.From the microcosmic point of view, the problem caused by this information asymmetry will make the innovation ability of the main body participating in cooperative innovation insufficient, but from the macro point of view, it will reduce the innovation ability of the whole region and even the whole country.Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the innovation of industry, college and research cooperation from the angle of asymmetric information.Therefore, this paper looks up the relevant literature, combs the basic theory, applies the game theory analysis method, starting from the asymmetric information characteristic of the cooperation innovation of industry, college and research, analyzes the reason of its emergence.Then, through two-stage sequential game analysis, the strategies of enterprises and researchers in cooperative innovation are analyzed in the process of production, education and research, and different choices are made to realize the maximization of their respective interests.Then through the establishment of the game model of the combination of research, enterprise and government, the paper discusses the game between the capital subsidy behavior of government and the innovation behavior of the main body of industry, college and research, so as to take this angle as the breakthrough point.The dynamic game between government and enterprise is the result of maximizing the expected performance of innovation and trying to make the data simulation to provide the theoretical basis for the cooperation between industry, university and research.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F124.3;F224.32

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本文編號：1737650