本文關(guān)鍵詞：市場化進程下高管薪酬差距與在職消費關(guān)系的實證研究　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 在職消費 高管薪酬差距 市場化進程

【摘要】：一邊是懸殊的薪酬差距,一邊是天價的在職消費,高管薪酬差距與在職消費的治理問題吸引學術(shù)界的廣泛研究。根據(jù)契約不完備理論,高管激勵契約不可能事無巨細地規(guī)定清楚,在職消費等隱性激勵契約內(nèi)生于兩權(quán)分離的現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度。高級管理人才是一種稀缺資源,有依據(jù)個人才能和貢獻獲取高于普通員工薪酬的理由。高管薪酬差距與在職消費都應該被納入激勵契約組合中聯(lián)動看待。在當今全面深入市場化改革的背景下,從市場化進程的層面來研究高管薪酬差距與在職消費在激勵契約組合中應用的多寡,具有非常重要的現(xiàn)實意義。本文運用理論分析與實證研究相結(jié)合的研究方法,在運用委托代理理論、不完備契約理論、信息不對稱理論、錦標賽理論等對市場化進程下高管薪酬差距與在職消費的關(guān)系進行理論分析梳理,提出研究假設。進而通過設計統(tǒng)計模型,實證檢驗了研究假設。在此基礎(chǔ)上對本文的研究結(jié)論進行探討并提出政策建議,指出本研究的不足與未來可能的研究方向。本文選取2013-2015年滬深兩市A股上市公司為樣本,共獲得1690個公司樣本的5070個觀測值,通過研究本文得出以下結(jié)論:高管薪酬差距與在職消費存在替代效應。分產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)研究的結(jié)論表明在國有企業(yè)中高管薪酬差距對在職消費的替代效應更強;在非國有企業(yè)中的高管薪酬差距與在職消費的替代效應不明顯。從市場化進程層面,動態(tài)考察高管薪酬差距與在職消費的關(guān)系,可以發(fā)現(xiàn),隨著市場化進程的提高,高管薪酬差距與在職消費的替代效應減弱。分產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)研究的結(jié)論表明在國有企業(yè)中,隨著市場化進程的提高,高管薪酬差距與在職消費的替代效應減弱得較少;非國有企業(yè)中,隨著市場化進程的提高,高管薪酬差距與在職消費的替代效應減弱得較多。為此,本文從優(yōu)化激勵契約組合、深化國有企業(yè)改革、全面推進市場化進程等方面提出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:One side is the salary gap, while the price of service consumption, extensive research on governance issues of executive pay gap and perks to attract academic. According to incomplete contract theory, incentive contract may not share contract clearly specified, within the separation of two rights of the modern enterprise incentive system recessive perquisiteconsumption senior management. Talent is a scarce resource, on the basis of individual talents and contributions to obtain higher than ordinary staff salary reasons. Executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption should be incorporated into the incentive contract combination in view of linkage. In the background of the comprehensive deepening of the market-oriented reform, to study the gap between executive compensation and perquisite consumption in the combined application of incentive contract the amount from the marketization level, has very important practical significance. This paper uses the theory research and empirical analysis In the method, using the principal-agent theory, incomplete contract theory, asymmetric information theory, the theoretical analysis about the relationship between the theory of championship executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption under the process of the market, put forward the research hypothesis. Then through the design of statistical model, an empirical test of the hypothesis. The conclusion of this paper on the basis of study and put forward policy recommendations, pointed out the deficiencies of this study and future research directions. This paper selects 2013-2015 A two years in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples, the company obtained a total of 1690 samples of 5070 measurements, this paper draws the following conclusions: the Executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption has a substitution effect research. The conclusion shows that the nature of property rights in state-owned enterprise executive compensation gap on the job consumption substitution effect is stronger; in non state-owned enterprises in executive pay gap and service The substitution effect of consumption is not obvious. From the marketization level, the relationship between the dynamic study, executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption can be found, along with the improvement of the marketization process, weaken the substitution effect of executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption. Research results show that the nature of property rights in state-owned enterprises, with the improvement of the marketization process. The substitution effect of executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption decreased less; the non state-owned enterprises, with the improvement of the marketization process, the substitution effect of executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption weakened more. Therefore, this article from the optimization of the incentive contract combination, deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, and comprehensively promote the marketization process and put forward the policy recommendations.

【學位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F126.1

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