【摘要】：金融市場(chǎng)的自律監(jiān)管已得到研究者的廣泛認(rèn)可,交易所通過合理的激勵(lì)措施來(lái)影響期貨公司的監(jiān)管行為是緩解道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、消除合謀行為的一個(gè)可能的"替代性監(jiān)管機(jī)制",但是多重激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的難以分離性與參與者非理性偏好的難以量化是相關(guān)研究的重要障礙。通過一個(gè)期貨市場(chǎng)實(shí)驗(yàn),在無(wú)獎(jiǎng)懲、懲罰、獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)、獎(jiǎng)懲聯(lián)合的機(jī)制與可剝離的返傭條件共同構(gòu)成的8種實(shí)驗(yàn)情境下,將量化的參與者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好作為控制變量,檢驗(yàn)了不同激勵(lì)機(jī)制對(duì)期貨公司監(jiān)管行為的影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)懲罰與獎(jiǎng)懲聯(lián)合機(jī)制對(duì)期貨公司的監(jiān)管行為約束較強(qiáng),而返傭削弱了獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制的作用。本實(shí)驗(yàn)為我國(guó)股指期貨市場(chǎng)自律監(jiān)管機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)提供了具體借鑒。
[Abstract]:The self-regulation of the financial market has been widely recognized by researchers. The exchange through reasonable incentives to affect the regulatory behavior of futures companies is a possible "alternative regulatory mechanism" to alleviate moral hazard and eliminate collusion. However, the inseparability of multiple incentive effects and the difficulty of quantifying the irrational preferences of participants are the important obstacles in related studies. Through a futures market experiment, the quantitative participants' risk preference is taken as the control variable under the eight experimental circumstances, which are composed of no reward and punishment, reward, reward and punishment combined with the detachable conditions of return to commission. The effects of different incentive mechanisms on the regulatory behavior of futures companies are examined. It is found that the combined mechanism of punishment and reward has a strong constraint on the regulatory behavior of futures companies, while the role of reward and punishment mechanism is weakened by the return of domestic helpers. This experiment provides a concrete reference for the design of self-regulatory mechanism of stock index futures market in China.
【作者單位】： 西安交通大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;第二炮兵工程大學(xué)審計(jì)辦公室;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71173166,71373202)
【分類號(hào)】：F832.39

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本文編號(hào)：2424703