本文關(guān)鍵詞： 對(duì)賭協(xié)議 激勵(lì)機(jī)制 公司治理 期權(quán) 射幸合同 價(jià)值　出處：《上海交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：PE作為一種戰(zhàn)略投資者，過(guò)去的十年在中國(guó)得到快速發(fā)展。而源于對(duì)非公眾公司信息披露不完善和公司治理水平的不確定性，對(duì)賭協(xié)議這一估值調(diào)整工具也被PE行業(yè)廣泛運(yùn)用，并成為項(xiàng)目的關(guān)鍵機(jī)制。 這一被投資方廣泛采用的機(jī)制是否真的實(shí)現(xiàn)了很好的價(jià)值發(fā)現(xiàn)功能和對(duì)融資方的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)，這是本文要論述的。 對(duì)賭協(xié)議從合同屬性來(lái)看，是建構(gòu)在合同自由這一民事行為原則基礎(chǔ)上，基于對(duì)未來(lái)不確定性收益建構(gòu)的一種利益交換約定，很好的體現(xiàn)了市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的自發(fā)調(diào)節(jié)原則，它所具備的射幸合同的等價(jià)有償?shù)南鄬?duì)性，很好的解決了信息不確定性下的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制機(jī)制。 而從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度來(lái)看，作為對(duì)信息不對(duì)稱環(huán)境下的“逆向選擇”和“道德問(wèn)題”的回應(yīng)，“對(duì)賭協(xié)議”在一定條件下，對(duì)管理層來(lái)說(shuō)是激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度最大，對(duì)投資者來(lái)說(shuō)是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制最優(yōu)，對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效率來(lái)講是帕累托最優(yōu)的一種機(jī)制安排。 本文重點(diǎn)用量化模型的方法，，首先構(gòu)建了一個(gè)方程模型，論證了對(duì)賭協(xié)議可以視為一個(gè)固定收益?zhèn)蛯?shí)物期權(quán)組合模型，并體現(xiàn)出了對(duì)賭協(xié)議對(duì)于投資方而言是一種很好的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移工具。 然后通過(guò)案例，比較了實(shí)物期權(quán)定價(jià)模型和凈現(xiàn)值計(jì)算結(jié)果的差異，發(fā)現(xiàn)了對(duì)賭協(xié)議作為一種期權(quán)性質(zhì)的財(cái)務(wù)工具的價(jià)值發(fā)現(xiàn)功能。 最后通過(guò)對(duì)賭協(xié)議投資方和融資方收益方程的建立與比較，進(jìn)一步論證了對(duì)賭協(xié)議是一種對(duì)投資方和融資方的雙向激勵(lì)機(jī)制。 作為公司治理中的激勵(lì)機(jī)制是否有效,取決于在多大程度上將激勵(lì)主體與激勵(lì)客體的目標(biāo)利益函數(shù)聯(lián)系在一起,使報(bào)酬具有充分的激勵(lì)數(shù)額與合理的結(jié)構(gòu)。對(duì)賭協(xié)議的恰恰很好的將投資方和融資方的目標(biāo)利益函數(shù)聯(lián)系在一起，它不只是一種零和博弈的利益再分配機(jī)制和對(duì)投資方的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保障，更是實(shí)現(xiàn)了對(duì)未來(lái)不確定性的戰(zhàn)略決策權(quán)的價(jià)值發(fā)現(xiàn)，進(jìn)而創(chuàng)造性的解決了投資和融資方之間的利益一致化問(wèn)題，實(shí)現(xiàn)一種雙向的激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)。對(duì)賭協(xié)議的設(shè)計(jì)體現(xiàn)了一種對(duì)當(dāng)事雙方的正向激勵(lì)性。
[Abstract]:As a strategic investor, PE has developed rapidly in China in the past ten years. But because of the uncertainty about the imperfect information disclosure of non-public companies and the level of corporate governance, gambling agreement, a valuation adjustment tool, has also been widely used in the PE industry. And become the key mechanism of the project. Whether the mechanism widely used by the investors has really realized the value discovery function and the incentive effect to the financier is discussed in this paper. From the point of view of contract attribute, the gambling agreement is based on the civil behavior principle of freedom of contract and a kind of benefit exchange agreement based on the construction of uncertain income in the future, which well embodies the principle of spontaneous regulation of market economy. It has the equivalent paid relativity of the lucky contract, which solves the risk control mechanism under the information uncertainty. From the economic point of view, as a response to the "adverse selection" and "moral issues" in the asymmetric information environment, the "gambling agreement" is the strongest incentive for the management under certain conditions. Risk control is optimal for investors and Pareto optimal mechanism for economic efficiency. In this paper, the quantitative model is used to construct an equation model, which proves that the bet agreement can be regarded as a combination model of fixed income bonds and real options. It also shows that gambling agreement is a good risk transfer tool for investors. Then the difference between the real option pricing model and the net present value calculation results is compared and the value discovery function of the gambling agreement as a financial tool of option nature is found. Finally, through the establishment and comparison of the profit equation between the investor and the financier of the gambling agreement, it is further demonstrated that the gambling agreement is a two-way incentive mechanism for the investor and the financier. Whether the incentive mechanism in corporate governance is effective or not depends on the extent to which the incentive subject and the objective interest function of the incentive object are linked together. Make the reward have sufficient incentive amount and reasonable structure. The agreement on gambling is a good link between the investor and the financier's objective interest function, It is not only a zero-sum game benefit redistribution mechanism and risk protection for investors, but also the realization of the value of the strategic decision-making power of uncertainty in the future. Then it creatively solves the problem of the consistency of interests between the investors and the financiers, and realizes the design of a two-way incentive mechanism, and the design of the gambling agreement reflects a positive incentive for both parties.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.48

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