本文選題：旅游服務供應鏈 + 機制設計��； 參考：《湖南工業(yè)大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著服務經濟時代的到來,旅游業(yè)在全球經濟中的占比越來越大,旅游服務供應鏈作為一個新的研究領域也逐漸興起。旅游產品綜合性的特點決定了旅游服務供應鏈的運作離不開旅行社和服務供應商之間的銜接和協調,然而,旅游業(yè)中企業(yè)異質性的特征決定了它們的利益目標并不一致。服務供應商一般不會主動向旅行社匯報它所擁有的諸如旅游市場狀況和服務能力等私有信息,此外,在為游客服務過程中的偷懶和怠工等行為將共同導致旅行社的利益受損。因此,如何對服務供應商實施有效激勵是旅行社面臨的實際問題。本文綜合運用管理學、經濟學、博弈論、委托代理理論和機制設計理論等多學科理論與方法,對旅行社如何運用激勵機制來防范上述問題進行了系統研究。 首先,闡述了旅游服務供應鏈的研究背景,指出了加強旅游服務供應鏈激勵機制設計研究的必要性；回顧與述評了相關研究,理清了旅游服務供應鏈中的委托代理關系,論證了旅行社的核心地位。 其次,提出了防范服務供應商道德風險的旁支付激勵機制。證明了旁支付激勵機制不僅能誘導服務供應商提高服務努力水平,還能增加旅行社的收益并提高旅游服務供應鏈的運作效率。 此外,針對旅行社如何激勵服務供應商努力工作并獲取真實旅游市場信息,進而制定旅游報價問題,設計了具有多目標激勵功能的甄別合約,并分析了各因素對博弈方最優(yōu)策略和收益的影響。 進一步,以服務供應商的服務能力具有連續(xù)特征為拓展假設,設計了既能甄別服務供應商的真實能力信息,又能激勵其提高服務努力水平的混合型激勵機制；提出了一種限制策略實現了對部分低能力服務供應商的排除,并討論了由該策略而導致的類“檸檬市場”現象。 最后,總結了全文并指出了幾個進一步研究的方向。
[Abstract]:With the arrival of service economy, tourism accounts for more and more in the global economy. As a new research field, tourism service supply chain (TSC) is emerging gradually. The comprehensive characteristics of tourism products determine that the operation of tourism service supply chain can not be separated from the connection and coordination between travel agencies and service providers. However, the heterogeneity of enterprises in tourism determines their interests and objectives are not the same. Service providers generally do not actively report private information such as tourism market conditions and service capabilities to travel agencies. In addition, idle and idle activities in the process of serving tourists will jointly cause damage to travel agencies' interests. Therefore, how to implement effective incentives to service providers is a practical problem faced by travel agencies. Based on the theories and methods of management, economics, game theory, principal-agent theory and mechanism design, this paper makes a systematic study on how travel agencies use incentive mechanism to prevent these problems. First of all, the research background of tourism service supply chain is expounded, and the necessity of strengthening the incentive mechanism design of tourism service supply chain is pointed out, and the principal-agent relationship in tourism service supply chain is clarified by reviewing and reviewing relevant research. The core position of travel agency is demonstrated. Secondly, it puts forward the side payment incentive mechanism to prevent the moral hazard of service providers. It is proved that the incentive mechanism of side payment can not only induce service providers to improve their service efforts, but also increase the income of travel agencies and improve the operational efficiency of tourism service supply chain. In addition, aiming at how travel agencies motivate service providers to work hard and obtain real tourism market information, and then formulate tourism quotation, a screening contract with multi-objective incentive function is designed. The influence of various factors on the game party's optimal strategy and income is analyzed. Furthermore, based on the hypothesis that the service provider's service capability has continuous characteristics, a hybrid incentive mechanism is designed, which can not only discriminate the true capability information of service provider, but also stimulate the service provider to improve the level of service effort. In this paper, a restriction strategy is proposed to eliminate some low-capacity service providers, and the "lemon market" phenomenon caused by this strategy is discussed. Finally, the paper summarizes the full text and points out several further research directions.
【學位授予單位】：湖南工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F590

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 張曉明;張輝;毛接炳;;旅游服務供應鏈中若干環(huán)節(jié)的協調[J];城市發(fā)展研究;2008年05期

2 高燕;鄭焱;;委托代理視角下的導游忠誠與激勵研究[J];旅游論壇;2008年05期

3 王惠琴;;國內旅游服務研究綜述[J];黑龍江對外經貿;2007年07期

4 田厚平;劉長賢;;非對稱信息下分銷渠道中的激勵契約設計[J];管理科學學報;2009年03期

5 田厚平;劉長賢;;雙重信息不對稱下銷售渠道雙目標混合激勵模型[J];管理科學學報;2011年03期

6 王曉凈;汪賢裕;;二級供應鏈中代理人的甄別與激勵研究[J];技術經濟與管理研究;2010年04期

7 何愛平;肖智;劉蜀鳳;;導游道德風險的動態(tài)最優(yōu)化分析[J];旅游學刊;2010年09期

8 張宗明;廖貅武;劉樹林;;需求不確定性下IT服務外包合同設計與分析[J];管理科學學報;2013年02期

9 張宗明;劉樹林;廖貅武;;逆向選擇下合作服務的最優(yōu)契約配置[J];科研管理;2013年04期

10 陳劍;徐鴻雁;;銷售激勵與定價關系研究[J];清華大學學報(哲學社會科學版);2006年S1期

相關博士學位論文 前2條

1 楊樹;旅游供應鏈競爭與協調[D];中國科學技術大學;2008年

2 黃小軍;旅游服務供應鏈協調機制與整體優(yōu)化研究[D];南昌大學;2009年

，

本文編號：2109075