發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-21 10:55

【摘要】：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性是財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)的一項(xiàng)重要慣例,是會(huì)計(jì)確認(rèn)和計(jì)量的一項(xiàng)基本原則,它存在并影響會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)踐已經(jīng)有幾百年的歷史。終極所有權(quán)的出現(xiàn)始于La Port et al.(1999),他們用終極控制股東的投票權(quán)和所有權(quán)來分別代表其控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán),并指出控股股東可以通過金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)、交叉持股和多重股份等控制權(quán)安排來實(shí)現(xiàn)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離,并以小股東利益為代價(jià)來獲得私有收益,其侵占行為加劇了控股股東和小股東的代理沖突。從此以后,關(guān)于終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)研究拉開了帷幕。我國(guó)是一個(gè)處于轉(zhuǎn)軌時(shí)期的新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家,具有股權(quán)高度集中、兩權(quán)分離嚴(yán)重、法制環(huán)境和監(jiān)管機(jī)制不完善等特點(diǎn),會(huì)計(jì)做假頻頻出現(xiàn),盈余信息含量不高。在如此特殊的制度背景下考察終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、投資者法律保護(hù)與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系在理論上和實(shí)踐中都具有深遠(yuǎn)意義。 本文運(yùn)用2008～2011年在滬深A(yù)股上市公司的3788個(gè)樣本的面板數(shù)據(jù),從終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)視角研究了終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系,并引入外部治理環(huán)境即投資者法律保護(hù),進(jìn)一步分析了在中國(guó)特殊制度背景下投資者法律保護(hù)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響,以及我國(guó)上市公司的終極控股股東的兩權(quán)分離度與投資者法律保護(hù)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的交互影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)終極控股股東的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間不存在顯著的關(guān)系；(2)終極控股股東的控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離度與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；(3)國(guó)有控股的上市公司會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性比非國(guó)有控股的上市公司會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性更高；(4)投資者法律保護(hù)水平越高,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越高；(5)有效的投資者法律保護(hù)可以削弱終極控股股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離度對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的負(fù)面影響。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important convention of financial accounting and a basic principle of accounting recognition and measurement. It has existed and influenced accounting practice for hundreds of years. The emergence of ultimate ownership began in La Port et al. (1999. They used the voting rights and ownership rights of ultimate controlling shareholders to represent their control rights and cash flow rights, respectively, and pointed out that controlling shareholders could pass through the pyramid structure. The separation of control rights from cash flow rights and private gains at the expense of minority shareholders' interests have aggravated the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders through the arrangement of control rights such as cross-shareholding and multiple shares. Since then, the relevant research on the ultimate ownership structure has begun. China is an emerging market country in the transitional period, with the characteristics of high concentration of stock rights, serious separation of two rights, imperfect legal environment and supervision mechanism, frequent accounting fraud and low information content of earnings. Under such a special institutional background, the relationship between investor legal protection and accounting conservatism is of profound significance both in theory and in practice. Using the panel data of 3788 samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2011, this paper studies the relationship between the ultimate ownership structure and accounting conservatism from the perspective of ultimate ownership structure, and introduces the external governance environment, that is, investor legal protection. This paper further analyzes the influence of investor legal protection on accounting conservatism under the background of Chinese special system, and the interaction between the separation of two rights of ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies in China and the legal protection of investors on accounting conservatism. The results show that: (1) there is no significant relationship between the cash flow right and accounting conservatism of the ultimate controlling shareholder; (2) the separation of the control right and cash flow right of the ultimate controlling shareholder is negatively related to the accounting conservatism. (3) the accounting conservatism of the state-owned holding listed company is higher than that of the non-state-owned holding company, (4) the higher the level of investor legal protection, the higher the accounting conservatism; (5) effective legal protection of investors can weaken the negative influence on accounting conservatism caused by the separation of controlling right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling shareholder.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F233;F275;F276.6

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 楊克智;謝志華;;金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、終極控股股東行為與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性[J];北京工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2010年06期

2 陶曉慧;柳建華;;資產(chǎn)替代、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與債權(quán)人保護(hù)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)理論與實(shí)踐;2010年04期

3 毛淑珍;劉志遠(yuǎn);樂國(guó)林;;投資者法律保護(hù)與終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)關(guān)系研究[J];財(cái)貿(mào)研究;2010年06期

4 甄紅線;史永東;;終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)研究——來自中國(guó)上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2008年11期

5 陳晨;陳海聲;;兩權(quán)分離、地區(qū)執(zhí)法強(qiáng)度與并購企業(yè)績(jī)效的相關(guān)性[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2012年30期

6 朱松;夏冬林;;制度環(huán)境、經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性[J];審計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2009年06期

7 吳宗法;張英麗;;基于法律環(huán)境和兩權(quán)分離的利益侵占研究——來自中國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];審計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2012年01期

8 高燕;;所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、終極控制人與盈余管理[J];審計(jì)研究;2008年06期

9 陶曉慧;柳建華;;會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性、債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)與債權(quán)人保護(hù)[J];山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2010年04期

10 黃登仕;劉海雁;;終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)權(quán)益資本成本的影響[J];統(tǒng)計(jì)與決策;2010年16期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 葉勇;上市公司終極控制權(quán)效應(yīng)研究及實(shí)證分析[D];西南交通大學(xué);2005年

，

本文編號(hào)：2195491