本文選題：技術授權　切入點：技術創(chuàng)　出處：《暨南大學》2008年博士論文

【摘要】： 理論上,對技術授權的研究多是集中在對技術授權契約的研究上,其中,對因不對稱信息所引起的道德風險和逆向選擇條件下的授權契約研究,則成為研究焦點。而這些研究一是忽視了研究信息不對稱下被授權方的逆向選擇行為對社會福利的影響;二是忽視了研究當本國廠商具備創(chuàng)新能力或者合作創(chuàng)新能力時,國外技術授權契約的形成及其對國內(nèi)社會福利的影響,更沒有具體結(jié)合國內(nèi)廠商的創(chuàng)新效率、成本、效益來具體研究國內(nèi)創(chuàng)新活動對技術授權、社會福利的影響。 本文以現(xiàn)有研究為基礎,在區(qū)分不同的市場結(jié)構(gòu)和專利權人是否參與市場競爭的前提下,探討了技術被授權方的私人信息、國內(nèi)廠商的創(chuàng)新能力以及本國政府對創(chuàng)新的鼓勵政策等因素對技術授權契約形成的影響,再分析該契約對社會福利的影響。 當專利權人不參與國內(nèi)壟斷市場競爭時,技術被授權方存在的私人信息將導致混合費用授權方式的出現(xiàn)。雖私人信息可使國內(nèi)廠商獲取額外的信息租金,但社會福利將會遭受更多損失。當國內(nèi)廠商具備創(chuàng)新能力時,可利用其迫使專利權人降低技術授權價格;另外,不對稱創(chuàng)新效率信息可降低技術授權費用,還可以提升國內(nèi)社會福利水平。政府對國內(nèi)廠商的研發(fā)補貼可激勵國內(nèi)廠商創(chuàng)新的積極性,增加國內(nèi)社會福利水平。 當專利權人參與國內(nèi)壟斷市場競爭時,信息對稱情況下的授權方式是提成費用方式;當國內(nèi)廠商存在私人信息時,混同均衡策略或擇優(yōu)授權策略將出現(xiàn)。當國內(nèi)廠商具備創(chuàng)新能力時,專利權人最優(yōu)授權策略仍采取提成費用的授權策略,但將降低提成費用。政府對國外廠商進行征稅可增加國內(nèi)廠商的市場份額和利潤,但對授權方式?jīng)]影響;對研發(fā)補貼則可增強國內(nèi)廠商的研發(fā)動機,降低技術授權的價格;另外,這兩種政策措施都可以增進社會福利。 當專利權人不參與國內(nèi)寡頭市場競爭時,在信息對稱的條件下,較小的市場規(guī)模將使專利權人采用固定費用方式只對低成本廠商進行授權;而較大的市場規(guī)模將使其采用提成費用方式對兩個國內(nèi)廠商同時授權。在信息不對稱的條件下,授權方式與信息對稱時相似,但優(yōu)勢成本廠商的低成本類型可獲得額外的信息租金。當一個國內(nèi)廠商具備研發(fā)能力時,專利權人對另一廠商的授權可增加國內(nèi)消費者剩余,但自主研發(fā)廠商的利潤減少了。當兩國內(nèi)廠商都具有創(chuàng)新能力時,其最優(yōu)的合作創(chuàng)新方式取決于彼此間技術外溢程度。合作創(chuàng)新不僅可以提升廠商利潤和社會福利,而且當其考慮技術授權時可以進一步降低技術授權中的價格。 當專利權人參與國內(nèi)寡頭市場競爭時,對于兩個無研發(fā)能力的國內(nèi)廠商,專利權人將采用提成費用方式對其同時授權,此時國內(nèi)社會福利水平?jīng)]有發(fā)生任何改變。若有一國內(nèi)廠商具有研發(fā)能力,固定費用的授權方式將被用來對另一廠商授權,使得國內(nèi)的消費者剩余增加了,選擇創(chuàng)新廠商的利潤減少了。若兩國內(nèi)廠商都具備創(chuàng)新能力,存在最優(yōu)的合作創(chuàng)新方式,彼此間的技術外溢程度和創(chuàng)新效率將決定其利潤和社會福利,同時還可以提高國內(nèi)廠商在技術授權中的談判砝碼。 最后,以國內(nèi)高新技術產(chǎn)業(yè)1995-2005年的數(shù)據(jù)對技術授權、技術創(chuàng)新與企業(yè)效益之間的關系作了一個經(jīng)驗分析。發(fā)現(xiàn)國內(nèi)企業(yè)的RD投入與技術引進之間存在著一個相互依賴、相互促進的關系。國內(nèi)企業(yè)的RD投入對企業(yè)效益的影響具有直接的、明顯的推動作用;技術引進對當期的企業(yè)效益影響具有輕微的抑制作用,但技術引進對企業(yè)效益的影響是通過間接的、滯后的方式顯示出來,通過形成固定資產(chǎn)和刺激RD投入而提高企業(yè)效益。
[Abstract]:On the other hand , the research on technical authorization is focused on the research of technical authorization contract , which is the focus of research on the research of authorization contract under the conditions of moral hazard and adverse selection caused by asymmetric information .


On the basis of the existing research , this paper discusses the influence of the private information of the authorized party , the innovation ability of the domestic manufacturers and the encouragement policy of the government to the innovation , and analyzes the effect of the contract on the social welfare under the premise of distinguishing whether different market structures and patent owners are involved in the market competition .


When the patent owner does not participate in the domestic monopoly market competition , the private information of the authorized party of the technology will lead to the appearance of the mixed fee authorization mode . Although the private information can make the domestic manufacturers obtain extra information rent , the social welfare will suffer more losses . When the domestic manufacturers have the creative ability , they can be used to force the patent holder to lower the technical authorization price . In addition , the asymmetric innovation efficiency information can reduce the technical authorization fees and improve the domestic social welfare level . The government ' s R & D subsidies for domestic manufacturers can stimulate the initiative of domestic manufacturers to innovate , and increase the domestic social welfare level .


When the patent owner participates in the competition of the domestic monopoly market , the authorization mode under the information symmetry condition is the expense mode ; when the domestic manufacturer has the creative ability , the mixed equilibrium strategy or the preferential authorization strategy will appear . When the domestic manufacturer has the innovation ability , the patent owner ' s optimal authorization policy still adopts the authorization strategy of raising the cost , but it will reduce the cost of authorization . The government can increase the domestic manufacturers ' market share and profit , but it has no effect on the authorization mode ; and the R & D subsidy can enhance the R & D motivation of the domestic manufacturers and reduce the price of technical authorization ; besides , both policy measures can improve social welfare .


When the patent owner does not participate in the domestic oligopolistic market competition , under the condition of information symmetry , the smaller market size will enable the patent owner to use fixed cost method only to authorize the low - cost manufacturers . When the information is asymmetric , the authorization mode is similar to the information symmetry , but the profit of the independent R & D manufacturers is reduced . When a domestic manufacturer has the capability of developing innovation , the optimal cooperative innovation mode depends on the degree of technology overflow with each other . The cooperation innovation can not only improve the profit and social welfare of the manufacturer , but also can further reduce the price in the technical authorization when considering the technical authorization .


When the patent owner participates in the domestic oligopolistic market competition , in the case of two domestic manufacturers that have no R & D capability , the patent owner will authorize the two countries without R & D capability at the same time . At this time , there is no change in the domestic social welfare level . If a domestic manufacturer has the R & D capability , the authorization mode of the fixed fee will be used to authorize another manufacturer , so that the surplus of the domestic consumer is reduced . If both domestic manufacturers have the innovation ability , there is an optimal cooperative innovation mode , the technology spillover degree and the innovation efficiency of each other will determine its profit and social welfare , and meanwhile , the negotiation weight of the domestic manufacturers in the technical authorization can be improved .


At last , the relationship between technology authorization , technological innovation and enterprise benefit is analyzed with the data of domestic high - tech industry in 1995 - 2005 .

【學位授予單位】：暨南大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F224;F062.4

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 吳延兵;創(chuàng)新、溢出效應與社會福利[J];產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟研究;2005年02期

2 李仁耀;黃金樹;;垂直品質(zhì)差異與技術授權策略選擇[J];產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟研究;2006年04期

3 張弘;寇宗來;;自主創(chuàng)新能力、專利許可與市場結(jié)構(gòu)[J];產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟研究;2006年05期

4 龔艷萍,周育生;基于R&D溢出的企業(yè)合作研發(fā)行為分析[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2002年05期

5 張倩肖;馮根福;;三種R&D溢出與本地企業(yè)技術創(chuàng)新——基于我國高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)的經(jīng)驗分析[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2007年11期

6 楊亞平;;FDI技術行業(yè)內(nèi)溢出還是行業(yè)間溢出——基于廣東工業(yè)面板數(shù)據(jù)的經(jīng)驗分析[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2007年11期

7 隋廣軍;申明浩;宋劍波;;基于專利水平地區(qū)差異的高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)化問題研究[J];管理世界;2005年08期

8 張元鵬;科技創(chuàng)新與最優(yōu)專利轉(zhuǎn)讓方式的選擇問題[J];經(jīng)濟科學;2005年02期

9 張倩肖;;外商直接投資、市場競爭及對我國制造業(yè)的技術外溢效應———基于隨機前沿生產(chǎn)函數(shù)的分析[J];經(jīng)濟學家;2007年03期

10 王子君,張偉;外國直接投資、技術許可與技術創(chuàng)新[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2002年03期

相關博士學位論文 前2條

1 郭紅珍;基于非合作寡占模型的技術許可研究[D];華北電力大學（北京）;2006年

2 李攀藝;基于非對稱信息的專利許可機制研究[D];重慶大學;2007年

，

本文編號：1670913