本文選題：承銷商聲譽(yù) + 承銷團(tuán)�。� 參考：《西南交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：IPO抑價(jià)(IPO underpricing)現(xiàn)象是指首發(fā)上市新股的發(fā)行定價(jià)價(jià)格遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于其上市首日的收盤價(jià)格,發(fā)行市場與交易市場之間出現(xiàn)巨大的交易價(jià)差,使得新股在上市的第一天就得到較高超額收益的金融現(xiàn)象�！癐PO抑價(jià)之謎”是多年來一直存在于資本市場中的異常現(xiàn)象,海內(nèi)外的專家學(xué)者紛紛從多個不同角度對IPO抑價(jià)現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行分析,得出了多種不同結(jié)論。2009年10月30日,中國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場正式成立。經(jīng)過了七年多的發(fā)展,創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的IPO抑價(jià)率依舊比較高,這不利于我國金融市場的長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展。同時,企業(yè)決定IPO以后,通常會有眾多的承銷機(jī)構(gòu)競爭IPO的主承銷商地位,企業(yè)往往會根據(jù)自身實(shí)力、發(fā)行規(guī)模等因素選擇實(shí)力較強(qiáng)、信譽(yù)較好的承銷機(jī)構(gòu)作為自已IPO上市的主承銷商。有些企業(yè)出于減少信息不對稱、降低發(fā)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等因素的考量,可能會組織承銷團(tuán)進(jìn)行承銷。在IPO過程中,由單一的主承銷商進(jìn)行上市承銷,進(jìn)而轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橛芍鞒袖N商牽頭來組織承銷團(tuán)隊(duì)進(jìn)行承銷的趨勢明顯增強(qiáng),承銷團(tuán)能否在IPO過程中扮演比單一承銷商更重要的角色,是否對減少信息不對稱性、降低發(fā)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及有更加合理的IPO抑價(jià)率,目前國內(nèi)對這一領(lǐng)域的研究還很少。本文在借鑒參考中外文獻(xiàn)和各種理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,從承銷商聲譽(yù)和承銷商團(tuán)角度出發(fā),分析承銷商聲譽(yù)和承銷團(tuán)這兩個因素對創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場IPO抑價(jià)率的影響。通過分析并在得出結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,為創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場IPO首發(fā)抑價(jià)問題提出一些解決思路和建議。這在一定程度上能夠豐富我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場IPO抑價(jià)的研究理論,也能夠從一個全新的角度即承銷團(tuán)視角對IPO抑價(jià)現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行分析,具備一定的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文采用創(chuàng)業(yè)板2010到2012年底IPO上市的318家企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本,通過實(shí)證分析聲譽(yù)機(jī)制下中國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場承銷團(tuán)與IPO抑價(jià)的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果表明承銷團(tuán)是影響IPO抑價(jià)的原因之一,同為高等聲譽(yù)的條件下,采用承銷團(tuán)進(jìn)行IPO的企業(yè)其IPO抑價(jià)率更低,但是中低等聲譽(yù)條件下承銷團(tuán)能降低IPO抑價(jià)的效果還不明顯。
[Abstract]:IPO underpricing (IPO underpricing) is a phenomenon in which the IPO price is far below the closing price on the first day of the IPO, and there is a huge price difference between the issuing market and the trading market. "IPO underpricing mystery" is an abnormal phenomenon that has existed in the capital market for many years. Experts and scholars at home and abroad have analyzed IPO underpricing from many different angles and drawn many different conclusions. On October 30, 2009, the gem market in China was formally established. After more than seven years of development, the IPO underpricing rate of gem market is still relatively high, which is not conducive to the long-term development of our financial market. At the same time, after the decision of IPO, there will usually be a large number of underwriters competing for the lead underwriter status of the IPO, and enterprises will often choose strong strength according to their own strength, issuing scale and other factors. A reputable underwriter acts as the lead underwriter for his IPO. In order to reduce information asymmetry and reduce the risk of issuance, some enterprises may organize underwriting groups to carry out underwriting. In the process of IPO, the trend of single lead underwriter is changed to lead by lead underwriter to organize underwriting team to carry out underwriting, the underwriting group can play a more important role than single underwriter in IPO process. At present, there are few researches on whether to reduce information asymmetry, reduce issuance risk and have more reasonable IPO underpricing rate. Based on the reference of Chinese and foreign literatures and theoretical analysis, this paper analyzes the influence of underwriter reputation and underwriting group on IPO underpricing rate in gem market from the perspective of underwriter reputation and underwriter group. On the basis of analysis and conclusion, this paper puts forward some solutions and suggestions for IPO underpricing in gem market. To a certain extent, it can enrich the research theory of IPO underpricing in China's gem market, and can also analyze the IPO underpricing phenomenon from a new perspective, that is, underwriting group, which has certain theoretical and practical significance. Based on the data of 318 IPOs listed in gem from 2010 to the end of 2012, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between underwriting groups and IPO underpricing in China's gem market under the reputation mechanism. The results show that underwriting group is one of the reasons that affect IPO underpricing. Under the condition of higher reputation, the underwriting group has lower IPO underpricing rate. But the effect of underwriting group can reduce IPO underpricing is not obvious.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：2013217