本文選題：控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) + 中小股東利益實(shí)現(xiàn)��； 參考：《蘭州理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：公司中的利益沖突問(wèn)題一直是公司治理要解決的核心。隨著現(xiàn)代股份制公司的發(fā)展,文獻(xiàn)研究的內(nèi)容從公司所有者與公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間的第一類(lèi)代理問(wèn)題轉(zhuǎn)移到控股股東與中小股東之間的第二類(lèi)代理問(wèn)題上,公司治理要解決的突出問(wèn)題從第一類(lèi)代理中的利益沖突轉(zhuǎn)移到了第二類(lèi)代理中的利益沖突上。在股權(quán)比較集中的公司中,大股東往往會(huì)得到比小股東多并且與其所持股份比例不相稱的額外收益,這部分收益不是由于其所擁有的所有權(quán)帶來(lái)的,而是大股東對(duì)小股東實(shí)施侵害所獲得的收益。 本文立足于公司治理機(jī)制,通過(guò)不同表現(xiàn)形式的控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)中小股東利益的影響機(jī)制分析和實(shí)證分析,驗(yàn)證在我國(guó)有制衡關(guān)系的控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有更高效公司治理機(jī)制,便于公司業(yè)績(jī)的不斷提升和中小股東利益的順利實(shí)現(xiàn),為公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化和資本市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展提供依據(jù)。在相關(guān)理論和影響機(jī)制分析的基礎(chǔ)上,選用了2007-2012年間第一大股東變更的143家A股上市公司,858個(gè)樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,通過(guò)相關(guān)分析和回歸分析發(fā)現(xiàn),股權(quán)集中有利于公司業(yè)績(jī)的提升,即相對(duì)于股權(quán)分散公司,股權(quán)集中有利于中小股東利益實(shí)現(xiàn)；有制衡關(guān)系的控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有利于公司治理效率的提高,表現(xiàn)為公司業(yè)績(jī)的提升,即存在制衡關(guān)系的控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)更有利于中小股東利益的實(shí)現(xiàn),且中小股東利益實(shí)現(xiàn)隨制衡強(qiáng)度的增強(qiáng)而更有利,但第一大股東的國(guó)有性質(zhì)在我國(guó)目前的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境中對(duì)中小股東的利益沒(méi)有顯著影響。 論文中的股東控制權(quán)以直接持股股東的持股比例體現(xiàn),設(shè)定間接控股股東為唯一控制人,未考慮控股股東通過(guò)控制若干直接持股股東的情況和若干控股股東共同控制某一直接持股股東的情況,研究結(jié)論有待進(jìn)一步完善和數(shù)據(jù)支持。
[Abstract]:The conflict of interest in the company has always been the core of corporate governance. With the development of modern joint-stock companies, the content of literature research has shifted from the first kind of agency problem between the owner and the manager of the company to the second kind of agency problem between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholder. The outstanding problems to be solved in corporate governance are transferred from the conflict of interest in the first kind of agency to the conflict of interest in the second type of agency. In companies with more concentrated shares, large shareholders tend to receive more than minority shareholders and are not commensurate with their share holdings, which is not due to their ownership. It is the income that the majority shareholder carries out to the minority shareholder. Based on the corporate governance mechanism, through the analysis and empirical analysis of the influence mechanism of different forms of control structure on the interests of minority shareholders, this paper verifies that the control right structure with checks and balances in China has a more efficient corporate governance mechanism. It is convenient for the improvement of the company's performance and the smooth realization of the interests of the minority shareholders, and provides the basis for the optimization of the corporate governance structure and the healthy development of the capital market. On the basis of the analysis of relevant theory and influence mechanism, we selected 143 A-share listed companies which changed the largest shareholder from 2007 to 2012 to carry out empirical research. Through correlation analysis and regression analysis, we found that, Equity concentration is conducive to the improvement of corporate performance, that is, relative to the decentralized equity companies, equity concentration is conducive to the realization of the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders; the control structure with checks and balances is conducive to the improvement of corporate governance efficiency, which is reflected in the improvement of corporate performance. That is, the structure of control with checks and balances is more beneficial to the realization of the interests of minority shareholders, and the realization of the interests of minority shareholders is more advantageous with the enhancement of the intensity of checks and balances. However, the state-owned nature of the largest shareholder has no significant influence on the interests of minority shareholders in the current market environment. In this paper, the shareholder control right is reflected by the proportion of the direct shareholding shareholder, and the indirect controlling shareholder is the sole controlling person. Without considering the situation of controlling some direct shareholders and controlling some direct shareholders, the conclusion of the research needs to be further improved and supported by data.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271;F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：1944573