本文選題：地方債務(wù) + 基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資�。� 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自2008年全球金融危機(jī)以來(lái),中國(guó)的地方政府性債務(wù)快速膨脹。本文從國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)和中國(guó)機(jī)制兩方面分析中國(guó)政府性債務(wù)與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的關(guān)系。從跨國(guó)歷史數(shù)據(jù)看,各國(guó)的政府債務(wù)膨脹和違約并非獨(dú)立隨機(jī)事件,具有顯著的集中爆發(fā)性和高度傳染性,與世界戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、商品價(jià)格劇烈波動(dòng),以及世界金融中心資本流向急劇轉(zhuǎn)變等現(xiàn)象密切相關(guān)。中國(guó)的政府性債務(wù)問(wèn)題既與全球金融危機(jī)引發(fā)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境變化有關(guān),也與國(guó)內(nèi)獨(dú)特的作用機(jī)制相聯(lián)系。為了深入剖析中國(guó)地方政府性債務(wù)對(duì)地區(qū)工業(yè)增長(zhǎng)的作用機(jī)制,本文構(gòu)建“工業(yè)投資者-地方政府”模型,從債務(wù)的雙重引資作用角度分析地方政府舉債沖動(dòng)難以遏制的原因。模型論證了以下機(jī)制：債務(wù)作為地方政府動(dòng)用資金能力的體現(xiàn),不僅表現(xiàn)為以直接投資的形式增加GDP,而且能夠通過(guò)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)和壓低工業(yè)用地價(jià)格雙重渠道吸引工業(yè)投資,對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)毓I(yè)增長(zhǎng)起到強(qiáng)烈的杠桿作用。本文的理論模型在傳統(tǒng)的地方政府引資競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模型基礎(chǔ)上引入工業(yè)用地市場(chǎng),將工業(yè)用地價(jià)格作為地方政府的關(guān)鍵決策變量之一；同時(shí)對(duì)地方政府的預(yù)算約束進(jìn)行拓展,引入地方債務(wù)變量和土地出讓收入等預(yù)算外資金。模型的主要結(jié)論是,地方債務(wù)能夠顯著地提高當(dāng)?shù)毓I(yè)投資水平,但地方債務(wù)對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)氐墓I(yè)用地價(jià)格的影響不確定,同時(shí)受到地方政府低價(jià)出讓和工業(yè)投資者需求上升兩種相反作用力的影響。本文的實(shí)證分析采用2003-2007年287個(gè)地級(jí)及以上城市的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析。新增工業(yè)投資采用全國(guó)各年微觀工業(yè)企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)匹配加總獲得,地方債務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)使用土地出讓、地方財(cái)政和地方融資平臺(tái)發(fā)行的企業(yè)債等作為替代變量。實(shí)證結(jié)果驗(yàn)證了理論模型的主要結(jié)論,支持地方政府性債務(wù)的雙重引資作用。本文指出,對(duì)于不同經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展條件與稟賦的地區(qū)來(lái)說(shuō),以債務(wù)推動(dòng)工業(yè)增長(zhǎng)的發(fā)展模式面臨兩類不同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：1)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件與稟賦較差的地區(qū)在引資競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中處于劣勢(shì),未來(lái)土地出讓收入可能不足以償還債務(wù)；2)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件與稟賦較好的地區(qū)在引資競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中將土地資源過(guò)度配置到工業(yè)部門,導(dǎo)致商住用地資源緊缺、住房?jī)r(jià)格快速上漲。
[Abstract]:Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China's local government debt has ballooned rapidly. This paper analyzes the relationship between Chinese government debt and economic growth from two aspects: international experience and Chinese mechanism. Looking at transnational historical data, governments' debt inflation and default are not independent random events. They are highly contagious and highly contagious. They are highly volatile in commodity prices in the face of world war. As well as the world financial center capital flow to change sharply and so on phenomenon is closely related. China's government debt problem is not only related to the change of macroeconomic environment caused by the global financial crisis, but also related to the unique domestic mechanism. In order to deeply analyze the mechanism of the local government debt acting on the regional industrial growth, this paper constructs the "industrial investor-local government" model, and analyzes the reasons why it is difficult to curb the borrowing impulse of the local government from the perspective of the dual role of the debt. The model demonstrates the following mechanism: debt, as a manifestation of the ability of local governments to use funds, not only increases GDP in the form of direct investment, but also can attract industrial investment through the dual channels of infrastructure construction and lowering the price of industrial land. Strong leverage over local industrial growth. The theoretical model of this paper introduces the industrial land market on the basis of the traditional competition model of the local government to attract capital, and takes the industrial land price as one of the key decision variables of the local government, at the same time, it extends the budget constraints of the local government. Introduction of local debt variables and land transfer income and other extrabudgetary funds. The main conclusion of the model is that local debt can significantly increase the level of local industrial investment, but the impact of local debt on local industrial land prices is uncertain. At the same time by local governments sell low prices and industrial investors demand rise two counterproductive forces. In this paper, the panel data of 287 prefectural cities and above are used to analyze. The new industrial investment is obtained by matching and summing up the national microcosmic industrial enterprise database, the local debt data is obtained by land transfer, and the corporate debt issued by local finance and local financing platform is taken as the substitute variable. The empirical results verify the main conclusions of the theoretical model and support the dual role of local government debt. This paper points out that for regions with different economic development conditions and endowments, the development model of debt-driven industrial growth faces two different types of risks: 1) regions with poor economic conditions and endowments are at a disadvantage in the competition for investment. Land transfer income in the future may not be enough to pay off debts. (2) areas with good economic conditions and endowments overallocate land resources to the industrial sector in the competition for attracting capital, resulting in a shortage of land resources for commercial and residential use and a rapid rise in housing prices.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F427;F812.5

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本文編號(hào)：1780379