本文選題：公司治理　切入點(diǎn)：債權(quán)治理　出處：《貴州財經(jīng)學(xué)院》2011年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：公司治理一直是一個炙手可熱的話題,也是一個老生常談的話題,同時又是個推陳出新的話題。相對于股權(quán)治理來講,債權(quán)治理還處在被忽視的地位,沒有受到應(yīng)有的重視。債權(quán)融資不僅是企業(yè)融通資金的一種方式,還具有公司治理的功效,債權(quán)治理與公司治理績效存在著密切關(guān)系。目前我國上市公司債權(quán)治理效應(yīng)處于失效狀態(tài),也就是治理效應(yīng)弱化與惡化的不合理現(xiàn)象,這都表明本論題的研究已提上日程,筆者主要圍繞以下幾個問題展開論述。 (1)僅從理論來講,公司采取債權(quán)融資這種方式會對內(nèi)部治理產(chǎn)生什么效應(yīng)?從第二章對目前國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)的梳理和第三章的分析中得出,債權(quán)融資對公司治理績效具有正面效應(yīng)。 (2)雖然從理論上分析得出公司采取債權(quán)融資方式有積極的治理效應(yīng),但在我國的實(shí)踐中,它在上市公司中發(fā)揮積極的正面效應(yīng)了嗎?通過實(shí)證和理論分析,債權(quán)融資對中國上市公司來說,不僅沒產(chǎn)生積極的預(yù)期效果,而且是與理論上分析的結(jié)果相悖,也就是債權(quán)融資治理效應(yīng)失效,并且有弱化與惡化的現(xiàn)象。第五章從理論和實(shí)證上說明了這個現(xiàn)象。 (3)為什么中國上市公司債權(quán)治理效應(yīng)與根據(jù)西方學(xué)者理論上所分析的情形背道而馳?原因有很多：主辦銀行制度沒有發(fā)揮作用,我國商業(yè)銀行還沒有起到對上市公司有效監(jiān)控的作用；債權(quán)債權(quán)關(guān)系的虛擬性,我國上市公司大部分是由國有企業(yè)改制而來,導(dǎo)致國有銀行與上市公司(所有者都是國家)之間是一種虛擬的債權(quán)債權(quán)關(guān)系。第六章著重探討了債權(quán)治理失效的原因。 (4)那債權(quán)人該怎樣保障自身權(quán)益?怎樣發(fā)揮積極的債權(quán)治理效應(yīng)?怎樣建立健全的公司治理機(jī)制?本文沒有眉毛胡子一把抓,而是有重點(diǎn)的從如下三個方面作出回答：一是建立高素質(zhì)的銀行體系,二是完善破產(chǎn)和退市機(jī)制,三是大力發(fā)展債券市場。第七章嘗試性的提出了一些解決問題的措施,其中建立高素質(zhì)的銀行體系是借鑒了第四章里面論述的日德模式。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance has always been a hot topic, as well as an old topic, and at the same time, it is also a topic of innovation. Compared with equity governance, the governance of creditor's rights is still in a neglected position. Creditor's rights financing is not only a way for enterprises to finance funds, but also has the effect of corporate governance. There is a close relationship between the governance of creditor's rights and the performance of corporate governance. At present, the governance effect of creditor's rights of listed companies in our country is in the state of failure, that is, the unreasonable phenomenon of weakening and worsening of the governance effect, which indicates that the research on this topic has been put on the agenda. The author mainly focuses on the following issues. Only from the theory, what effect will the company take the debt financing method to the internal governance? From the second chapter of the domestic and foreign literature and the analysis of the third chapter, it is concluded that creditor's rights financing has a positive effect on corporate governance performance. (2) although it is theoretically analyzed that there is a positive governance effect in the way of creditor's rights financing, has it played a positive role in the listed companies in our country's practice? Through empirical and theoretical analysis, creditor's rights financing for listed companies in China, not only did not have a positive expected effect, but also contrary to the theoretical analysis of the results, that is, the governance effect of creditor's rights financing is ineffective. And there is the phenomenon of weakening and deterioration. Chapter 5th explains this phenomenon theoretically and empirically. Why does the governance effect of creditor's rights of listed companies in China run counter to the situation analyzed by western scholars? There are many reasons: the host bank system has not played a role, our commercial banks have not played an effective role in monitoring the listed companies; the fictitious nature of creditor's rights and creditor's rights relationship, most of the listed companies in our country come from the reform of state-owned enterprises. The relationship between state-owned banks and listed companies (owners are the state) is a kind of fictitious creditor's rights relationship. Chapter 6th focuses on the causes of failure of creditor's rights governance. 4) how should creditors protect their rights and interests? How to give play to the positive governance effect of creditor's rights? How to establish a sound corporate governance mechanism? This article has no eyebrow and beard to grasp, but a key answer from the following three aspects: first, to establish a high-quality banking system, second, to improve the bankruptcy and delisting mechanism, The third is to vigorously develop the bond market. Chapter 7th tries to put forward some measures to solve the problem, among which the establishment of a high-quality banking system is based on the model of Japan and Germany discussed in Chapter 4th.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州財經(jīng)學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：F275

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