本文關(guān)鍵詞： 獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò) 被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 信息雙向傳遞 內(nèi)部控制 環(huán)境不確定性　出處：《管理科學(xué)》2017年04期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：近年來頻繁發(fā)生的訴訟案件威脅公司內(nèi)外部"和諧",引發(fā)各界關(guān)注。一般認(rèn)為,信息不對(duì)稱是引發(fā)公司訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重要原因。一方面,外部利益相關(guān)者對(duì)公司內(nèi)部信息不了解,使經(jīng)理人機(jī)會(huì)主義行為更易發(fā)生;而且,外部利益相關(guān)者與公司間的信息偏誤,也會(huì)造成日后糾紛,這些都可能引發(fā)公司被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。另一方面,公司經(jīng)理人掌握的外部信息不充分,使其在環(huán)境不確定性下的各項(xiàng)決策面臨更高的失敗風(fēng)險(xiǎn),極易引發(fā)由決策失敗導(dǎo)致的被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此,研究如何緩解公司內(nèi)外部間的信息不對(duì)稱、規(guī)避公司被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)具有重要的理論價(jià)值和實(shí)踐意義�；谇度胄院凸緝�(nèi)外部間信息雙向傳遞的視角,考察獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)對(duì)公司被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響及其作用機(jī)理。以2007年至2014年中國A股上市公司為研究對(duì)象,構(gòu)建獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)-信息雙向傳遞-公司被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理論分析框架,運(yùn)用Stata 13.0軟件進(jìn)行多元回歸分析、PSM分析和工具變量回歸分析,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)對(duì)公司被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,并結(jié)合內(nèi)部控制有效性和環(huán)境不確定性探討這一影響的具體作用機(jī)理,最后對(duì)研究中涉及的內(nèi)生性問題進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。研究結(jié)果表明,獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)有助于公司內(nèi)外部間的信息雙向傳遞,降低公司被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。對(duì)作用機(jī)理的檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明,在內(nèi)部控制不健全、環(huán)境不確定性較高的公司中,獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)抑制被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的效應(yīng)更加明顯,說明獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)既可以將公司內(nèi)部信息向外部傳遞,緩解經(jīng)理人機(jī)會(huì)主義行為和公司內(nèi)外部間信息偏誤,也可以將外部信息向公司內(nèi)部傳遞,提升經(jīng)理人決策科學(xué)性。而且,獨(dú)立董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)并未強(qiáng)化獨(dú)立董事監(jiān)督職能,而是通過信息傳遞增強(qiáng)證券分析師和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者等外部監(jiān)督,改善了公司信息環(huán)境。穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明,在考慮替代變量、獨(dú)立董事自選擇偏差、內(nèi)生性等問題之后結(jié)論依然穩(wěn)健。研究結(jié)果有助于豐富和完善社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)與公司治理和訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成因的研究,也為中國上市公司認(rèn)識(shí)和規(guī)避當(dāng)前被訴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提供一些有益的現(xiàn)實(shí)啟示。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the frequent litigation cases threaten the internal and external "harmony" of the company, and arouse the attention of all walks of life. It is generally believed that asymmetric information is an important reason for the litigation risk of the company. On the one hand. External stakeholders do not understand the internal information of the company, which makes managers opportunistic behavior more likely to occur; Moreover, the information bias between the external stakeholders and the company will also cause disputes in the future, which may lead to the risk of the company being sued. On the other hand, the external information held by the company manager is not sufficient. Under the uncertainty of the environment, each decision is faced with higher risk of failure, which can easily lead to the risk of being sued. Therefore, this paper studies how to alleviate the information asymmetry between the internal and external companies. It has important theoretical value and practical significance to avoid the risk of the company being sued. It is based on the perspective of embeddedness and two-way transmission of information between internal and external companies. To investigate the impact of independent director network on the risk of being sued and its mechanism. From 2007 to 2014, China A-share listed companies as the research object. To construct the theoretical analysis framework of independent director network, information two-way transmission and corporate defendant risk, using Stata 13.0 software to carry out multivariate regression analysis and tool variable regression analysis. Empirical test of the impact of independent director network on the risk of litigation, and combined with the effectiveness of internal control and environmental uncertainty to explore the specific mechanism of this impact. Finally, the endogenetic problems involved in the study are tested. The results show that the independent director network is conducive to the two-way transmission of information between the internal and external companies. The test results of the mechanism of action show that in the companies with imperfect internal control and high environmental uncertainty, the effect of independent director network on the risk of being sued is more obvious. It shows that the independent director network can not only transfer the internal information of the company to the outside, alleviate the behavior of manager opportunism and the bias between the internal and external information of the company, but also transfer the external information to the internal company. Moreover, the network of independent directors does not strengthen the supervision function of independent directors, but strengthens the external supervision of securities analysts and institutional investors through information transmission. The results of robustness test show that when considering the substitution variable, the independent director's self-selection bias is improved. The results are helpful to enrich and improve the social network, corporate governance and litigation risk. It also provides some practical enlightenment for Chinese listed companies to understand and avoid the risk of being sued.
【作者單位】： 西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)保險(xiǎn)學(xué)院;
【基金】：中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專項(xiàng)資金(JBK1507124,JBK1507181)~~
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51
【正文快照】： 引言 “鄰睦無難事,事事皆春意”,中國傳統(tǒng)文化中的和諧具有非凡的重要性。近年來,上市公司層出不窮的訴訟案件直接威脅到公司內(nèi)外部和諧,乃至日常經(jīng)營活動(dòng)的順利開展。根據(jù)CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫統(tǒng)計(jì),2007年至2014年間多達(dá)1 275家上市公司曾卷入訴訟案件,平均每年的訴訟金額達(dá)302.501

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