本文關(guān)鍵詞： 地方債務(wù) 政治資源 項(xiàng)目制 資本回報(bào)率　出處：《華僑大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái)地方債務(wù)的迅速擴(kuò)張引起了學(xué)術(shù)界的高度重視,由于地方債務(wù)涉及到房地產(chǎn)、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施等多個(gè)領(lǐng)域,對(duì)維持經(jīng)濟(jì)健康發(fā)展有著至關(guān)重要的作用,因此,弄清楚地方債務(wù)擴(kuò)張行為的內(nèi)在機(jī)制對(duì)中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展顯得尤為重要。本文以項(xiàng)目制治理模式為出發(fā)點(diǎn),探究了專(zhuān)項(xiàng)補(bǔ)助對(duì)地方債務(wù)擴(kuò)張行為的影響,并進(jìn)一步討論了近年來(lái)資本回報(bào)率下降與地方債務(wù)擴(kuò)張現(xiàn)象之間的聯(lián)系。根據(jù)2003年到2014年30個(gè)省份的面板數(shù)據(jù),分析項(xiàng)目制下地方債務(wù)的擴(kuò)張行為以及資本回報(bào)率的影響而得出結(jié)論:第一,項(xiàng)目制雖契合了地方政府追求GDP增長(zhǎng)和官員晉升的需要,充分調(diào)動(dòng)了地方政府項(xiàng)目投資的積極性,但是,項(xiàng)目制所帶有的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和配套機(jī)制還造成了地方政府沉重的債務(wù)。并且,在項(xiàng)目制的激勵(lì)下,專(zhuān)項(xiàng)資金的增量越大,地方投資經(jīng)營(yíng)的范圍就越廣,地方債務(wù)擴(kuò)張的力度也越大。第二,由于項(xiàng)目的支配權(quán)掌握在中央各部門(mén)手中,地方官員所擁有的的政治資源,會(huì)影響本地區(qū)獲得的項(xiàng)目資金,也會(huì)影響到上級(jí)部門(mén)對(duì)于城投債發(fā)行的審批。因此,政治資源降低了地方政府的融資成本,并扭曲了地方政府的投資行為。隨著地方政府的支配權(quán)力越來(lái)越大,政治資源稟賦必然會(huì)影響項(xiàng)目制與地方債務(wù)之間的動(dòng)態(tài)關(guān)系。第三,項(xiàng)目制治理模式下,我國(guó)高額的投資規(guī)模間接上由地方債務(wù)支撐,地方債務(wù)的高速膨脹,會(huì)推動(dòng)投資率的上升,造成資本大量積累、產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩加劇等問(wèn)題,對(duì)整個(gè)社會(huì)的資本回報(bào)率產(chǎn)生不利的影響。第四,盡管地方債務(wù)投資對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)存在著一定的促進(jìn)作用,在一定程度上有助于挖掘經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)潛力,但是由于債務(wù)資金大量投資到基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目,而基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施所需資金流量大,回報(bào)周期很長(zhǎng),短期內(nèi)造成的資源配置效率損失,是其較為長(zhǎng)期的正外部性效應(yīng)很難彌補(bǔ)的,最終還是會(huì)抑制整體的資本回報(bào)率。第五,在地方政府干預(yù)下,國(guó)有企業(yè)可能獲得更多的銀行貸款支持,使得民營(yíng)企業(yè)的股權(quán)融資和債務(wù)融資相對(duì)較難,從而扭曲了資源配置效率。與此同時(shí),地方債務(wù)的大規(guī)模擴(kuò)張又使得銀行信貸資源被過(guò)多占用,并不利于要素的優(yōu)化配置和使用,強(qiáng)化了政府干預(yù)對(duì)資本回報(bào)率的影響。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the rapid expansion of local debt has attracted great attention of the academic community. Because local debt involves real estate, infrastructure and other fields, it plays a vital role in maintaining the healthy development of the economy. To understand the internal mechanism of local debt expansion behavior is particularly important to the economic development of China. This paper takes the project governance model as the starting point to explore the impact of special subsidies on the local debt expansion behavior. The relationship between the decline in the return on capital and the phenomenon of local debt expansion in recent years is further discussed. According to panel data of 30 provinces from 2003 to 2014. Analysis of the expansion of local debt under the project system and the impact of the return on capital comes to the conclusion: first, the project system meets the needs of local governments in pursuit of GDP growth and the promotion of officials. Fully mobilize the enthusiasm of local government project investment, but the project system with competition and supporting mechanism also caused a heavy debt of local governments. And, under the incentive of the project system. The larger the increment of special funds, the wider the scope of local investment and operation, and the greater the intensity of local debt expansion. Second, because the control of projects is in the hands of the central departments. The political resources owned by local officials will affect the project funds obtained in the region, and will also affect the approval of the city investment bond issuance by the higher authorities. As a result, the political resources will reduce the financing costs of local governments. It distorts the investment behavior of the local government. With the increasing power of the local government, political resource endowment will inevitably affect the dynamic relationship between the project system and local debt. Third, under the project governance model. The high investment scale of our country is indirectly supported by the local debt, and the rapid expansion of the local debt will promote the increase of investment rate, resulting in a large amount of capital accumulation, the aggravation of overcapacity and other problems. It has a negative impact on the return on capital of the whole society. 4th, although the local debt investment has a certain role in promoting the Chinese economy, to a certain extent, it helps to tap the potential of economic growth. However, due to the large amount of debt funds invested in infrastructure projects, and the large amount of capital needed for infrastructure, the return cycle is very long, the efficiency of resource allocation is lost in the short term. Is its longer term positive externality effect is very difficult to make up for, will eventually suppress the overall return on capital. 5th, under the local government intervention, state-owned enterprises may get more bank loan support. The equity financing and debt financing of private enterprises are relatively difficult, thus distorting the efficiency of resource allocation. At the same time, the large-scale expansion of local debt makes the bank credit resources become too much. It is not conducive to the optimal allocation and use of elements, and strengthens the impact of government intervention on the return on capital.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華僑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F812.5

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