本文關(guān)鍵詞：產(chǎn)品異質(zhì)條件下排污權(quán)交易市場支配力的影響及其防范機制研究　出處：《江蘇大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 產(chǎn)品異質(zhì) 排污權(quán)交易 市場支配力 系統(tǒng)均衡 初始分配 矯正性稅收

【摘要】：日趨臻顯的外向型、開放型經(jīng)濟發(fā)展特點和行業(yè)細(xì)分趨勢等因素在很大程度上決定了我國區(qū)域排污權(quán)交易系統(tǒng)內(nèi)不存在顯著的產(chǎn)品競爭�，F(xiàn)有的理論與實踐表明,排污權(quán)交易體系中同樣存在市場支配力,并導(dǎo)致市場機制扭曲,進而損害其實施的有效性及效果。因此,在市場經(jīng)濟體制尚不完善的基本國情下,要實現(xiàn)向排污權(quán)交易這一新型環(huán)境管理體制的順利轉(zhuǎn)型,亟需對其予以充分關(guān)注。鑒于此,在產(chǎn)品異質(zhì)條件下,通過考慮產(chǎn)成品市場與排污權(quán)交易市場之間的關(guān)聯(lián)影響,綜合運用非線性規(guī)劃、博弈論等方法,在分析社會最優(yōu)的排污權(quán)配置狀態(tài)的基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建了主導(dǎo)企業(yè)與從屬企業(yè)之間的主從博弈模型,通過分析特定排污權(quán)市場價格下從屬企業(yè)的最優(yōu)行為特征,深入剖析了主導(dǎo)企業(yè)的策略性行為及其對系統(tǒng)均衡的影響。進而,以實現(xiàn)社會最優(yōu)化配置方案為基準(zhǔn),從排污權(quán)初始分配和矯正性稅收的視角分別探討市場支配的防范措施。基于數(shù)理分析結(jié)論并針對其不足,采用量化分析方法對結(jié)論進行了驗證性分析。具體而言:首先,針對排污權(quán)交易中存在的市場支配力問題進行分析,深入挖掘主導(dǎo)企業(yè)運用市場支配力進行價格操縱的證據(jù),對比市場支配力狀態(tài)下的系統(tǒng)均衡較社會最優(yōu)化配置狀態(tài)的偏離。主要結(jié)論表明:在社會最優(yōu)配置方案下,企業(yè)使用單位排污權(quán)的邊際收益及單位污染削減的邊際成本都應(yīng)與排污權(quán)價格相一致;為了獲取更大的額外收益,主導(dǎo)企業(yè)存在作為賣家時選擇“溢價”與作為買家時“抑價”兩種排污權(quán)價格操縱形式,并不可避免地導(dǎo)致系統(tǒng)均衡與社會最優(yōu)配置狀態(tài)的偏離,而從屬企業(yè)卻會蒙受更巨大的損失;初始排污權(quán)稟賦是影響主導(dǎo)企業(yè)最優(yōu)決策的重要因素。其次,在深入分析市場支配力對排污權(quán)交易系統(tǒng)均衡影響的基礎(chǔ)上,本文嘗試從排污權(quán)初始分配的視角出發(fā),實現(xiàn)對市場支配力的事前控制。結(jié)果顯示:在現(xiàn)有的分配機制下,針對第1分配周期可能存在的市場支配力問題,政府部門對主導(dǎo)企業(yè)和從屬企業(yè)第2分配周期初始稟賦量進行調(diào)節(jié),促進減排任務(wù)的再分配,倒逼主導(dǎo)企業(yè)在第1分配周期的理性決策是不進行排污權(quán)交易價格操縱,進而實現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)效率的最優(yōu)。最終,考慮到市場支配力對系統(tǒng)均衡的影響具有多樣性與復(fù)雜性,以及排污權(quán)自身復(fù)雜性、市場不確定性、信息不對稱等因素廣泛存在使得合理的排污權(quán)初始分配機制面臨諸多困境,特別是在排污權(quán)交易過程中出現(xiàn)市場支配力問題的防范顯得尤為乏力。因此,對市場支配力的防范由事前控制轉(zhuǎn)為事中控制顯得尤為重要。排污權(quán)交易稅作為政府管制的一種工具,對排污權(quán)交易系統(tǒng)同樣具有扭曲作用,本文進一步嘗試并將其納入企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)、削減、交易等環(huán)節(jié)的決策深入探討排污權(quán)交易市場支配力的防范機制。結(jié)果顯示,精心設(shè)計的矯正性稅收機制能有效地抑制主導(dǎo)企業(yè)的策略性行為,成為市場支配力防范的有力工具。本文的研究對揭示與解釋排污權(quán)交易系統(tǒng)中的市場支配力問題等具有重要的理論意義和學(xué)術(shù)價值,可為相關(guān)政策決策提供理論依據(jù),有效防范機制的提出為實現(xiàn)排污權(quán)交易機制的合理選取與創(chuàng)設(shè),降低實施的盲目性與不確定性,為其實施的持續(xù)性和可接受性提供參考。
[Abstract]:Has attained significant export-oriented, open economy characteristics and subdivision of industry trends and other factors to a great extent determine that there is no significant product competition in China's regional emissions trading system. Theory and practice show that the market power has the same emission trading system, and lead to the distortion of the market mechanism, and damage to the effectiveness of their implementation and effect. Therefore, the basic conditions of the market economy system is not perfect, to achieve a smooth transition to the emission trading is a new environmental management system, to give full attention to it. In view of this, in the condition of product heterogeneity, by considering the correlation effect between product and market the emissions trading market, the integrated use of nonlinear programming, game theory and other methods, based on the status of emission rights allocation between social analysis on the optimal construction of leading enterprises and subordinate enterprises The game model, through the analysis of the optimal behavior of subordinate enterprise specific emission rights market price, in-depth analysis of the strategic behavior of dominant enterprises and its influence on the system equilibrium. Then, in order to achieve the social optimum allocation scheme for reference, discuss market control and preventive measures from the initial allocation of emission rights and corrective tax from the perspective of mathematical analysis and conclusion. Aiming at the lack of quantitative analysis methods based on the conclusions are verified. Firstly, this paper analyzes the existing emissions trading market power issues, in-depth excavation of leading enterprises using market power for evidence of price fixing system deviates from the equilibrium state comparison of market power under the optimal configuration compared to the social state. The main results show that the optimal allocation in the society, enterprises use unit emission right side When the marginal cost of revenue and unit pollution reduction should be consistent with the emission right price; in order to obtain additional income more, leading enterprises as the seller's choice of "premium" and "underpricing" as buyers of two kinds of emission right price manipulation, and inevitably lead to deviation from the equilibrium and the social optimum allocation system state, and subordinate enterprises will suffer more huge losses; initial emission rights endowment is an important factor influencing the leading enterprises optimal decision. Secondly, based on the in-depth analysis of market dominance effects on emissions trading system equilibrium, this paper attempts to start from the initial allocation of emission rights from the perspective of the beforehand control of the market the dominant force. The results showed that: in the existing allocation mechanism, aiming at the first distribution cycle may have market power, government departments of leading enterprise and subordinate enterprise distribution second The amount of initial endowment cycle adjustment, promote the redistribution of emission reduction task, forced the leading enterprises in the rational decision first distribution period is not emissions trading price manipulation, so as to realize the optimal efficiency of the system. Finally, considering the market power has the diversity and complexity of system equilibrium, and the complexity of emission rights, market uncertainty, information asymmetry and other factors exist makes the initial allocation of emission rights reasonable mechanism are facing many difficulties, especially to prevent power market problems in the process of emissions trading is very weak. Therefore, to prevent market power by the beforehand control of things into control is very important. A tool emissions trading tax as the government regulation, also have a distorting effect on the emission trading system, this paper attempts to further and bring it into the enterprise life Cut, production, trade and other links making in-depth study of prevention mechanism of emissions trading market power. The results show that carefully designed corrective tax mechanism can effectively restrain the dominant strategy of enterprises, has become a powerful tool to prevent market power. This research has important theoretical significance and academic value of reveal and explain the emission trading system in the market power issues, provide a theoretical basis for the policy decision, put forward effective prevention mechanism for rational selection and creation to achieve emissions trading mechanism, reduce the blindness of the implementation and uncertainty, persistent and acceptable to provide reference for its implementation.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：X196;F832.5

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