本文關(guān)鍵詞：代理沖突對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)柔性影響的實(shí)證研究　出處：《深圳大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：當(dāng)今世界經(jīng)濟(jì)處于疲軟復(fù)蘇時(shí)期,經(jīng)濟(jì)的全球化帶來了機(jī)遇與挑戰(zhàn),經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)從資本市場波及到實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì),企業(yè)所處的經(jīng)營環(huán)境充滿了不確定性。在時(shí)刻變化的競爭市場中,企業(yè)一方面要充分防范不確定事件帶來的沖擊,另一方面也要把握好的投資增長機(jī)會(huì)。財(cái)務(wù)柔性作為企業(yè)重要的戰(zhàn)略資源儲(chǔ)備,通過財(cái)務(wù)柔性的預(yù)防和利用屬性,可以有效地幫助企業(yè)在動(dòng)蕩的環(huán)境中取得競爭優(yōu)勢。目前理論界關(guān)于財(cái)務(wù)柔性的研究多集中于財(cái)務(wù)柔性的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果研究,例如財(cái)務(wù)柔性對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率、企業(yè)價(jià)值的影響等等,很少涉及財(cái)務(wù)柔性的前因研究,而內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策有著重要的影響,因此本文在有關(guān)公司治理和財(cái)務(wù)柔性的相關(guān)研究基礎(chǔ)之上,選取代理沖突的視角研究公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與財(cái)務(wù)柔性之間的關(guān)系。財(cái)務(wù)柔性主要來自于企業(yè)的現(xiàn)金持有水平以及未舉債能力。因此本文選取了現(xiàn)金柔性以及負(fù)債柔性來衡量財(cái)務(wù)柔性。對(duì)于公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)方面,主要從大小股東之間的代理沖突和股東與管理者之間的代理沖突來進(jìn)行研究,選取股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)制衡度來衡量大小股東之間的代理沖突,董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事比例、管理層持股比例和高管薪酬來衡量股東與管理者之間的代理沖突。本文選取了2009-2015年滬深兩市A股上市公司1561家作為研究對(duì)象,通過實(shí)證研究分析得到如下結(jié)論:股權(quán)集中度對(duì)現(xiàn)金柔性、負(fù)債柔性和財(cái)務(wù)柔性有顯著正向影響;股權(quán)制衡度對(duì)現(xiàn)金柔性、負(fù)債柔性和財(cái)務(wù)柔性具有顯著負(fù)向影響;管理層持股比例與現(xiàn)金柔性之間存在著顯著的U型非線性關(guān)系,管理層持股比例與負(fù)債柔性、財(cái)務(wù)柔性之間存在正向關(guān)系;董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事比例和高管薪酬與三者之間均不存在顯著影響�；诖�,探討分析了可能的原因以及相關(guān)建議和未來展望。
[Abstract]:Today the world economy is in a weak recovery period, economic globalization has brought opportunities and challenges, the economic crisis from the capital market to the real economy. The operating environment of enterprises is full of uncertainty. In the ever-changing competitive market, enterprises should, on the one hand, take full precautions against the impact of uncertain events. On the other hand, we should also grasp the investment growth opportunities. Financial flexibility as an important strategic resource reserve, through the financial flexibility of the prevention and use of attributes. It can effectively help enterprises to gain competitive advantage in the turbulent environment. At present, the research on financial flexibility focuses on the economic consequences of financial flexibility, such as financial flexibility on the investment efficiency of enterprises. The influence of enterprise value and so on rarely involves the research on the antecedents of financial flexibility, while the internal governance structure has an important influence on the capital structure decision of the company. Therefore, this paper is based on the related research on corporate governance and financial flexibility. The relationship between corporate governance structure and financial flexibility is studied from the perspective of agency conflict. Financial flexibility mainly comes from the level of cash holding and the ability of unborrowed debt. Therefore, this paper selects cash flexibility and debt flexibility. To measure financial flexibility. For the internal governance structure of the company. Mainly from the large and small shareholders between the agency conflict and between shareholders and managers of the agency conflict to study the selection of equity concentration and equity checks and balances to measure the size of the large and small shareholders of the agency conflict board size. Proportion of independent directors. The proportion of managerial shareholding and executive compensation is used to measure the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. This paper selects 1561 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009-2015 as the research object. The conclusions are as follows: ownership concentration has a significant positive effect on cash flexibility, debt flexibility and financial flexibility; Equity balance has a significant negative impact on cash flexibility, debt flexibility and financial flexibility; There is a significant U-type nonlinear relationship between managerial shareholding ratio and cash flexibility, a positive relationship between managerial shareholding ratio and debt flexibility, and financial flexibility. There is no significant influence between board size, proportion of independent directors and executive compensation. Based on this, the possible reasons, related suggestions and future prospects are discussed and analyzed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：深圳大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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