本文關(guān)鍵詞：股權(quán)性質(zhì)、非效率投資與企業(yè)價值影響研究　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：投資活動、籌資活動與股利分配活動并稱為現(xiàn)代公司理財(cái)活動的三大核心內(nèi)容。其中,投資活動作為企業(yè)獲取未來現(xiàn)金流量增長和實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)成長的主要動因,間接影響到其他兩大核心決策,通過評價投資決策的效率和效果,理財(cái)人員可以全面了解到企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流量的動向以及企業(yè)價值的創(chuàng)造。 現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中,企業(yè)普遍面臨不對稱信息帶來的“融資困境”及“債務(wù)懸橫”。同時,管理層出于增加報酬和證明自身的需要會不斷擴(kuò)大企業(yè)規(guī)模,超出了企業(yè)的實(shí)際投資需要。加之職業(yè)經(jīng)理人本身就存在偷懶和謀取私利的動機(jī),投資決策背后隱藏著深刻的道德風(fēng)險,本文首先假設(shè)我國企業(yè)普遍存在非效率投資。在我國,國有企業(yè)兼具“雙重身份”—享受著來自政策扶持的同時,也承擔(dān)著政治干預(yù)下的“效率損失”。此外,國企領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人眾多的“政治關(guān)聯(lián)”及地方政府的過度干預(yù)也會對企業(yè)的投資決策產(chǎn)生不利影響,隨之假設(shè)國家股權(quán)性質(zhì)與企業(yè)價值負(fù)向相關(guān)。根據(jù)Wooldridge(1988)的研究,當(dāng)企業(yè)披露購買廠房設(shè)備、新產(chǎn)品引進(jìn)或增加研發(fā)支出消息時,股票價格一般會上升。本文認(rèn)為,企業(yè)投資消息是“利好”的反映,能夠引發(fā)眾多投資者們的“羊群行為”,構(gòu)成正能量循環(huán)的開始。相反,投資不足的企業(yè)為走出困境發(fā)出的融資信號向外傳遞了負(fù)能量,導(dǎo)致投資者們“信心”下降,導(dǎo)致企業(yè)長期處于一種投資缺乏、融資困難、市場信心較低的狀態(tài),最終造成企業(yè)價值的下降。本文假設(shè)投資過度能夠促進(jìn)企業(yè)價值的提升,投資不足則與企業(yè)價值呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。國有企業(yè)因其雄厚的資金背景和政策關(guān)注支持,導(dǎo)致市場對其宣布的信號更有信心(林娜,2011)。在上述兩種情況下,企業(yè)的一切決策行為—包括投資決策,會更加迅速的體現(xiàn)在企業(yè)價值上,于是本文假設(shè)對于投資效率與企業(yè)價值的作用,在國有企業(yè)會表現(xiàn)地更加強(qiáng)烈。 在實(shí)證部分,本文借鑒La Porta(2002)對股權(quán)性質(zhì)的“終極控制人”劃分標(biāo)準(zhǔn),將我國的上市公司分為“國有”股權(quán)性質(zhì)與“非國有”股權(quán)性質(zhì)兩個大類,同時按照Richardson(2006)非效率投資的測量模型,依據(jù)“投資過度”與“投資不足”兩類對中國上市公司的非效率投資程度進(jìn)行了反映。進(jìn)一步,選取我國A股上市公司主板市場2007-2012年的數(shù)據(jù)加以整理篩選,以股權(quán)性質(zhì)和非效率投資(投資過度與投資不足)作為解釋變量構(gòu)建面板數(shù)據(jù)回歸模型,根據(jù)數(shù)據(jù)分析的結(jié)果對本文提出的假設(shè)進(jìn)行解釋與驗(yàn)證,最終得出本文的研究結(jié)論：我國上市公司普遍存在非效率投資行為,并且投資過度程度更加嚴(yán)重；相比非國有股權(quán)性質(zhì),國有股權(quán)性質(zhì)與企業(yè)價值呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；投資過度的非效率投資行為與企業(yè)價值呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,其程度在國有股權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)可能強(qiáng)于非國有股權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)；投資不足的非效率投資行為與企業(yè)價值呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,其作用程度在國有股權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)可能強(qiáng)于非國有股權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)。 最后,以本文理論分析結(jié)論和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果為依據(jù),提出諸如轉(zhuǎn)變政府職能、完善上市公司的投資決策機(jī)制、發(fā)揮外部監(jiān)督以及改進(jìn)國有企業(yè)管理人員考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等建議,同時分析了本研究的不足以及進(jìn)一步研究的方向,以期為我國當(dāng)前國有企業(yè)改革和實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)資產(chǎn)的保值增值提供更多可行的建議。
[Abstract]:Investment activities, financing activities and dividend distribution activities and known as the three core financial activities of modern companies. Among them, the investment activities as the main motivation for enterprises to obtain the growth of future cash flow and achieve business growth, and indirectly affect the other two core decision-making, through efficiency and effect evaluation of investment decision-making, financial personnel can fully understand to create the trend of enterprise cash flow and enterprise value.
In the real world, enterprises generally face asymmetric information brings the "financing difficulties" and "debt overhang horizontal". At the same time, the management for increasing returns and prove their needs will continue to expand the scale of enterprises, beyond the actual needs of enterprises and investment managers. Occupation itself is lazy and seek personal motivation behind the investment decision hidden moral risk deeply. Firstly, the assumption that the Chinese enterprises are generally inefficient investment. In our country, state-owned enterprises with "dual identity" - enjoy from policy support at the same time, also bear the political intervention of the "efficiency". In addition, many of the leaders of the state-owned enterprises' political connection and local government the excessive intervention may also adversely affect the investment decision of enterprises, with the assumption of the nature of equity and enterprise value of national negative correlation. According to Wooldridge (1988) study, When the enterprise to disclose the purchase of plant and equipment, the introduction of new products or increase R & D spending news, stock prices will generally rise. This paper argues that enterprise investment news is "good" to reflect, caused many investors "herd behavior", which is the beginning of the energy cycle. On the contrary, the lack of investment in the enterprise financing signal out of the predicament from the outward transfer of negative energy, resulting in a decline in investors "confidence", resulting in a lack of long-term investment, corporate financing difficulties, market confidence is low, eventually leading to a decline in the value of the enterprise. This paper assumes that excessive investment can promote the enterprise value, the lack of investment is negatively correlated with the enterprise the value of the state-owned enterprises. Because of its strong financial background and policy concern support, leading to the market on the announcement signal more confidence (Lin Na, 2011). In the above two cases, enterprises All decision making actions, including investment decisions, will be reflected more rapidly in the enterprise value. Therefore, this paper assumes that the role of investment efficiency and corporate value will be more intense in state-owned enterprises.
In the empirical part, this paper uses La Porta (2002) of the equity nature of the ultimate controller division standard, will be China's listed companies are divided into state-owned and non state-owned equity property ownership "two categories, according to Richardson (2006) model of measuring the efficiency of investment, on the basis of the" investment excessive "and" insufficient investment "two kinds of Chinese listed company inefficient investment is reflected. Further, select the A listed company in China the main market 2007-2012 data collected by screening, the nature of equity and non efficiency investment (over investment and under investment) as explanatory variables to construct a panel data regression model in this paper according to the analysis results of the hypothesis to explain and verify the final conclusion of this article: China's listed companies generally have non efficiency investment behavior, and the degree of over investment More serious; compared with non state-owned equity nature, there was a negative correlation between the nature and the state-owned equity value is positively related to enterprise value; non efficiency investment behavior and corporate over investment, the degree may be stronger than that of non state-owned enterprises in the ownership nature of state-owned shares of enterprises; there was a negative correlation between the non efficiency investment behavior and insufficient investment value and the degree of the effect may be stronger than the non state-owned enterprises in the ownership of state-owned equity nature of the enterprise.
Finally, the conclusion and the empirical results of this paper is based on the theory, put forward such as the transformation of government functions, improve the investment decision-making mechanism of listed companies, and improve the standard of play to the external supervision management assessment of state-owned enterprises, and analyzes the shortcomings of this research and the direction of further research, in order to provide more practical advice for me in the current reform of state-owned enterprises and enterprises to realize the value of the assets.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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