本文選題：非對(duì)稱(chēng)信息 + 環(huán)境保護(hù)　； 參考：《廈門(mén)大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文

【摘要】： 隨著我同經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)快速增長(zhǎng),環(huán)境問(wèn)題日益突出并因此受到廣泛關(guān)注。保護(hù)與改善環(huán)境,實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展已經(jīng)成為我國(guó)的基本國(guó)策。但是當(dāng)前的政策焦點(diǎn)在于如何不斷增加環(huán)境治理資金的投入來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)改善環(huán)境質(zhì)量的目標(biāo),而不是在于關(guān)注現(xiàn)行環(huán)境政策的低效率以及政府問(wèn)政策實(shí)施過(guò)程中的制度性問(wèn)題,而這兩方面問(wèn)題卻是制約我國(guó)環(huán)境改善的重要因素。本文的目標(biāo)就是運(yùn)用信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、博弈論等方法探求以上問(wèn)題的根本原因并且提出切實(shí)有效的解決方案。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于: (1)從完全信息和非對(duì)稱(chēng)信息角度對(duì)包括收費(fèi)、補(bǔ)貼和可交易排污權(quán)在內(nèi)的環(huán)境污染控制政策工具進(jìn)行定性和定量比較,提出非對(duì)稱(chēng)信息下補(bǔ)貼改進(jìn)模型,從理論上證明可交易排污許可證對(duì)四類(lèi)污染物治理的市場(chǎng)效率等同。 (2)將污染控制的隨機(jī)因素納入模型當(dāng)中,建立地區(qū)內(nèi)多廠商博弈模型,從根源上解決生產(chǎn)廠商保留自身信息回避污染控制的“搭便車(chē)”問(wèn)題。 (3)分析中央與地方政府關(guān)于環(huán)境保護(hù)政策的博弈行為,從靜態(tài)和動(dòng)態(tài)的角度探討政策的選擇和執(zhí)行。將政府“信譽(yù)”引入動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型中,得出具有實(shí)際意義的政策結(jié)論。 (4)針對(duì)我國(guó)的現(xiàn)實(shí)國(guó)情,比較市場(chǎng)化程度發(fā)達(dá)的國(guó)家與我國(guó)在政治體制、經(jīng)濟(jì)制度、技術(shù)水平等方面的差異,結(jié)合本文所分析的模型提出更合適我國(guó)的環(huán)境政策體系。 本文借鑒發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家環(huán)境治理的成功經(jīng)驗(yàn),結(jié)合我國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)型發(fā)展階段的現(xiàn)實(shí)國(guó)情,把經(jīng)濟(jì)分析方法和博弈理論引入環(huán)境決策機(jī)制,將環(huán)境經(jīng)濟(jì)政策與行政命令控制型政策很好的結(jié)合起來(lái),分析我國(guó)政府與企業(yè)之問(wèn),企業(yè)與企業(yè)之間及政府與政府之間的關(guān)于環(huán)保的博弈關(guān)系,形成一套在非對(duì)稱(chēng)信息下更為有效率更具靈活性的環(huán)境政策體系,對(duì)解決我國(guó)的環(huán)境問(wèn)題無(wú)疑有重大的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:As our economy continues to grow rapidly, environmental issues have become increasingly prominent and have attracted widespread attention. To protect and improve the environment and realize the sustainable development of economy has become the basic national policy of our country. However, the current policy focus is on how to continuously increase the investment of environmental governance funds to achieve the goal of improving environmental quality, rather than focusing on the inefficiency of current environmental policies and the institutional problems in the process of implementing the policies. However, these two problems are the important factors restricting the improvement of our country's environment. The aim of this paper is to use the methods of information economics and game theory to find out the root causes of the above problems and to put forward practical and effective solutions. The innovations of this paper are: 1) qualitatively and quantitatively compare the environmental pollution control policy tools, including fees, subsidies and tradable emission rights, from the perspective of complete information and asymmetric information, and propose an improved model of subsidies under asymmetric information. It is proved theoretically that the market efficiency of tradable emission permits for the treatment of four kinds of pollutants is the same. (2) the stochastic factors of pollution control are brought into the model, and the multi-vendor game model in the region is established to solve the problem of "hitchhiking" in which manufacturers retain their own information to avoid pollution control. (3) analyzing the game behavior of central and local governments on environmental protection policy, and discussing the choice and implementation of policy from static and dynamic point of view. The government "reputation" is introduced into the dynamic game model, and the policy conclusions of practical significance are obtained. 4) according to the actual situation of our country, comparing the differences of political system, economic system and technical level between the developed countries and our country, and combining with the model analyzed in this paper, the author puts forward a more suitable environmental policy system of our country. Based on the successful experience of environmental governance in developed countries and the reality of China's transition and development, this paper introduces the economic analysis method and game theory into the environmental decision-making mechanism. Combining the environmental economic policy with the administrative order control policy, this paper analyzes the game relationship between the government and the enterprise, between the enterprise and the government, and between the government and the government. The formation of a more efficient and flexible environmental policy system under asymmetric information is undoubtedly of great practical significance to the solution of environmental problems in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門(mén)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：X196

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 殷倩;海洋污染模擬與控制決策支持系統(tǒng)建模研究[D];中國(guó)海洋大學(xué);2010年

，

本文編號(hào)：1831659