本文選題：公共物品 + 期望效用函數(shù)��； 參考：《東北大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文

【摘要】：關(guān)于同時(shí)具有非排他性和非競爭性的公共物品,相關(guān)學(xué)者已就公共物品的最優(yōu)供給數(shù)量、偏好顯示機(jī)制、由私人供給公共物品可能存在的問題、政府供給公共物品對公共物品供給的影響作了比較充分的理論分析、經(jīng)驗(yàn)檢驗(yàn)和實(shí)驗(yàn)室模擬檢驗(yàn),但關(guān)于如何有效地供給公共物品,仍在不斷的探討之中,對于公共物品的供給機(jī)制,并未達(dá)成共識。 本文對非對稱信息條件下公共物品的供給機(jī)制進(jìn)行了初步的探討。在一系列的假定條件下,借鑒期望效用理論和信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)已有的研究成果,建立了關(guān)于公共物品供給的委托代理模型,并在線性契約條件下,采用一個(gè)模擬算例對該模型的計(jì)算方法進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證�；趯δＰ偷姆治�,在線性支付機(jī)制條件下,消費(fèi)者和公共部門須具有相同且穩(wěn)定不變的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避程度,并要求消費(fèi)者和公共部門的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避程度小于企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避程度,同時(shí)消費(fèi)者對企業(yè)的邊際效用轉(zhuǎn)換率和似然比須滿足一個(gè)特定的等式約束關(guān)系。 通過委托代理機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)和實(shí)施,可以找到最優(yōu)合約支付函數(shù)的特征,據(jù)以設(shè)計(jì)委托代理合約,可以有效地克服存在于公共物品生產(chǎn)環(huán)節(jié)的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在公共決策的過程中應(yīng)充分關(guān)注委托代理關(guān)系的研究,并以經(jīng)濟(jì)人假設(shè)作為制定經(jīng)濟(jì)和法律制度的自然前提。
[Abstract]:With regard to public goods which are both non-exclusive and non-competitive, relevant scholars have discussed the optimal supply quantity of public goods, the preference display mechanism, and the possible problems existing in the private supply of public goods. The influence of government supply on the supply of public goods has been fully analyzed, tested by experience and simulated in laboratory, but how to supply public goods effectively is still under discussion. For the supply mechanism of public goods, there is no consensus. This paper discusses the supply mechanism of public goods under asymmetric information. Under a series of hypothetical conditions, a principal-agent model of public goods supply is established based on the theory of expected utility and the existing research results of information economics, and under the condition of linear contract, A simulation example is used to verify the calculation method of the model. Based on the analysis of the model, under the condition of linear payment mechanism, consumers and public sectors should have the same and stable degree of risk aversion, and the degree of risk aversion of consumers and public sectors is smaller than that of enterprises. At the same time, the marginal utility conversion rate and likelihood ratio of consumer to enterprise must satisfy a specific equality constraint relationship. Through the design and implementation of the principal-agent mechanism, we can find out the characteristics of the optimal contract payment function and design the principal-agent contract, which can effectively overcome the moral hazard existing in the production of public goods. In the process of public decision-making, we should pay full attention to the study of principal-agent relationship, and take the hypothesis of economic man as the natural prerequisite for the formulation of economic and legal system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：F224;F062.6

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 錢興[，

本文編號：1778699