本文關(guān)鍵詞： 公共建筑 碳排放交易 運(yùn)行機(jī)制 進(jìn)化博弈　出處：《生態(tài)環(huán)境學(xué)報(bào)》2017年11期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：可持續(xù)建筑是當(dāng)今社會(huì)長(zhǎng)盛不衰的話題,其中耗能量較高的公共建筑成為建筑業(yè)節(jié)能減排重點(diǎn)之一,而有效降低公建能耗的關(guān)鍵在于運(yùn)行階段節(jié)能。在政府出臺(tái)文件強(qiáng)制降低能耗收效欠佳的情況下,作者認(rèn)為應(yīng)將市場(chǎng)機(jī)制引入到公共建筑能耗控制過程中。文章將碳排放交易與公共建筑運(yùn)行節(jié)能相結(jié)合,在前人論證建筑領(lǐng)域碳排放交易機(jī)制框架可行性的基礎(chǔ)上,采用進(jìn)化博弈理論分析如何激勵(lì)公共建筑業(yè)主加入碳排放交易。建立包含政府、公建業(yè)主、交易機(jī)構(gòu)、核查機(jī)構(gòu)、中介機(jī)構(gòu)的公共建筑領(lǐng)域碳排放交易主體關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò),以政府{管制,不管制}、公建業(yè)主{參與交易,不參與交易}為策略建立進(jìn)化博弈收益矩陣。由于單獨(dú)考慮業(yè)主或政府的進(jìn)化穩(wěn)定策略無法得出混合決策系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定策略,分4種情況對(duì)業(yè)主-政府混合決策系統(tǒng)的進(jìn)化穩(wěn)定策略進(jìn)行討論,并得出(0,0)、(0,1)、(1,0)3種穩(wěn)定策略。模型結(jié)果表明:減小碳排放交易成本、增加采用節(jié)能技術(shù)或者其他節(jié)能減排措施帶來的節(jié)能收益、增加參與碳排放交易能夠獲得的環(huán)境效益、對(duì)違規(guī)者排放者加大經(jīng)濟(jì)懲罰力度、增加對(duì)積極參與碳排放交易的公共建筑業(yè)主的優(yōu)惠或獎(jiǎng)勵(lì),是促進(jìn)公共建筑領(lǐng)域碳排放交易市場(chǎng)有效運(yùn)行的途徑。最后,建立了公共建筑領(lǐng)域碳排放交易的整體流程,并對(duì)業(yè)主履約流程做出詳細(xì)設(shè)計(jì)。
[Abstract]:Sustainable building is a popular topic in today's society, among which the public building with high energy consumption has become one of the key points of energy conservation and emission reduction in the construction industry. And the key to reduce the public building energy consumption effectively lies in the operation phase of energy saving. In the case of the government issued documents to force the reduction of energy efficiency is not good. The author thinks that the market mechanism should be introduced into the process of energy consumption control of public buildings. On the basis of the previous demonstration of the feasibility of carbon emissions trading mechanism framework in the field of construction, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze how to encourage public building owners to join in carbon emissions trading. Trading agencies, verification agencies, intermediary agencies in the field of public building carbon emissions trading principal relationship network, to government {regulation, regardless of system}, public building owners {participate in the transaction. The income matrix of evolutionary game is established for the strategy without participating in the transaction. The stability strategy of mixed decision system can not be obtained because the evolutionary stability strategy of the owner or government is considered alone. In this paper, the evolutionary stability strategy of the owner-government mixed decision system is discussed in four cases, and the conclusion is drawn that there is no difference in the evolution stability of the mixed decision-making system between the owner and the government. The model results show that reducing the cost of carbon emissions trading and increasing the energy saving benefits from the use of energy-saving technology or other energy-saving measures. Increase the environmental benefits of participating in carbon emissions trading, increase financial penalties for violators, and increase incentives or incentives for owners of public buildings who actively participate in carbon emissions trading. It is the way to promote the effective operation of the carbon emissions trading market in the public building field. Finally, the overall process of carbon emissions trading in the public building field is established, and the detailed design of the owners' performance process is made.
【作者單位】： 西安建筑科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;西安中鐵京泰房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)有限公司;
【基金】：陜西省面向“十三五”重大理論與現(xiàn)實(shí)問題研究項(xiàng)目(2016ZDA04)
【分類號(hào)】：F426.92;X196
【正文快照】： 引用格式:劉曉君,郭曉彤,張雨晴.2017.進(jìn)化博弈視角下中國(guó)公共建筑碳排放交易運(yùn)行機(jī)制研究[J].生態(tài)環(huán)境學(xué)報(bào),26(11):1904-1915.LIU Xiaojun,GUO Xiaotong,ZHANG Yuqing.2017.Trade mechanism of carbon emission of chinese public buildings under theperspective of evoluti，

本文編號(hào)：1483550