本文選題：PPP項目 + 利益相關(guān)者��； 參考：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來，我國社會經(jīng)濟處于快速發(fā)展時期，公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和公共服務(wù)項目建設(shè)對推進經(jīng)濟發(fā)展，促進社會進步發(fā)揮著至關(guān)重要的作用。為了緩解政府在公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目上財政壓力，引入私營資本實現(xiàn)投資主體的多元化，PPP（Public-Private Partnerships）模式扮演著重要的角色，而PPP項目也逐步在我國廣泛應(yīng)用。PPP項目中，，由公共部門、私營部門合作形成的動態(tài)聯(lián)盟收益分配無論在理論研究上、還是項目實踐運作中，都是核心問題。本文在合作博弈理論指導(dǎo)下，以Shapley值法為基礎(chǔ)構(gòu)建了PPP項目核心利益相關(guān)者收益分配方案模型，激勵雙方更好的為合作聯(lián)盟服務(wù)，豐富了PPP項目收益分配的理論方法研究，也為PPP項目收益分配實踐提供了參考，具有較好的理論意義和實踐意義。 本文首先通過PPP模式發(fā)展實踐總結(jié)及文獻研究提出本文研究的PPP項目收益分配問題，此后深刻剖析了PPP模式的本質(zhì)及優(yōu)勢，并在利益相關(guān)者理論指導(dǎo)下研究分析了PPP項目的利益相關(guān)者及其利益訴求，然后在論證可行性的基礎(chǔ)上建立了基于Shapley值理論的PPP項目核心利益相關(guān)者收益分配方案模型，然后通過對該方案的評價分析，提出通過風(fēng)險因子修正完善該收益分配方案的新問題。最后在綜合分析PPP項目核心利益相關(guān)者風(fēng)險分擔(dān)的基礎(chǔ)上，研究建立了基于風(fēng)險因子修正的Shapley值收益分配方案模型，并進行了相關(guān)案例分析，驗證結(jié)果表明修正的收益分配方案更能體現(xiàn)分配的公平性和激勵項目的效率性，從而使項目聯(lián)盟得以更好的運作，促進社會經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China's social economy is in a period of rapid development. The construction of public infrastructure and public service projects plays a vital role in promoting economic development and promoting social progress. In order to alleviate the financial pressure on public infrastructure projects by the government, it is very important to introduce private capital to realize the diversification of investment main body (PPPU Public-Private Partnership) model, and the PPP project is also widely used in our country gradually by the public sector. The distribution of benefits of dynamic alliance formed by private sector cooperation is the core issue in both theoretical research and project practice. Under the guidance of cooperative game theory, based on Shapley value method, this paper constructs a model of income distribution for core stakeholders of PPP project, which motivates both parties to better serve the cooperative alliance, and enriches the theoretical and methodological research of PPP project income distribution. It also provides a reference for the practice of PPP project income distribution, which has good theoretical and practical significance. Firstly, through the PPP model development practice summary and literature research, this paper puts forward the PPP project income distribution problem. After that, the essence and advantages of PPP model are deeply analyzed, and the stakeholders of PPP project and their interest demands are analyzed under the guidance of stakeholder theory. Then, on the basis of demonstrating the feasibility, the model of PPP project core stakeholder income distribution scheme based on Shapley value theory is established, and then through the evaluation and analysis of the scheme, This paper puts forward a new problem of perfecting the income distribution scheme by modifying the risk factor. Finally, on the basis of comprehensive analysis of risk sharing among core stakeholders of PPP project, the Shapley profit distribution model based on risk factor correction is established, and the relevant cases are analyzed. The results show that the revised income distribution scheme can better reflect the fairness of distribution and the efficiency of incentive projects, so that the project alliance can operate better and promote the development of social economy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F283

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本文編號：1995157