本文選題：地方官員來源去向 + 政治晉升　； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國地方官員的政治晉升主要由中央政府按照國家干部人事管理制度決定,由于目前其以經(jīng)濟(jì)績效為主要的考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn),因此地方官員需要推動(dòng)轄區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長在速度競爭中名列前茅以獲得政治晉升。 地方官員可以通過增加財(cái)政支出對(duì)于固定資產(chǎn)及其相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè)建設(shè)的投入從供給以及需求兩個(gè)方面拉動(dòng)轄區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)現(xiàn)快速增長：短期內(nèi)固定資產(chǎn)投資通過向社會(huì)擴(kuò)大的再生產(chǎn)過程投入新的生產(chǎn)要素增加其生產(chǎn)資料供給,從供給方面拉動(dòng)當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì)增長；由于固定資產(chǎn)投資主要投向的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施及其相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè)建設(shè)可以直接拉動(dòng)社會(huì)總需求,但是其乘數(shù)效應(yīng)需要經(jīng)過時(shí)間積累后才能發(fā)揮作用,因此長期內(nèi)從需求方面拉動(dòng)當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì)增長。 本文對(duì)于不同來源去向的地方官員影響轄區(qū)固定資產(chǎn)投資情況的假設(shè)如下：通過內(nèi)部晉升出任與通過其他來源出任的地方官員相比,在任職初期階段進(jìn)行固定資產(chǎn)投資以拉動(dòng)轄區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的動(dòng)力較強(qiáng)；離任后升職與離任后降職的地方官員相比,受到以往轄區(qū)人員請(qǐng)求其支持經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)的可能較大,因此其對(duì)于以往轄區(qū)提供財(cái)政以及政策支持的可能也較大。 由于固定資產(chǎn)及其相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè)的建設(shè)需要經(jīng)過時(shí)間積累,因此本文對(duì)于固定資產(chǎn)投資及其影響因素的數(shù)據(jù)做了滯后1期以及2期的處理。本文通過Eviews計(jì)量軟件對(duì)于2006—2010年間全國31個(gè)省自治區(qū)直轄市省委書記以及省長來源去向與轄區(qū)固定資產(chǎn)投資及其影響因素情況的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行回歸后獲得的定量分析結(jié)果表明：東部地區(qū)離任后升職的省長對(duì)于轄區(qū)固定資產(chǎn)投資產(chǎn)生滯后2期的顯著正向影響。
[Abstract]:The political promotion of local officials in China is mainly determined by the central government in accordance with the personnel management system of the state cadres. Because of its current economic performance as the main assessment standard, local officials need to push the economic growth in the area to get the best political promotion in the speed competition.
Local officials can increase the economic growth from two aspects of supply and demand by increasing the investment of financial expenditure on the construction of fixed assets and related industries from supply and demand. In the short term, fixed assets investment will increase the supply of production data by investing new production factors into the process of reproduction to the social expansion, from the supply side. The growth of local economy is stimulated; the infrastructure and related industries that are mainly invested in fixed assets investment can directly stimulate the total social demand, but the multiplier effect needs time accumulation to play a role, so the local economic growth will be driven from demand for a long time.
In this paper, the assumption that the local officials of different sources affect the fixed assets investment in the jurisdiction is as follows: compared with the local officials who have been appointed by other sources, it is stronger to carry on the investment of fixed assets in the initial stage in order to stimulate the economic growth of the area. Local officials are likely to be more likely to support economic construction by the people of the past, so they are likely to provide financial and policy support for the past.
Since the construction of fixed assets and related industries needs to be accumulated through time, the data of fixed assets investment and its influencing factors are delayed 1 and 2 periods. This paper is based on Eviews software for the provincial Party committee secretary and provincial governor of 31 provinces and autonomous regions in the period from 2006 to 2010. The quantitative analysis results obtained by the panel data of fixed assets investment and its influencing factors show that the governor of the eastern region after leaving office has a significant positive effect on the 2 period of lagging behind the fixed assets investment in the area.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D630;F283

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