本文選題：機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)　切入點(diǎn)：代理人與保險(xiǎn)人　出處：《廣西大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自20世紀(jì)80代中國(guó)保險(xiǎn)業(yè)復(fù)業(yè)以來,保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)得到了快速而有效的發(fā)展,據(jù)權(quán)威機(jī)構(gòu)統(tǒng)計(jì)保費(fèi)收入以每年30%的速度增長(zhǎng),機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)作為保險(xiǎn)的重要組成部分,其占保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)的比例越來越大,到2013年底機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)占財(cái)險(xiǎn)總額的比例達(dá)到70%以上。然而伴隨著機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,很多嚴(yán)峻的問題也隨之出現(xiàn),根據(jù)保監(jiān)會(huì)的一些數(shù)據(jù)顯示,機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)存在著嚴(yán)重的保險(xiǎn)欺詐現(xiàn)象,我國(guó)的保險(xiǎn)欺詐金額占保險(xiǎn)賠付總額的比例超過20%。這種欺詐行為不僅影響保險(xiǎn)公司的利益,同樣也影響投保人和受益人的利益。如今的保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)由于保險(xiǎn)代理人和保險(xiǎn)人之間信息存在嚴(yán)重的不對(duì)稱,加之保險(xiǎn)公司又沒有良好且有效的保險(xiǎn)代理人激勵(lì)機(jī)制,導(dǎo)致我國(guó)機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重的混亂,保險(xiǎn)代理人和保險(xiǎn)人之間的欺詐行為就是其中最典型的現(xiàn)象之一,這種行為嚴(yán)重的影響了機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)的穩(wěn)定和發(fā)展。鑒于此,本文將機(jī)動(dòng)車保險(xiǎn)代理人與保險(xiǎn)人之間的欺詐博弈作為研究對(duì)象。 本文首先從我國(guó)機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)的實(shí)際出發(fā),分析機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)的特點(diǎn)及我國(guó)機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)中代理人和保險(xiǎn)人之間的欺詐形式,欺詐動(dòng)機(jī),以及欺詐所造成的危害。再結(jié)合相關(guān)博弈論的知識(shí)和方法,通過對(duì)博弈假設(shè)條件的分析,建立相關(guān)的博弈模型,最后對(duì)博弈模型的分析,得出保險(xiǎn)代理人和保險(xiǎn)人博弈均衡結(jié)果,依據(jù)博弈模型的結(jié)果提出反欺詐的博弈策略。最后根據(jù)反欺詐的博弈策略進(jìn)一步研究出保險(xiǎn)人對(duì)保險(xiǎn)代理人的有效而合理的約束和激勵(lì)機(jī)制。希望能為機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)上代理人和保險(xiǎn)人提供一些參考性的意見,從而保障機(jī)動(dòng)車輛保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)的健康穩(wěn)定的運(yùn)行。
[Abstract]:Since the resumption of insurance industry in the 20th century, the insurance industry has developed rapidly and effectively. According to the statistics of authoritative organizations, the premium income increases by 30% per year, and motor vehicle insurance is an important part of insurance.By the end of 2013, motor vehicle insurance accounted for more than 70 percent of the total insurance coverage.However, with the development of motor vehicle insurance market and economy, many serious problems also appear. According to some data of CIRC, there is serious insurance fraud in motor vehicle insurance market.The insurance fraud amount in our country accounts for more than 20% of the total insurance indemnity.This fraud not only affects the interests of insurance companies, but also affects the interests of policyholders and beneficiaries.Due to the serious asymmetry of information between insurance agents and insurers and the lack of a good and effective incentive mechanism for insurance agents in the insurance market today, there is a serious confusion in the motor vehicle insurance market in China.The fraud between insurance agents and insurers is one of the most typical phenomena, which seriously affects the stability and development of the motor vehicle insurance market.In view of this, this paper regards the fraud game between the motor vehicle insurance agent and the insurer as the research object.This paper first analyzes the characteristics of motor vehicle insurance and the form of fraud between agents and insurers in China's motor vehicle insurance market, the motive of fraud, and the harm caused by fraud.Combined with the knowledge and methods of game theory, through the analysis of the hypothetical conditions of the game, the relevant game model is established. Finally, the game model is analyzed, and the equilibrium result of insurance agent and insurer game is obtained.According to the result of game model, the game strategy of anti-fraud is put forward.Finally, according to the game strategy of anti-fraud, the effective and reasonable restraint and incentive mechanism of insurer to insurance agent is further studied.It is hoped that it can provide some reference advice for the agents and insurers in the motor vehicle insurance market so as to ensure the healthy and stable operation of the motor vehicle insurance market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F842.4;F224.32

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本文編號(hào)：1727501