本文選題：過(guò)度投資　切入點(diǎn)：經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值　出處：《湘潭大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：企業(yè)的投資行為與效率問(wèn)題一直是學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)，它與企業(yè)管理層的業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)方式息息相關(guān)，良好的業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)方式可以影響及提高企業(yè)的投資效率。近年來(lái)，市場(chǎng)上掀起了一股投資熱潮，，卻因?yàn)椴糠制髽I(yè)不顧發(fā)展規(guī)律盲目擴(kuò)大投資而導(dǎo)致了眾多過(guò)度投資行為。宏觀(guān)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，在中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)的固定資產(chǎn)投資在保持較高水平的同時(shí)，其投資效率卻比較低下。2010年，國(guó)務(wù)院國(guó)資委開(kāi)始全面推行衡量企業(yè)價(jià)值創(chuàng)造能力的央企負(fù)責(zé)人EVA績(jī)效考核體系，經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值（EVA）成為央企負(fù)責(zé)人績(jī)效考核的核心指標(biāo)。到目前為止，EVA績(jī)效考核體系已經(jīng)推行了三年多時(shí)間。EVA績(jī)效考核體系的實(shí)施效果如何，是否符合中央企業(yè)有效地抑制過(guò)度投資的預(yù)期，或者它還能作哪些方面的改進(jìn)，這將是本文探討的問(wèn)題。 論文以央企上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了EVA績(jī)效考核體系推行的效果，并檢驗(yàn)了行業(yè)因素差異對(duì)EVA的實(shí)施效果是否存在某些影響。在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，本文將EVA績(jī)效考核體系推行前兩年的央企上市公司相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)與推行后三年的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行對(duì)比，即用2008-2012年的數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)檢驗(yàn)了EVA績(jī)效考核政策對(duì)過(guò)度投資的影響大小，同時(shí)還將過(guò)度投資樣本分為制造業(yè)組和非制造業(yè)組分別進(jìn)行回歸，對(duì)比考察了行業(yè)類(lèi)別因素對(duì)兩者關(guān)系的影響程度。研究結(jié)果顯示，從整體上來(lái)看，EVA績(jī)效考核體系有效的抑制了央企上市公司過(guò)度投資行為。這從數(shù)據(jù)上支持了國(guó)資委推行EVA業(yè)績(jī)考核政策的成效，也給EVA的進(jìn)一步推廣應(yīng)用增強(qiáng)了信心。與此同時(shí)，EVA績(jī)效考核政策對(duì)非制造業(yè)央企上市公司的影響顯著強(qiáng)于其對(duì)制造業(yè)的央企上市公司的影響，這表明，行業(yè)類(lèi)別因素也影響了EVA績(jī)效考核政策對(duì)企業(yè)過(guò)度投資行為的效用發(fā)揮。
[Abstract]:The investment behavior and efficiency of enterprises have always been the focus of academic attention, it is closely related to the performance evaluation of enterprise management, good performance evaluation can affect and improve the investment efficiency of enterprises in recent years. There is an investment boom in the market, but because some enterprises blindly expand their investment in disregard of the law of development, it has led to a lot of overinvestment. Macro data show that while the fixed asset investment of Chinese state-owned enterprises is maintaining a high level, In 2010, the SASAC of the State Council began to fully implement the EVA performance appraisal system, which measures the ability of enterprises to create value. Economic value added (EVA) has become the core indicator of the performance appraisal of the responsible persons in central enterprises. So far, the EVA performance appraisal system has been implemented for more than three years. What is the effect of the implementation of the EVA performance appraisal system? Whether it is in line with the expectations of central enterprises to effectively curb excessive investment, or what improvements it can make, will be discussed in this paper. Taking the data of the listed companies of central enterprises as the research sample, this paper empirically tests the effect of the implementation of the EVA performance appraisal system, and examines whether there is some influence on the implementation effect of EVA by the differences of industry factors. This paper compares the relevant data of the EVA performance appraisal system between the two years before the implementation of the performance appraisal system and the data of the three years after the implementation, that is, using the data from 2008 to 2012 to test the impact of the EVA performance appraisal policy on the over-investment. At the same time, the samples of overinvestment were divided into manufacturing group and non-manufacturing group for regression analysis, and the influence of industry category factors on the relationship between them was compared. On the whole, the EVA performance appraisal system effectively restrains the over-investment behavior of the listed companies in central enterprises. This data supports the effectiveness of the SASAC's implementation of the EVA performance appraisal policy. At the same time, the impact of the EVA performance appraisal policy on the listed companies of non-manufacturing enterprises is significantly stronger than that on the listed companies of the manufacturing enterprises, which indicates that, Industry category factors also affect the effectiveness of EVA performance appraisal policy on overinvestment behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F224

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