本文選題：零售商主導(dǎo)　切入點(diǎn)：制造商　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：渠道是制造商順利將產(chǎn)品送往消費(fèi)者手中的必經(jīng)之路，是產(chǎn)品流通的載體，，同時(shí)也是制造商利益產(chǎn)生的途徑，離開渠道，也就斷了制造商利益的來(lái)源，因此渠道選擇對(duì)制造商尤為重要。在較多已有的關(guān)于制造商渠道選擇研究的文獻(xiàn)中，普遍考慮以生產(chǎn)為主的市場(chǎng)為研究背景，即制造商主導(dǎo)市場(chǎng)。然而在激烈的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下，零售商主導(dǎo)供應(yīng)鏈已逐步形成，零售商強(qiáng)勁勢(shì)力侵蝕制造商的利潤(rùn)，威脅部分制造商的生存，引起制造商關(guān)注渠道的公平性。此外，隨著B2C電子商務(wù)和物流運(yùn)輸業(yè)的蓬勃發(fā)展，為零售商欺壓下的制造商提供了更多渠道選擇的空間。為了避免傳統(tǒng)渠道策略中強(qiáng)勢(shì)零售商帶來(lái)的損失，制造商在渠道管理方面該采取怎樣的行動(dòng)，如何選擇渠道策略，選擇的依據(jù)又是什么，公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)其渠道策略有怎樣的影響？這已成為渠道管理研究中亟待解決的問題，也是本文將要討論的核心問題。 本文在分析和總結(jié)了大量國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于渠道理論研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上，構(gòu)建了一個(gè)由單個(gè)制造商和單個(gè)零售商組成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)，并以零售商主導(dǎo)下單一傳統(tǒng)零售渠道模型為基本模型，考慮零售商主導(dǎo)作用，零售商是博弈過程的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，而制造商是跟隨者。基本模型模擬了銷售渠道體系的需求、成本及利潤(rùn)，并對(duì)強(qiáng)勢(shì)零售商主導(dǎo)的決策過程進(jìn)行均衡分析和定量研究，分別探討了分散決策和集中決策下供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)決策。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)存在雙重邊際效應(yīng)，若對(duì)渠道成員行為及關(guān)系進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)，有利于提高供應(yīng)鏈整體收益。 在此基礎(chǔ)上，在第四章中將單一渠道擴(kuò)展到雙渠道，建立混合雙渠道和零售雙渠道的數(shù)學(xué)模型，并進(jìn)行比較分析，探討零售商主導(dǎo)下制造商的渠道選擇策略。通過比較分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：三種渠道策略并不存在某一渠道占絕對(duì)的優(yōu)勢(shì)，但混合雙渠道策略能夠挖潛市場(chǎng)潛在的需求，且有利于提高消費(fèi)者效應(yīng)。第五章在第三、四章研究的基礎(chǔ)上考慮制造商關(guān)注渠道公平性，在三種渠道策略模型中引入公平關(guān)切強(qiáng)度系數(shù)，探索公平關(guān)切下制造商的渠道選擇策略，并通過算例分析研究公平關(guān)切對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效的影響關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：制造商對(duì)渠道的公平關(guān)切是影響渠道利潤(rùn)分配的重要因素，也是制造商抵抗強(qiáng)勢(shì)零售商的有效手段，且當(dāng)消費(fèi)者對(duì)電子渠道偏好程度較大時(shí)，制造商選擇混合雙渠道策略并采取公平關(guān)切行為能有效提高制造商自身效用，也對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈整體效用增加發(fā)揮作用。
[Abstract]:The channel is the only way for the manufacturer to smoothly send the product to the consumer, is the carrier of the product circulation, and is also the way for the manufacturer to generate benefits. Leaving the channel, the source of the manufacturer's interest will be cut off. Therefore, channel selection is particularly important for manufacturers. In many existing literatures on manufacturers' channel selection, the production-oriented market is generally considered as the research background, that is, the manufacturer dominates the market. However, under the fierce market competition, Retailers' dominant supply chain has gradually formed. The strong influence of retailers has eroded the profits of manufacturers, threatened the survival of some manufacturers, and aroused manufacturers' concern about the fairness of channels. In addition, with the booming development of B2C e-commerce and logistics transportation, In order to avoid the loss caused by the strong retailer in the traditional channel strategy, what action should the manufacturer take in the channel management and how to choose the channel strategy? What is the basis for selection and how does fair concern affect its channel strategy? This has become an urgent problem in the research of channel management, and is also the core problem to be discussed in this paper. On the basis of analyzing and summarizing a large number of domestic and foreign research achievements on channel theory, this paper constructs a two-stage supply chain system composed of single manufacturer and single retailer. Taking the single traditional retail channel model led by retailers as the basic model, considering the retailer's leading role, the retailer is the leader of the game process, and the manufacturer is the follower. The basic model simulates the demand of the sales channel system. Cost and profit, as well as the equilibrium analysis and quantitative study of the decision-making process led by strong retailers, respectively, discuss the optimal decision of supply chain under decentralized and centralized decision-making, and find that there are double marginal effects. If we coordinate the behavior and relationship of channel members, it will help to improve the overall revenue of supply chain. On this basis, in chapter 4th, the single channel is extended to the double channel, and the mathematical model of the mixed dual channel and the retail dual channel is established, and the comparative analysis is carried out. Through the comparative analysis, it is found that the three channel strategies do not have an absolute advantage in one channel, but the mixed dual channel strategy can tap the potential demand of the market. In Chapter 5th, based on the third and fourth chapters, the manufacturer is concerned about the fairness of the channel, and the intensity coefficient of fair concern is introduced into the three channel strategy models. This paper explores the channel selection strategies of manufacturers under fair concerns, and studies the impact of equity concerns on supply chain performance through a case study. The results show that the manufacturer's concern for channel equity is an important factor affecting the distribution of channel profits. It is also an effective means for manufacturers to resist strong retailers, and when consumers have a greater preference for electronic channels, manufacturers choose a mixed dual channel strategy and adopt fair concern behavior can effectively improve the effectiveness of manufacturers themselves. It also plays a role in increasing the overall utility of the supply chain.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F713.32;F274;F224

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